"...La visite, début mars, de la secrétaire d'Etat, Hillary Clinton, dans la capitale turque, et la récente tournée de deux jours du président Barack Obama, qualifiée de succès par tous les commentateurs, ont mis en lumière le rôle central qu'Ankara peut jouer dans la nouvelle politique régionale américaine. Missions de bons offices avec l'Iran, Israël et la Syrie, la Géorgie ; rencontres tripartites avec les chefs d'Etat afghan et pakistanais : les Turcs, après les années de tensions liées à l'administration Bush, avancent sur la scène internationale munis d'un feu vert des Américains. Surtout, l'allié de l'OTAN pourrait être appelé à jouer une plus grande partition en Irak et en Afghanistan. "Des enjeux pour lesquels nous partageons des objectifs communs", assure-t-on à l'ambassade américaine à Ankara....Deux théâtres d'opération où "Incirlik continuera de jouer un rôle important", ajoute, d'une formule elliptique, la source américaine, avant de lâcher : "Rien que pour l'Irak, cette base reste vitale pour nos opérations...., le président George Bush accepte de fournir des informations en temps réel sur la localisation des rebelles kurdes du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK) obtenue grâce aux vols de surveillance dans le nord de l'Irak....Pour l'heure, 50 % des avions cargos militaires destinés à l'Irak passent par Incirlik. Chaque jour, six à huit imposants C-17 décollent des longues pistes de la base. Deux d'entre eux partent pour l'Afghanistan, selon les chiffres avancés par le colonel McDaniel. "C'est un peu moins pour l'Irak qu'il y a quelque temps, glisse-t-il, et un peu plus pour le terrain afghan." Comme en écho d'une tendance qui s'annonce."
Monday, May 4, 2009
La base turque d'Incirlik, enjeu stratégique américain
Le Monde, here
Addressing U.S., Hamas Says It Has Grounded Its Rockets to Israel
NYTimes, here
“I promise the American administration and the international community that we will be part of the solution, period,” the leader, Khaled Meshal, said during a five-hour interview with The New York Times spread over two days in his home office here in the Syrian capital..."
Iran Denies Dennis Ross Planning a Visit ....(Denials of this type frequently mean the opposite?)
"...Iran has dismissed reports claiming that Washington's point man on Tehran will be dispatched to Iran to meet with the country's officials.
"A report published by Ria Novosti on a potential visit to Iran by the US State Department's special advisor for the Persian Gulf Dennis Ross lacks credibility," spokesman for the Iranian embassy in Moscow said on Monday.The report started circulating after Ross traveled to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and other Persian Gulf littoral states on April 28 to address regional concerns about the new US administration's strategy toward Iran.The RIA Novosti report also claimed that Ross was to be accompanied by NSC Senior Director Puneet Talwar and CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. John Allen in his Iran visit..."
Via TWN, here
Steve Clemons: "I have no further information, other than the world on the street in Doha, but it seems to me that denials from the Iranian press mean that something is afoot and we may be tilting towards Ross and others on the Obama team heading over..."
Damascus, trying to determine how Lebanese troops killer managed to enter Syria
AFP, here
"Hussein Jaafar is being questioned by Syrian authorities who informed us that they will hand him over once they finish interrogating him," the official told AFP, on condition of anonymity. He said Damascus was trying to determine how Jaafar managed to enter Syria with a fake Syrian ID. The suspect had been arrested in Turkey which sent him back to Syrian officials. .."
Mullen's "comfortable about the current security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons..."
AP, here
"I know what we've done over the last three years, specifically, to both invest, assist (Pakistan), and I've watched them improve their security fairly dramatically over the last three years," Mullen said.
Fears that Zardari's government could crumble have tempered but officials said extremist infiltration of the military and intelligence services could compromise the safety of nuclear weapons....
Mullen, meanwhile, cautioned that he remained "gravely concerned" about the Pakistan military's ability to sustain operations inside Pakistan and in the border areas.
"The consequences of their success directly threaten our national interests in the region and our safety here at home," Mullen said...'
What is Moqtada al-Sadr doing in Turkey?
"......What's he up to?According to Turkish reports, Sadr met with Prime Minister Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, along with other Turkish officials.No official statement was released from the meetings with Turkish officials. Al-Zaman reports that an unidentified Turkish official said that they discussed the security situation in Iraq and the evolving Turkish-Iranian relationship. A leading Sadrist said that Sadr went to Turkey from Tehran to follow up on conversations between Turkish officials and Sadrists in Najaf about the future of Iraq (which according to al-Zaman is the first official admission by the Sadrists that he has been in Iran).
Perhaps as important, Sadr also reportedly met with a large number of Sadrist officials and personalities as well as a delegation of top leaders who came up from Iraq. He reportedly laid out the political strategy for the movement in the new era. The assembled Sadrists took the opportunity to discuss political strategies and coalitions for the coming election period in light of the failure of the Shia United Iraqi Alliance. Sadr reportedly spoke of "continued resistance" to occupation, promising not to use weapons against Iraqi soldiers but to continue all forms of resistance. His spokesman also said that he promised to return soon to Iraq....
What does his public appearance portend for the role of the Sadrists in Iraqi politics in the coming period? Is this a bid for prominence in the upcoming national elections? How would a Sadrist political revival affect the escalating tension between Maliki and his Shia rivals such as ISCI? Or is this about security, whether the U.S. withdrawal plan or the recent uptick in attacks on Shia targets? Does Sadr's choice of Turkey as the place to re-emerge send any message about the movement's approach to the ever-hotter Kurdish issue? ..."
"The Pharaoh Strikes Back: Egypt vs. Hezbollah"
Schenker (funny) aggrandizes Mubarak as Egypt's Pharaoh and sounds as sincere as Geagea' talking about the Greatness of Islam! WINEP, here
"Anyone who has watched an Arab summit knows that the Middle East is racked with divisions. The highlight reel from the March 2009 Doha summit leads with a lengthy ad hominem attack by Libya's leader Muammar Qaddafi against Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, so severe that the Qatari hosts cut the audio feed midstream.But the fissures run much deeper than personal animosity. The Arab world is embroiled in a cold war, pitting Iranian allies Syria, Qatar, Hezbollah, and Hamas against "moderate" pro-West states like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. The battle-between competing regional visions of moqawama(resistance) and development and coexistence-has been joined in Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq.
Washington has a clear interest in seeing its allies prevail in this contest and reversing the regional trend toward moqawama being driven by Iran. Slowing Tehran's momentum has proven difficult, however, at least in part because Washington's leading Arab ally, Egypt, has seen its regional influence decline. Tehran has capitalized on Cairo's diminished leadership role, asserting itself in Arab politics. The virtual absence of Egypt as a bulwark against Tehran's militancy has complicated Washington's efforts to promote moderation and check Iran's march toward a nuclear weapon.
But recent developments suggest that Egypt may finally be taking steps to reestablish itself as a counterweight to a resurgent Tehran. ......
There is little doubt that the arrests enhance Egypt's security. But the round-up of the Hezbollah cell also benefits Egypt with Washington and strengthens Cairo's position in the region. Cairo is looking to improve relations with Washington, and it seems likely that the arrests will earn Egypt credit with the Obama White House.
At the same time, the move against Hezbollah may have been calculated to influence the electorate in Lebanon, where the pro-Western government faces a tight race against the Iranian-backed Hezbollah-led opposition in the June 7 elections. Indeed, Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki suggested that the government of Egypt had fabricated charges against Hezbollah cells expressly for this purpose.
One additional but perhaps unintended benefit for the Mubarak regime appears to have been the ill-advised response of the Islamist opposition to the arrests. The Muslim Brotherhood-which came out in support of Hezbollah's efforts to aid Hamas in Gaza despite the violation of Egyptian territorial sovereignty-seems to have misjudged popular sentiment.
The incarceration of Hezbollah operatives by Egypt comes at a critical time, just as the Obama administration is embarking on a controversial policy of diplomatic engagement with Tehran. In the Middle East, Washington's Arab allies are watching closely, concerned that the new president may choose accommodation over confrontation with Tehran. Although it would constitute an unlikely change in U.S. policy, the prospect that Washington may be prepared to live with a nuclear Iran is not a development that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other moderate Arab states would welcome, to say the least.
Egypt's going public against Hezbollah was a sign that Cairo at least has drawn a red line for Iran. With a little luck, should Egypt persist in its willingness to confront Tehran, it could encourage Washington's other regional allies to step up, facilitating international efforts to prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon.
For Washington, Cairo's combativeness is good news that should be encouraged with concrete steps to support Egyptian efforts to counter further Iranian infiltration and subversion. Mubarak's visit to Washington later this month will be a good opportunity to explore how best to pursue this coincidence of interest....."
As the U.S. Retreats, Iran Fills the Void
Neocon Amir Taheri, in the WSJ, here
"Convinced that the Obama administration is preparing to retreat from the Middle East, Iran's Khomeinist regime is intensifying its goal of regional domination. It has targeted six close allies of the U.S.: Egypt, Lebanon, Bahrain, Morocco, Kuwait and Jordan, all of which are experiencing economic and/or political crises.
Iranian strategists believe that Egypt is heading for a major crisis once President Hosni Mubarak, 81, departs from the political scene. He has failed to impose his eldest son Gamal as successor, while the military-security establishment, which traditionally chooses the president, is divided. ...
But in its campaign for regional hegemony, Tehran expects Lebanon as its first prize. Iran is spending massive amounts of cash on June's general election. It supports a coalition led by Hezbollah, and including the Christian ex-general Michel Aoun. Lebanon, now in the column of pro-U.S. countries, would shift to the pro-Iran column....
Iran-controlled groups have also been uncovered in Kuwait and Jordan. According to Kuwaiti media, more than 1,000 alleged Iranian agents were arrested and shipped back home last winter. According to the Tehran media, Kuwait is believed vulnerable because of chronic parliamentary disputes that have led to governmental paralysis.
As for Jordan, Iranian strategists believe the kingdom, where Palestinians are two-thirds of the population, is a colonial creation and should disappear from the map -- opening the way for a single state covering the whole of Palestine. Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have both described the division of Palestine as "a crime and a tragedy."
Arab states are especially concerned because Tehran has succeeded in transcending sectarian and ideological divides to create a coalition that includes Sunni movements such as Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, sections of the Muslim Brotherhood, and even Marxist-Leninist and other leftist outfits that share Iran's anti-Americanism....
Tehran plays a patient game. Wherever possible, it is determined to pursue its goals through open political means, including elections. With pro-American and other democratic groups disheartened by the perceived weakness of the Obama administration, Tehran hopes its allies will win all the elections planned for this year in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.
"There is this perception that the new U.S. administration is not interested in the democratization strategy," a senior Lebanese political leader told me. That perception only grows as President Obama calls for an "exit strategy" from Afghanistan and Iraq. Power abhors a vacuum, which the Islamic Republic of Iran is only too happy to fill."
Diplomatic 'leak': ".. to portray the French as pro-Israeli & neoconservative...on Iran"
"...Essentially, the memo, written by high-ranking French diplomat Gérard Araud, summarizes a conversation he had with the Treasury Department's point man on terrorism and financial intelligence, Stuart Levey, in which Levey lobbies Araud to pressure the Obama administration for a tougher stance, including stronger sanctions, towards Iran...This leak confirms the basic point underlying my argument, namely that the French line on Iran is a bit tougher than what the Obama administration is shooting for. But it also reveals the factional infighting on just what line to take, not only in Washington (Levey is a Bush administration holdover), but also in Paris. The French Foreign Ministry claims the document was leaked on purpose, in order to portray the French as pro-Israeli and borderline neoconservative. And while the French diplomatic corps is pretty disciplined, this isn't the first time I've come across evidence of discontent with the Sarkozy-Kouchner regime among the career diplomats.Meanwhile, U.S. diplomats have reportedly told their French counterparts that the U.S. will withhold sharing sensitive information on the Iranian nuclear dossier until the source of the leak is brought to light.This could be a tempest in a teapot. But it bears keeping an eye on."
Gates: "... fears among Gulf states may be based on "an exaggerated sense of what's possible"..'
In the NYTimes, here
"... U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates said on Sunday he would reassure Saudi Arabia this week that the kingdom would not suffer from Washington's efforts to improve its relations with Iran....
The policy, a shift from the stance of George W. Bush's administration, has stirred unease among Gulf allies of the United States, who fear they could lose out if Washington builds a better relationship with Tehran.
But Gates, who visits Egypt and Saudi Arabia this week, said U.S. allies had no cause for concern and promised Washington would be "tough-minded" with Tehran if its overtures were rebuffed.
"One important message will be, particularly for the Saudis, that any kind of outreach to Iran will not be at the expense of our long-term relationships with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states that have been our partners and friends for decades," he said. [...]
He said some fears among Gulf states may be based on "an exaggerated sense of what's possible" in relations between Washington and Tehran..."
Peres at AIPAC's: "Iran is not threatened by anybody."
Via Mondoweiss, here
"...AIPAC president David Victor punctuated Peres's speech with a charge to the AIPAC members about what they should be lobbying the Congress about starting tomorrow: the threat from Iran."This is a moment of danger... Too few people see the urgency. We must highlight to our leaders the true stark dimensions of the threat," Victor said. "We are the only constituency in America making this case."That sense of loneliness and focus pervades this room. The rest of America is talking about the economy and Pakistan and the two-state solution. During Peres's speech, two members of Code Pink, the antiwar group, were dragged from the convention center, crying out, "Stop the killing" and "The children of Gaza are people too."As for Iran, the message is that sanctions are good, but Obama has to back up sanctions with severe penalties, and as Jane Harman emphasized yesterday, leave the military option on the table. Petroleum imports are the "Achilles heel" of the Iranian economy, Victor said, and he said that actions against the central banking system of Iran would work, having a "crippling effect on Iran's economy."(I guess Iran is threatened by somebody...)Victor invoked the Holocaust analogy at the end of his speech. He described the fate of the USS St. Louis, the boat carrying 900 Holocaust refugees that was denied entry into the U.S. in June 1939, dooming many of those aboard. The White House and Congress were then indifferent, he said."The good people in this room will not be bystanders to this pivot moment in history," he concluded.
UNIFIL expects post-election changes
UPI, VIA Tehran Times, here
"...Gen. Claudio Graziano, commander of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, predicted challenges ahead for his peacekeeping efforts, the Lebanese Daily Star reports.“The situation in our area of operations remains somewhat volatile and the upcoming electoral period in Lebanon is likely to impact our operations,” Graziano said.UNIFIL operates largely in the south of Lebanon to implement cease-fire obligations with Israel and to ensure militants are honoring their commitments in the area as well.Timor Goksel, a former UN adviser, told the Star he was uncertain of any complications in the south as Hezbollah is not expected to face any significant challenges in the parliamentary elections, adding the Lebanese military has gained influence in the area. .."
The Hizbullah paradox
G Gambill in the JPOst, here
".....The conventional wisdom that Syria or Iran can be induced to solve the Hizbullah problem by fiat is also problematic. Coercing or persuading Damascus to cut off Hizbullah's arms supplies may gradually weaken the strategic threat posed by its arsenal, but it won't appreciably degrade the group's capacity to fend off the state and rival militias. Iran has a much more intimate relationship with Hizbullah, but its deeply unpopular clerical regime may not be politically capable of getting tough with the Shi'ite world's most admired public figure even if it were strategically disposed to do so (which it clearly isn't).........
Fortunately, there is no compelling reason for the Obama administration to roll the dice. The deployment of UN peacekeepers in south Lebanon after the 2006 war effectively sealed off Hizbullah's access to the battlefield, while the enormous destruction Israel rained upon Lebanon has rendered unprovoked cross-border attacks politically unthinkable. So long as Hizbullah is actively engaged in the political sphere (and periodically reminded of the apocalypse to follow any armed provocations against Israel), this nearly three-year state of non-belligerency could prove to be remarkably durable."
Sunday, May 3, 2009
"... We Tried to Get at Nasrallah..."
In a weekend interview with Channel Two, former IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz confirmed that Israel had attempted to kill Hizbullah chief terrorist Hassan Nasrallah. "We tried to get to him, but couldn't find him. I personally cannot accept that he is still free to shuttle between his bunker and his tunnels. There's no question that we would have had a great feeling if he had not survived the war, but there is no person who cannot be replaced," Halutz said.
Halutz also said that he saw "his" war in Lebanon as more successful than Operation Cast Lead. "I don't want to judge the effectiveness of Operation Cast Lead, but the fact that the rockets from Gaza continued to fall the very next day – as opposed to what happened in Lebanon – casts a question mark on whether we should have stopped the war at the point we did. Not one rocket has been fired at Israel by Hizbullah since the end of the Lebanon war," he said.
Israel Rejects Syria Peace Talks
Bloomberg, here
“Under the present circumstances I think it would be ill- advised,” for Israel to hold talks with Syria, Ayalon said. “We would like to have assurances that at the end of the day the Syrians will stop supporting terror and also, no less importantly, the very radical regime in Tehran.”
Iraq rules out extension of U.S. withdrawal dates
Reuters, here
"...Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said Iraq was committed to adhering to the withdrawal schedule in the pact, which took effect on January 1, including the requirement to withdraw U.S. combat troops from towns and cities by the end of June and a full withdrawal by the end of 2011..."
Belarus fronts Russian Iskander-M surface missile sale to Iran, Syria?
... says Debka-file, here"...Western military sources have reported in the past that Israel cannot afford to allow this high-performance hardware enter operational service in Iran and Syria, because it would dangerously destabilizing the Middle East arms balance. Nonetheless, confirmation of the sale has come from the horse's mouth: Thursday, April 30, Belarus president Alexander Lukashenko stated: "I would like to implement top-level agreements with the government of Tehran. We will sacredly fulfill our agreements with Iran President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and expect more activity in projects earmarked for joint implementation." Lukashenko did not specify what projects he had in mind, but military sources in Minsk and Moscow confirmed he was talking about the Iskanader-M transaction. And a short while after he spoke, the Russian news agency Ria Novosti which has a good rapport with Kremlin officials reported: "The swiftness of relation-building between the two states (Belarus and Iran) is an indication that President Lukashenko is selling the short-range missiles to Iran...".... military sources note that Moscow often uses Minsk for top-of-the-line arms sales which might embarrass Moscow diplomatically – especially in the case of two such weapons going to Syria as well as Iran...."
Al-Khaleej: "US's Ambassador return to Damascus. imminent"
"...According to Syrian sources, the U.S. will return its ambassador to Damascus before the end of May, and this will be resolved during the visit to Syria by Acting Assistant U.S. Secretary of State Jeffery Feltman and U.S. National Security Council official Daniel Shapiro. Also to be discussed during the visit are the developments in Iraq and Lebanon, the Middle East peace process, and U.S.-Syria relations. The sources added that Syria expects the U.S. to refrain from renewing the sanctions on Syria, or at least to reduce them.."
Saturday, May 2, 2009
Turkey won’t allow Israel to use Turkish airspace in attacking Iran... and would shoot IAF planes down ...
In Today's Zaman, here"...Speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, he said Turkey would never signal its willingness to accept such an air strike by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and would immediately shoot down any aircraft violating its own space en route to Iran, which he described as a neighbor and important trading partner. “Even tacit approval of such an operation would go against everything Turkey stands for and would throw the balance of power in the region into chaos,” he stressed...“I do not envision Israeli aircraft in Turkish airspace without permission,” stressed Lt. Col. Rick Francona, who is a retired US Air Force intelligence officer that had worked for the National Security Agency (NSA) and the CIA. Speaking to Today’s Zaman, military analyst Francona said, “I don’t think the Turks will allow it, especially since the December 2008-January 2009 Israeli attacks in Gaza.” “That operation has put a real strain on Turkey’s relations with Israel,” he noted....Turkey was furious at Israel in 2007 when Israeli warplanes attacked a target at Deir ez-Zor in northeast Syria, and exited Syrian airspace by traveling towards the Mediterranean via Turkey. After discovering that two Israeli fuel tanks had been dropped by the warplanes in Turkish territory, one near Gaziantep and the other near Antakya, Ankara demanded an explanation from Israel...."
"Israeli Empire: 49% Jews and 51% non-Jews"
Mondoweiss, here"According to the data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics and by the CIA, the Israeli government rules over 11.43 million people at this time. Of those, 5.6 million people are Jewish, while 5.83 million people are not Jewish (2.46 million Palestinians in the West Bank, 1.55 million Palestinians residing in the Gaza Strip, 1.5 million Palestinians who are citizens of the State of Israel, and another 0.32 million people characterized as “other non-Jews.”)Therefore, the accurate figures are in fact as follows: A total of 49% Jews and 51% non-Jews currently live across the territory of the Israeli empire. "
OxfAn: "Obama & the Israelis' capability to play a spoiler role on a range of US objectives in the Middle East"
OxfAn, via Gulf News
Analysis
There are numerous significant policy disagreements between newly installed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Barack Obama. They include:
US support for a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which Netanyahu regards sceptically and his foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, has openly derided;
Washington's interest in at least limited dialogue with Iran, while Netanyahu argues that Tehran must clearly abandon its nuclear ambitions or face a potential military strike;
Obama's request that Congress relax restrictions on dealing with a potential Palestinian government incorporating Hamas - an approach that Netanyahu rejects in favour of continued isolation of Hamas; and
White House support for the 2002 Arab Initiative for Arab-Israeli peace, which Netanyahu - like many Israelis - does not see as a change from the fundamental hostility Arabs have expressed towards Israel for over 60 years.
Nevertheless, the two leaders agree on one key priority: maintaining a strong US-Israeli relationship. Any politician seen as undermining that relationship, in either Washington or Israel, would risk retribution at the polls. This dynamic makes fundamentally shifting bilateral ties - and wider US policy towards the region - very difficult.
Washington and Tel Aviv are locked in a game of 'chicken', each challenging the other to risk the bilateral relationship in pursuit of its preferred regional priorities. The two sides have made conflicting policy assessments, but also have an imperative to patch-up (or at least manage) these differences:
1. White House strengths. Netanyahu seeks to manage this conflict when he presents the confrontation with Iran in existential terms. In doing so, he attracts considerable sympathy from both Israelis and many US citizens. However, Netanyahu is generally on shakier political ground than the White House. The Obama administration is more stable and unified than its Israeli counterpart, and the president enjoys more widespread domestic political support than the prime minister. Despite early concerns that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would seek to grandstand or otherwise overshadow her boss and former political rival, she has been a loyal and on-message articulator of the president's message. Netanyahu's foreign minister has not only drawn headlines for undiplomatic opinions expressed in the media, but he is also under criminal investigation for corruption.
2. Complex Obama agenda. Yet despite his better position, Obama is trying to manage a much more complex set of regional imperatives, ranging from Afghanistan and Pakistan, through Iran and Iraq, and into the Levant and beyond. In this context, progress on Arab-Israeli issues is not necessarily the highest priority, but it has the potential to undermine progress on all of the other fronts.
3. Israeli spoiler role? It would be a mistake for Obama to underestimate the Israelis' capability to play a spoiler role on a range of US objectives in the Middle East:
Israeli jets are capable of striking Iran on their own - radically altering the Middle East strategic landscape, despite US objections. While some in the Arab world would quietly applaud Israeli military action against Iran, the public outcry would likely be overwhelmingly negative. Should such an attack occur, it would fall to the United States to manage the regional consequences, which might include attacks against US interests and those of its Gulf allies for their supposed complicity in such a strike. In the final months of the administration of former president George Bush, senior US officials regularly went to Israel to urge former prime minister Ehud Olmert not to attack Iran; whether the Obama administration is capable of effectively restraining the Netanyahu government in this manner is less certain.
Netanyahu could also change the tenor of regional diplomacy through his actions towards the Palestinians. For example, a renewed offensive in Gaza, a high-profile assassination campaign against the Hamas leadership, or increased settlement building on the West Bank would all force the US government to choose between condoning Israeli actions (perhaps risking the wrath of the Arab world) or seeking to pressure Netanyahu to alter his tactics.
Obama may need to decide if, in managing relations with Israel, it is more important to persuade Netanyahu of his good intentions, or demonstrate to the prime minister that he is more politically powerful, secure and influential than the Israeli leader.
During their White House encounter next month, both leaders will seek to do two things:
Assess the seriousness and commitment of the other side to its own worldview.
Try to persuade their interlocutor that it is truly committed to its stated positions and unlikely to modify them.
The atmospherics leading up to the meeting are more mixed than is customary ahead of a US visit by an Israeli prime minister. The fact that the meeting has slid later into May and Obama was not available on some dates suggested by Netanyahu's office can be taken as signs of tension.
In addition, each side has engaged in extensive political positioning in the lead-up to the meeting:
The Obama administration made clear that it would inform Netanyahu of its new Iran strategy during the meeting, sending a signal that Israel would have to respond to a US strategy rather than shape it. Netanyahu responded by appearing to tie progress on Arab-Israeli diplomacy to satisfaction with US actions against Iran. (When King Abdullah of Jordan was in Washington last week, he hinted that Arab support against Iran was contingent on US success in spurring progress on Arab-Israeli issues.)
Meanwhile, Clinton strongly suggested last week that the United States might take a position toward Hamas that was similar to its position toward Hezbollah - that it would not have direct contacts with the group, but it would have contacts with a government that contained members of the group. The move not only reflected the Obama administration's general willingness to engage with differing viewpoints, but also the very strong view in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Arab world that progress on Palestinian issues is impossible unless some form of unity government is established between Fatah and Hamas. Some of Israel's supporters in the US Congress are gravely concerned by the move, and Netanyahu can be expected to weigh in against this approach to Hamas when he is in Washington in May.
Netanyahu's electoral victory has produced the chilliest US-Israeli relationship in a decade - since Netanyahu's first stint as prime minister, when former president Bill Clinton was trying to move the Oslo Process forward.
Conclusion: In Washington, Netanyahu is unlikely to reject US regional policy outright, or say 'no' to the president. Instead, he is more likely to emphasise caveats, confronting the Obama administration with a frustrating set of obstructions, delays and diversions.
This approach is intended to offer enough tactical concessions to keep the White House happy, while yielding no strategic concessions that Netanyahu deems a threat to Israeli security...'
Iranian helicopters attack Kurdish villages in Iraq ...
"...The border guard official said the area was not considered a stronghold of the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), an Iranian Kurdish separatist group that appeared to have been the target of the raid.The incident comes a week after reports of a clash between Iranian police officers and suspected PJAK fighters in the country's western province of Kermanshah.At least 10 policemen and 10 fighters were killed in the gun battle..."
"...officials say this is the most specific the U.S. has been about the size of Iran's assistance to Hezbollah..."
"Buried in Thursday's annual State Department report on terrorism trends, which we blogged about yesterday, is an interesting little nugget about Iran's relationship with Hezbollah, the Lebanese Sh'ite Muslim group on the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations.
In a section of the report here, the State Department says that Iran provided $200 million in funding for Hezbollah in 2008, and trained 3,000 of its fighters in camps in Iran. We did a little calling around, and officials say this appears to be the most specific the U.S. government has been publicly about the size of the assistance that Iran provides Hezbollah.....
Hezbollah, which fought a bloody 2006 war with Israel, is of course more than an armed faction or a terrorist outfit. It also has an extensive social welfare organization, and is a political party that controls Cabinet posts in Beirut. And it's expected to do well in Lebanon's elections next month...."
"Stumbling blocs"
" ... The polarised rhetoric that has characterised the last four years has not really faded since Doha, but the Obama administration’s new Middle East policy has forced Lebanese parties to adjust expectations. March 14 leaders have quieted their attacks on Damascus as Bashar al Assad has been courted by American and European diplomats. Meanwhile, Syria’s peace negotiations with Israel seem to have prompted Hizbollah to display greater openness to the idea of integrating its weapons into a credible national defence. Processes of engagement and reconciliation within Arab ranks and between the United States and Iran have weakened the centripetal forces that helped produce two distinct political coalitions in Lebanon.
March 14 in particular has looked increasingly disorganised of late. While its leadership has gone to great lengths to project an image of unity and commitment to the principles of the Cedar Revolution, the cracks in the coalition are becoming ever more apparent. This was evidenced most recently by the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s diatribe against his Sunni and Christian allies, .....
By contrast, March 8 has remained relatively unified and on-message, largely because its binding principle – opposition to the Siniora government – still obtains, whereas the anti-Syrian sentiment that united the March 14 coalition has weakened over time. And while the opposition has also witnessed internal squabbling over seats – between Michel Aoun and the Amal leader Nabih Berri – there have been no significant fissures. .....
Most polls predict a very close race, unlikely to give either coalition a convincing mandate. Because of the way in which electoral districts are drawn, the vast majority of seats (about 100 out of 128) will witness little competition. The remaining swing seats fall largely in Christian-majority districts; these electoral battles will determine which coalition reaches a 65-seat majority. Analysts are divided as to who has the upper hand, but there is a consensus that the margin of victory will be a narrow one......'
Friday, May 1, 2009
Ex-Spy Turned Negotiator Sits Down With Islamists and the West
"...The mission of Conflicts Forum, which he founded in 2004, resembles a kind of blueprint for the Obama administration’s current outreach efforts: to “open a new relationship between the West and Muslim world” through dialogue and better mutual understanding.Yet Mr. Crooke, who is legendary for his deep network of contacts among Islamist groups across the Middle East, is not sanguine about the prospects for mere dialogue, especially with Iran.
“I think there is a real fear there will be a process of talking past each other,” Mr. Crooke said. “The Iranians will say, ‘we want to talk about justice and respect.’ The U.S. will say, ‘are you willing to give up enrichment or not?’ ”
To get past that impasse with Iran, and with Islamist groups generally, the West will need to change its diplomatic language of threats and rewards, Mr. Crooke said, and show more respect for their adversaries’ point of view..."
Is Netanyahu bringing Israel closer to a 'second Holocaust'?
Aluf Benn in Haaretz, here
"Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's actions are shaped by a profound conviction that Israel will be in danger of extermination if Iran has nuclear weapons at its disposal. Senior political figures say Netanyahu has spoken to them about the danger of another Holocaust in private conversations as well. They are convinced that he truly believes it is his historic mission to rescue the Jewish people from a catastrophe. .....In all these cases, which constituted turning points in the war, the leaders ostensibly acted out of their own volition and could have chosen another path, which would have changed the course of history.The first test for Netanyahu's approach will come during his upcoming meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama. Netanyahu sees Obama, more than anyone else in the world, as the one person who can halt Iranian armament. During their meeting in Jerusalem last July, when they were both still running for office, Netanyahu told Obama that his presidency would be judged by his handling of Iran. He expressed support for Obama's proposal for rapprochement with the Iranians, and told him that in that case, the end far outweighs the means. In Netanyahu's opinion Obama has tremendous political clout - something his predecessor George W. Bush lacked - to launch an operation against Iran. He has at his disposal all the diplomatic, economic and military capabilities of the American superpower.Furthermore, Netanyahu apparently understands that, in return for American actions to remove the specter of the Iranian threat from the region, Israel will be required to embark on a diplomatic process with the Palestinians, and perhaps with the Syrians, too. In case he didn't understand this, during her appearance in Congress last week, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made it her business to explain to him that the Arab countries will not stand with Israel against Iran if Israel does not advance the peace process with the Palestinians...... The PMO did not issue a specific denial, and the headline in The Atlantic - "Netanyahu to Obama: Stop Iran - Or I Will" - became the basis for a worldwide media discussion ...What will a Netanyahu-led Israel do if Obama succeeds and reaches an agreement that will leave Iran with the status of a "threshold nation" - with nuclear capability, but without a bomb? And what will Israel demand in return for such an arrangement, in the form of American security guarantees in case it is violated?....But its strong commitment to Israeli security will not allow America to forcibly prevent a military operation designed to prevent a second Holocaust. That is the message Netanyahu will try to implant in the minds of the members of Congress. ..."
A Syrian view on the future of relations with the U.S.
".....While Moustapha radiated optimism about and appreciation for the Obama administration's approach, it is clear that there is a long road ahead. ... he made a number of important points -- particularly on Syrian views of the Obama administration, on Palestinian politics and the peace process, on Iraq, and on Lebanon.
Perhaps the most interesting single thing he said was the claim -- repeated twice -- that the U.S. was asking Syria to use its influence with Hamas to convince them to overcome its differences with Mahmoud Abbas and join a unity government. ....I have my doubts, given the administration's very clear line against including Hamas in the unity government without its first meeting the Quartet pre-conditions, ....
Like every other Arab official I've seen in the last few months, Moustapha praised Obama's public commitment to working for a two-state solution and the appointment of George Mitchell. Moustapha fell over himself to praise the seriousness of the Obama team and the President's diplomatic overtures. Where Bush officials would begin every discussion with a recitation of demands that Syria must meet (to which Syrians would respond with a litany of complaints about Israel), Obama officials -- he claimed -- used a civil and respectful tone and avoided lecturing or listing demands. There are still sharp disagreements, he said, but now there is the possibility of having productive discussions aimed at solving the problems. Instead of dual monologues achieving nothing, there was now the opportunity for real dialogue.
That sounds great, but.... at the same time, Moustapha continued to fall back on the old style in his own responses to questions and challenges -- exactly the litany of complaints about Israel which he a few minutes earlier had self-mockingly described as the stock response to the Bush administration's lectures. For instance, he dismissed questions about Syrian material support for Hezbollah and Hamas by waving it away as the sort of thing the Washington Institute for Near East Policy would produce. His low point came in his response to a Syrian man who asked him to speak about human rights abuses and repression inside of Syria. His response, equating the Syrian questioner with the Israelis and WINEP and then going on about Israeli war crimes, drew audible grumbling from the audience. If the Obama administration has indeed adopted such a fresh new style with Syria, it does not yet seem to be reciprocated in Syrian public diplomacy.
On Iraq, Moustapha took great pains to present an enormous opportunity for cooperation with the U.S. rooted in mutual self-interest. He explained that Syria no longer disagreed with the U.S. about Iraq, that it fully supported an American withdrawal on a responsible timetable and that Syria would do whatever it could to ensure that the withdrawal succeeds and leaves behind a stable Iraq. He also spoke about the claimed 1.5 million Iraqi refugees in Syria, noting that despite the great burden they posed on the country they would not be sent back. A stable Iraq would make it more likely they would leave of their own accord, he argued, by way of demonstrating the Syrian national interest in Iraqi success. All of this makes it puzzling that Syria has evidently not yet done as much as it could to control its border with Iraq. Perhaps that's the bargaining chip Damascus intends to offer up when Jeff Feltman and Dan Shapiro head back to Syria next week?
Finally, I asked him about Syrian views of the upcoming Lebanese elections. Moustapha said that Syria supported a peaceful, successful election. He noted that the U.S. was trying to help its friends and allies in those elections, and so was Syria. But regardless of the results, he argued, the winner of the election must include the losers in a participatory coalition government instead of trying to rule by a zero-sum logic. He claimed that Syria was giving this advice to its Lebanese allies, and that they were saying the same thing back to Damascus. We shall see.'
Bandar Bin Sultan & America's Tangled Relationship With Saudi Arabia
Preview of D Ottaway's book, in the WaPo, here
"...Bandar emerges as a tragic hero -- canny but hubristic; skilled yet ultimately unable to preserve the strength of the original bond between the United States and the House of Saud."
Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy
From the Jamestown Foundation, here
"... Although the exercise might be inconsequential militarily, it has enormous political significance, which partly explains Israel's reaction. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war ten years ago over the latter's harboring of PKK militants, their new security cooperation heralds a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it highlights the changing alignments of Turkey within the region.One explanation for the flourishing of the so-called Turkish-Israeli alliance throughout the 1990's, which led to the establishment of closer military cooperation, was the common threat perceptions concerning Syria. Turkey was so frustrated by Damascus supporting the PKK that in 1998 it had to amass its army along the border and threaten to use force unless Damascus ceased its support. Following the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in the late 1990's diplomatic relations improved, reflecting Turkey's new policy of normalizing relations with the Middle East. The real push came with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Fostering closer ties with Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors became one of the cornerstones of the AKP's new multi-dimensional foreign policy -which is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (EDM, March 25).Under the AKP, Ankara and Damascus have overcome their differences and promoted the growth of economic, social and cultural ties between the two countries, as expressed symbolically in the close personal ties between Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey resisted attempts to isolate Syria diplomatically, and has served as the conduit for opening Damascus to the outside world. Most significantly, it has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria by arranging indirect talks between the two countries.Diplomatic analysts had once discussed a Turkish-Israeli axis against Syria, while clearly the interests of Turkey and Syria are now converging, which permits the development of military cooperation. These alternating roles have naturally raised questions as to whether Turkey might be trading its strategic ties with Israel for a new partnership with Syria. Although many Western analysts argue that Turkey may be drifting away from the West under the AKP's new foreign policy, the crucial support of the secular Turkish military must be considered before reaching any conclusion.Israeli and some Western sources criticize the AKP for following an ideological foreign policy agenda and seeking to decouple Turkey from its traditional transatlantic orientation, instead increasingly serving Islamist and Arab interests. The AKP, in contrast, presents its search for autonomy and normalization of its relations with its neighbors as reflecting geopolitical reality, and argues that this serves both Turkish and Western interests in the surrounding regions.The military leadership's expression of support comes to the aid of the AKP as it pursues several controversial foreign policy initiatives. These include the rapprochement with Syria and criticism of Israel, notably during the Gaza crisis. This approach does not represent parochial "Islamist" concerns, but rather they enjoy the backing of broader segments of the Turkish political and military elite. Despite their occasional differences of opinion over domestic political issues, particularly on the question of secularism, the government and the military have managed to reach a consensus over foreign policy, which suggests that a simple distinction along Islamist versus secular might no longer be relevant to understand Turkish foreign policy..."
"Lack of reprisals from Iraq's Shiite: diminished status and options or a collective decision to hold back?"
AP, here
"... An Iraqi offensive last year into Sadr City broke the control of al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia, which used the huge Shiite slum as its Baghdad base and ran it as they wished with armed patrols and checkpoints. It's now in the hands of Iraqi security forces......Almost immediately after the Sadr City blasts, stunned residents denounced Iraqi forces for failing to protect them. Some called for the Mahdi Army's return as a more reliable defense against insurgents..... But there was a widespread feeling that the days of Mahdi Army swagger were likely over....But patience among the former Mahdi Army patrons already could be wearing thin..."
"Gambler" Charles Ayyoub attacks Syria and gets praise from ...MEMRI
MEMRI, here
"Why doesn't Champress talk about the hundreds of millions of dollars stolen in the past 20 years by Syrian officials, acting in coordination with Lebanese officials who are allies of Syria? Michel Aoun - who once spoke of breaking the head of Syrian president Hafez Al-Assad and of pounding a nail into the coffin of the Syrian regime, and who acted [to promote the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution] 1559 against Syria, and [even] claimed to be [the resolution's] spiritual father - has [today] become the symbol of nationalism, in Champress's eyes... I challenge any senior Syrian official [who claims to have] served Syria more than I have in the past 21 years to compete against me [in loyalty to Syria]. Even though [the Syrian officials] brought me down in the [1996] elections, and lied to me, I did not change my position - [a position of] support and love for Syria...
"[Champress] says that I have changed from a tiger into a mouse... We saw you [Syrian officials] during the investigation of [then-commissioner of the U.N. International Independent Investigation Commission on the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri, Detlev] Mehlis, and how you sat for hours as he interrogated you - we did not see tigers in front of Mehlis. You owe Charles Ayyoub and Al-Diyyar for their toppling of Mehlis... It was I who brought about the downfall of the Mehlis commission, which investigated the most senior Syrian officials on every tiny detail. To Champress I say: You [Syrians] faked the [results of] elections in Lebanon for 25 years. Stop interfering in the elections, let us [hold] free elections..."
Detlev Mehlis: "This could send the tribunal into oblivion,..."
"I salute the tribunal," said Mihran Pamboukdjian, a retired industrialist sitting in a cafe in downtown Beirut. "Those who incarcerated the generals are part of a corrupt regime. It is well known that the Lebanese judiciary is corrupt."Visitors to Hariri's grave outside a giant mosque that he financed also said it was right to free the generals if they could not be indicted, even if this had come as a shock....Most voters have already made up their minds, in line with sectarian loyalties and local patronage. Many Lebanese analysts expect Iranian-backed Hezbollah and its allies to reverse the slim majority won by the anti-Syrian bloc after Hariri's death....Nadim Shehadi, a fellow at London's Chatham House, linked faith in the tribunal with faith in the outside world's ability to protect Lebanon, which he said had been badly dented by the failure to halt Israel's 2006 war on Hezbollah guerrillas..."
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