OxfAn: "Obama & the Israelis' capability to play a spoiler role on a range of US objectives in the Middle East"

OxfAn, via Gulf News

Analysis There are numerous significant policy disagreements between newly installed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Barack Obama. They include: US support for a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which Netanyahu regards sceptically and his foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, has openly derided; Washington's interest in at least limited dialogue with Iran, while Netanyahu argues that Tehran must clearly abandon its nuclear ambitions or face a potential military strike; Obama's request that Congress relax restrictions on dealing with a potential Palestinian government incorporating Hamas - an approach that Netanyahu rejects in favour of continued isolation of Hamas; and White House support for the 2002 Arab Initiative for Arab-Israeli peace, which Netanyahu - like many Israelis - does not see as a change from the fundamental hostility Arabs have expressed towards Israel for over 60 years. Nevertheless, the two leaders agree on one key priority: maintaining a strong US-Israeli relationship. Any politician seen as undermining that relationship, in either Washington or Israel, would risk retribution at the polls. This dynamic makes fundamentally shifting bilateral ties - and wider US policy towards the region - very difficult. Washington and Tel Aviv are locked in a game of 'chicken', each challenging the other to risk the bilateral relationship in pursuit of its preferred regional priorities. The two sides have made conflicting policy assessments, but also have an imperative to patch-up (or at least manage) these differences: 1. White House strengths. Netanyahu seeks to manage this conflict when he presents the confrontation with Iran in existential terms. In doing so, he attracts considerable sympathy from both Israelis and many US citizens. However, Netanyahu is generally on shakier political ground than the White House. The Obama administration is more stable and unified than its Israeli counterpart, and the president enjoys more widespread domestic political support than the prime minister. Despite early concerns that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would seek to grandstand or otherwise overshadow her boss and former political rival, she has been a loyal and on-message articulator of the president's message. Netanyahu's foreign minister has not only drawn headlines for undiplomatic opinions expressed in the media, but he is also under criminal investigation for corruption. 2. Complex Obama agenda. Yet despite his better position, Obama is trying to manage a much more complex set of regional imperatives, ranging from Afghanistan and Pakistan, through Iran and Iraq, and into the Levant and beyond. In this context, progress on Arab-Israeli issues is not necessarily the highest priority, but it has the potential to undermine progress on all of the other fronts. 3. Israeli spoiler role? It would be a mistake for Obama to underestimate the Israelis' capability to play a spoiler role on a range of US objectives in the Middle East: Israeli jets are capable of striking Iran on their own - radically altering the Middle East strategic landscape, despite US objections. While some in the Arab world would quietly applaud Israeli military action against Iran, the public outcry would likely be overwhelmingly negative. Should such an attack occur, it would fall to the United States to manage the regional consequences, which might include attacks against US interests and those of its Gulf allies for their supposed complicity in such a strike. In the final months of the administration of former president George Bush, senior US officials regularly went to Israel to urge former prime minister Ehud Olmert not to attack Iran; whether the Obama administration is capable of effectively restraining the Netanyahu government in this manner is less certain. Netanyahu could also change the tenor of regional diplomacy through his actions towards the Palestinians. For example, a renewed offensive in Gaza, a high-profile assassination campaign against the Hamas leadership, or increased settlement building on the West Bank would all force the US government to choose between condoning Israeli actions (perhaps risking the wrath of the Arab world) or seeking to pressure Netanyahu to alter his tactics. Obama may need to decide if, in managing relations with Israel, it is more important to persuade Netanyahu of his good intentions, or demonstrate to the prime minister that he is more politically powerful, secure and influential than the Israeli leader. During their White House encounter next month, both leaders will seek to do two things: Assess the seriousness and commitment of the other side to its own worldview. Try to persuade their interlocutor that it is truly committed to its stated positions and unlikely to modify them. The atmospherics leading up to the meeting are more mixed than is customary ahead of a US visit by an Israeli prime minister. The fact that the meeting has slid later into May and Obama was not available on some dates suggested by Netanyahu's office can be taken as signs of tension. In addition, each side has engaged in extensive political positioning in the lead-up to the meeting: The Obama administration made clear that it would inform Netanyahu of its new Iran strategy during the meeting, sending a signal that Israel would have to respond to a US strategy rather than shape it. Netanyahu responded by appearing to tie progress on Arab-Israeli diplomacy to satisfaction with US actions against Iran. (When King Abdullah of Jordan was in Washington last week, he hinted that Arab support against Iran was contingent on US success in spurring progress on Arab-Israeli issues.) Meanwhile, Clinton strongly suggested last week that the United States might take a position toward Hamas that was similar to its position toward Hezbollah - that it would not have direct contacts with the group, but it would have contacts with a government that contained members of the group. The move not only reflected the Obama administration's general willingness to engage with differing viewpoints, but also the very strong view in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Arab world that progress on Palestinian issues is impossible unless some form of unity government is established between Fatah and Hamas. Some of Israel's supporters in the US Congress are gravely concerned by the move, and Netanyahu can be expected to weigh in against this approach to Hamas when he is in Washington in May. Netanyahu's electoral victory has produced the chilliest US-Israeli relationship in a decade - since Netanyahu's first stint as prime minister, when former president Bill Clinton was trying to move the Oslo Process forward. Conclusion: In Washington, Netanyahu is unlikely to reject US regional policy outright, or say 'no' to the president. Instead, he is more likely to emphasise caveats, confronting the Obama administration with a frustrating set of obstructions, delays and diversions. This approach is intended to offer enough tactical concessions to keep the White House happy, while yielding no strategic concessions that Netanyahu deems a threat to Israeli security...'