Elliott Abrams: "Dahlan, raised in corruption have no future role in the PA..."

"... I have no inside information about this confrontation with Dahlan, but the notion that he was plotting an actual coup strikes me as ridiculous. He lacks the forces to do it, and as a clever man he must know he would never get away with it. To me, this episode is a reminder of two things: First, that Fatah remains in disarray. All efforts at serious reform and modernization have failed. Last year, Fatah called off local elections in the PA once again, mostly because it was simply unready. Presidential and parliamentary elections are long overdue. If there is ever to be a stable and democratic Palestinian state, it will need democratic parties that can win elections. Fatah today is not able to do that. Second, that the gap between Fatah and the Palestinian Authority remains significant—and indeed is growing. Dahlan was a Fatah security guy, who handled the various gangs Arafat had created and played off against each other. He never had a role in the increasingly professional PA security system.

 

That system reports to Prime Minister Fayyad, has been trained mostly by the United States, has brought law and order to the streets of the West Bank, and works closely with the Israelis to stop terror. People like Dahlan and other former Arafat cronies, raised with the corruption and disarray of Arafat’s satrapy, have no role and no future in the PA. That’s why there remains considerable tension between Fayyad and Fatah, and great resentment toward him on the part of the Fatah grandees. Instead of claiming partial credit for his achievements, they try endlessly to grab PA jobs and get back to the good old days when they had a finger in the pie. If the Dahlan story helps show that the old days are over, it will be a positive event...."

"The so called 'moderate Arab regime' is rotting from within..."

"For the last few weeks, a massive wave of protests has been rocking Tunisia over the Ben Ali regime's alleged corruption, authoritarianism, and economic failings. A grisly suicide attack on a Coptic Christian Church in Alexandria on New Year's Day has sparked escalating worries about the state of Christian-Muslim relations in Egypt. Over the last few days, Jordanian security forces have struggled to put down riots in the southern town of Maan, the latest in an increasingly worrisome trend towards local violence and clashes. Kuwaiti politics continue to be roiled by the fallout from the Dec. 8 attack by security forces against law professor Obaid al-Wasimi and a group of academics and parliamentarians. What do these have in common?
These four seemingly unrelated incidents over the last month all draw attention to the accelerating decay of the institutional foundations and fraying of the social fabric across many of the so-called "moderate," pro-Western Arab regimes. What seems to link these four ongoing episodes, despite the obvious differences, is a combination of authoritarian retrenchment, unfulfilled economic promises, rising sectarianism at the popular level, and deep frustration among an increasingly tech-savvy rising generation. The internal security forces in these states remain powerful, of course, and it's unlikely that any of the regimes will fall any time soon (though some analysts seem more enthusiastic about the prospects for change in Tunisia). But even if these upgraded authoritarians can keep hold of power, there's a palpable sense that these incidents represent the leading edge of rising economic, social and political challenges which their degraded institutions are manifestly unable to handle.....
These four events hitting at roughly the same time, for all their differences, seem to crystallize a long-developing sense that these regimes have failed ....It would be good if these incidents served as a wake-up call to Arab regimes, but they probably won't. The tactical demands of holding on to power will likely continue to stand in the way of their engaging in the kinds of strategic reforms needed for long-term stability. Meanwhile, the energy and desperation across disenfranchised but wired youth populations will likely become increasingly potent. It's likely to manifest not in organized politics and elections, but in the kind of outburst of social protest we're seeing now in Tunisia.... and, alarmingly, in the kinds of outburst of social violence which we can see in Jordan and Egypt. Whether that energy is channeled into productive political engagement or into anomic violence would seem to be one of the crucial variables shaping the coming period in Arab politics. Right now, the trends aren't in the right direction."

"... With al-Sadr Back In, Is US on Way Out?"

"... Some speculate that al-Sadr's surprise return may have been prompted by Iran. Tehran insists that all U.S. troops must leave Iraq, and its Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, visited Baghdad on Wednesday and insisted that al-Maliki's government refrain from agreeing to any extension of the U.S. military presence beyond Dec. 31. While al-Sadr's movement has received support from Tehran, the Iranians maintain close ties with a range of Shi'ite political leaders, including al-Maliki. And while the U.S. military views al-Sadr as an Iranian proxy, many Iran analysts see him as a fiercely independent nationalist.

Al-Sadr began agitating for a U.S. withdrawal almost immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein, when the main Iran-backed Shi'ite parties were cooperating with Washington. And he may have reason to believe that the Americans are, in fact, going to leave this year. Asked by the Wall Street Journal in an interview shortly before the New Year about the possibility of U.S. troops staying on beyond 2011, al-Maliki was blunt: "The withdrawal of forces agreement expires on Dec. 31, 2011. The last American soldier will leave Iraq." He said the agreement could not be extended or amended unless his government had the parliament's backing to seek a new agreement. So, if there's to be any U.S. military presence beyond New Year's Eve 2011, it will have to be democratically agreed to by the Iraqi parliament. And that's a decision in which al-Sadr will have a major say...."

Bribing the occupying aggressors ..

http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/wikileaks-israel-charged-bribes-for-goods-entering-gaza-1.335585

"I am going to speak with Hosni about Hamas & Hezbollah..."

"... An Egyptian official said Thursday’s talks, which were to begin at 12 p.m. British time, aimed to help break an impasse in the peace diplomacy, but did not give details.
“I am going to speak with (MubaAn Egyptian official said Thursday’s talks, which were to begin at 12 p.m. British time, aimed to help break an impasse in the peace diplomacy, but did not give details....."

Muqtada al Sadr returns to Iraq

"... A spokesman for Sadr's Najaf office said that the cleric has returned to Iraq permanently and plans to transfer his religious studies to a renowned Shiite center in Najaf, adding that Sadr would "announce his agenda to the public" in coming days...."

Target: Hassan Nasrallah!

French Foreign Minister Alliot-Marie is either ignorant or deceiving when does not say that the STL is very clear  in Article 3 'Individual criminal responsibility' 

 1. A person shall be individually responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of  the Special Tribunal if that person:  

(a) Committed, participated as accomplice, organized or directed others to commit the crime set forth in article 2 of this Statute; or 

 (b) Contributed in any other way to the commission of the crime set forth in article 2 of this Statute by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, where such contribution is intentional and is either made with the aim of furthering the  general criminal activity or purpose of the group or in the knowledge of the  intention of the group to commit the crime. 

2. With respect to superior and subordinate relationships, a superior shall be  criminally responsible for any of the crimes set forth in article 2 of this Statute  committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a  result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates,where: 

 (a) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information that  clearly indicated that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such  crimes; 

 (b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective  responsibility and control of the superior; and 

 (c) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within  his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to  the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 

3. The fact that the person acted pursuant to an order of a superior shall not  relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of  punishment if the Special Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 

.....    so when she says (in an interview with 20Minutes) that  "Le Hezbollah a des élus dans les institutions, ce qui prouve le fonctionnement des institutions. Si des personnes sont mises en cause devant le TSL, elles le seront en tant que personnes et non comme représentantes d’un parti ou d’une communauté.....", it sums up the suspicious nature of the whole enterprise!

Al Manar TV: 'solution to Lebanon's impasse is in last stages..'

“The solution to Lebanon's impasse is almost ready & is awaiting the sign-off & recovery of Saudi King Abdullah... ,” Al-Manar reported ...it did not provide further details.

No Israeli aggression likely ...until late 2011'

Oxford Analytica: Excerpts:

"... Israel does not expect anything to come from the talks. While preparations for an attack are going ahead, a number of factors are making them more difficult and complicated than initially anticipated. Israeli military preparations for an assault on Iran are proceeding apace. Following the closing of Turkish airspace to Israeli air force training manoeuvres earlier this year, the Israelis have begun making more use of other countries' airspace for long-range aerial training exercises. They are also training special forces for an attack.  Moreover, by choosing Yoav Gallant as the new chief of staff, and Tamir Pardo as the new head of the Mossad, the Israeli government is sending a powerful, if indirect, message. Both men are known as operational field operatives, rather than administrators .........However, both budgets and events elsewhere are affecting their plans. Furthermore, Israeli planners are having to try to balance several timelines simultaneously .....  Israel and the United States are coming closer in their assessments of the pace of Iran's nuclear development. Both now estimate that, depending on how effective future covert operations and sanctions are, it may take 2-3 years before Iran has a testable bomb... 

US constraints. Although Washington has stressed that it has operational military plans to deal with the Iranian threat, it remains reluctant to become involved in a new war amid continuing economic challenges and deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a minimum, the Israelis would need silent US backing for any assault. Any assault would, almost inevitably, force Israel to end up fighting a three-front war. Israeli military planners fully anticipate that should Israel attack Iran, their homefront would come under fire from the thousands of rockets now in the possession of Iranian allies Hizbollah and Hamas.  .... Israel's entire military posture for decades has been based on the principle that offence is the best form of defence. For that reason, Israel has always focused most of its military purchases on offensive weaponry such as the latest generation of fighter-bombers. However, beginning with the 1991 Gulf war, and especially since the 2006 Lebanese War and the 2008-09 incursion into Gaza, there has been growing public pressure to increase Israel's passive defensive capacity. However, because of the costs, six Israeli villages on the border with Gaza have yet to be equipped with adequate shelters, and there are only enough gas masks for 60% of the population. Many home front services such as fire-fighting units remain woefully under-equipped.  In addition, the introduction of new, Israeli-designed Iron Dome anti-rocket missile batteries is being delayed because of costs ....   even if all this economic aid had been appropriated, the Israelis would still only have the means to protect a few air bases and not the population as a whole.... 

Regional security factors. Another potential complication in decision-making on Iran is internal domestic instability in Lebanon and Gaza ... The Israelis fear that Hizbollah could create a series of border incidents, and even another full-scale war, in order to unite the Lebanese public behind it. The Hamas administration in Gaza has recently been under increasing pressure from even more extremist groups to renew rocket and mortar attacks on Israel. There has been an increase in the shelling of Israeli civilian targets in recent weeks........ the balance of various factors means that the Israeli government will likely choose to wait out the next few months in order to follow developments before taking stock of issues such as the state of the Iranian nuclear programme, the impact of covert operations and sanctions, their own defensive preparedness, and the US political climate as the presidential campaign gets underway.

"Assad peut tirer profit des tensions irano-saoudiennes mais doit veiller à ne pas s'aliéner l'une ou l'autre partie.."

Thanks MAK.

"... L'élément le plus parlant est le dernier, à savoir la réorganisation des services de la sécurité et de la justice. Le fait est que tous les changements concernant l'armée et les principaux organes de sécurité - les postes de commandement de l'armée et du renseignement militaire ainsi que la direction de la sécurité générale, de la sécurité aéroportuaire, etc. - affecteraient principalement des proches du Hezbollah [parti chiite allié de l'Iran]. Et pour que la Syrie et l'Arabie saoudite retirent quelque chose au Hezbollah, il faudrait que l'Iran donne préalablement son approbation.

En public, les porte-parole libanais prosyriens donnent une lecture légèrement différente de la situation. Ils concèdent qu'un remaniement gouvernemental est dans l'air, mais ils n'admettent aucune divergence avec le Hezbollah. Ils laissent entendre que le contexte politique est favorable à la Syrie et au Hezbollah, et que le gouvernement, les services de sécurité et d'autres organismes publics doivent refléter cette tendance. Certains vont jusqu'à suggérer qu'une refonte radicale du système politique libanais est nécessaire pour conférer davantage de pouvoir à la communauté chiite. Mais de telles idées ne font pas un accord syro-saoudien. Quelles que soient les propositions acceptées par Damas et Riyad, elles devront obtenir, non seulement l'approbation de l'Iran, mais également celle des Etats-Unis.

Le président syrien, Bachar El-Assad, est engagé dans un délicat exercice d'équilibriste. Il peut tirer profit des tensions irano-saoudiennes mais doit veiller à ne pas s'aliéner l'une ou l'autre partie. Il souhaite compromettre la légitimité du tribunal spécial, car il ne veut pas que ce dernier affaiblisse le Hezbollah ou mette en cause les responsables syriens. Mais il ne peut pas laisser le Hezbollah humilier M. Hariri comme il l'a fait en mai 2008 [le Hezbollah avait pris par la force le contrôle de Beyrouth], sachant que cela nuirait à ses relations avec les Saoudiens et renforcerait la position de l'Iran en tant qu'acteur dominant de Beyrouth.

Il y aussi les Etats-Unis. Syriens et Saoudiens ne doivent pas seulement prendre en considération la manière dont l'Iran perçoit leurs pourparlers, mais aussi celle dont Washington va réagir. Le président El-Assad doit rétablir des liens avec Washington s'il veut avoir d'autres options que son alliance fructueuse, mais souvent humiliante et contraignante, avec l'Iran. Et il doit également se protéger contre les Israéliens, dans l'éventualité où ces derniers verraient le Hezbollah comme une menace stratégique, ce qui déclencherait au Liban une guerre dans laquelle la Syrie serait impliquée.

Si, pour défendre le Hezbollah, le président El-Assad s'en prend trop au tribunal, les Etats-Unis et Israël vont commencer à grincer des dents. Washington n'est pas prêt à renoncer à une institution qui pourrait prochainement accuser le Hezbollah. De son côté, Israël ne verra pas d'un bon œil des mesures libanaises qui, en protégeant le Hezbollah d'un procès, renforcerait implicitement son pouvoir militaire, et par suite celui de l'Iran.

Voilà le contexte terriblement complexe dans lequel se déroulent les pourparlers syro-saoudiens, et c'est pourquoi il ne faut pas trop s'attendre à une solution dans un avenir proche. Ces pourparlers mettent en présence deux pays qui ont une influence importante sur les affaires libanaises mais pas forcément le dernier mot. Quelles que soient les décisions auxquelles ils parviendront, il leur restera des obstacles à surmonter et la tâche ne sera pas facile...."

The Myth of Defensible Borders

"...Israeli security orthodoxy has long been built on two related premises: first, that Arab and Muslim hostility toward Israel is both inexorable and irrational -- so neither withdrawal nor peace is likely to offer Israelis major security dividends -- and second, that foreign powers and international institutions cannot be trusted to protect Israel.

To be sure, Israel's leaders have at times questioned the continuing relevance of these premises. Indeed, when seeking the Knesset's support for the Oslo agreement in 1993, the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared, "No longer are we necessarily 'a people that dwells alone,' and no longer is it true that 'the whole world is against us.'"

Over the last decade, however, widespread disillusionment with the Oslo process, and the sense that their unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip served to embolden, rather than placate, enemies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, have led many Israelis to conclude that genuine peace is an elusive dream. Moreover, they cite the perceived failure of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the European Union Border Assistance Mission in Gaza to prevent rocket attacks on Israel as evidence that when the going gets tough, Israelis can rely only on themselves for security. Presented with this bleak security picture, many Israelis see the retention of West Bank territory -- i.e., the concept of defensible borders -- as not only politically desirable but also a strategic necessity.

Israelis have learned the wrong lessons from the wars of the last decade. Although defensible borders would preserve Israel's latitude to act independently in the short run, it would undermine, rather than promote, its long-term security. Israel's refusal to relinquish territory occupied in 1967 would give its enemies increased motivation to attack -- and bolster the perceived legitimacy of violence among Arabs disillusioned with the international community's failure to make good on the promise to deliver land for peace. And it would only marginally limit the capacity of Israel's enemies to inflict damage: Israel's efforts to shift its population away from its crowded coastline, along with steady advances in the range of missiles and rockets possessed by militant groups and nearby states, will leave Israelis vulnerable regardless of where the state's borders are drawn. And as the international community presses further toward accountability for war crimes, Israel will find it increasingly costly, legally and politically, to use overwhelming military force to deter attacks. ..."

'Covert Action' and Iran ..."We must try..."

"...now another covert-action program appears to have scored a big success. Israeli cabinet minister Moshe Yaalon, a former Israeli military chief of staff, said last week that, as a result of recent setbacks, Iran will not go nuclear until 2014 at the earliest. That's quite a change from earlier Israeli forecasts that Iran could get the bomb in 2011.

Why the extra three years? Mr. Yaalon didn't elaborate beyond the bland statement that "the Iranian nuclear program has a number of technological challenges and difficulties." But it has been widely reported that Siemens computers used to control Iranian nuclear facilities in Natanz and Bushehr were infected by a fiendishly clever virus, called Stuxnet, that is hard to detect and even harder to eradicate. Meanwhile, there have been several assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists... While the mullahs blame the Little Satan and the Great Satan for everything under the sun, in this case they are probably right. There has been rampant speculation that the Mossad or the CIA is behind the assassinations (my bet would be the former), and that the U.S. National Security Agency or its Israeli equivalent, Unit 8200, is behind Stuxnet. Whoever is responsible may have scored the most notable victory yet recorded in the brief annals of cyberwarfare. It appears that Stuxnet has managed to delay the Iranian nuclear program as long as Israeli air strikes might have, while avoiding any of the obvious blowback. Hezbollah has threatened to rain thousands of missiles on Israel in the event of Israeli attacks on its Iranian sponsors, but a computer virus doesn't offer an obvious casus belli even to the most fanatical terrorists....

In the case of Iran, the question is whether we'll make good use of the time apparently bought by successful covert action. If the Obama administration spends the next three years trying to push sanctions resolutions out of the United Nations or trying to open negotiations with Tehran, it will accomplish little. Better to ramp up another covert action program - this one designed to help the Iranian people overthrow their dictators.

Of course, Tehran is on guard against what happened with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, and the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon - all of which received American assistance. Toppling a regime is far more difficult than impeding a nuclear program or a terrorist plot. It may be impossible. But we must try. Otherwise we risk sacrificing the recent gains achieved by skilled and daring intelligence operatives..."

"The Dubai job" (by 'Caesarea', aka. Pumpous & Clumsy)

"At 6:45 a.m., the first members of an Israeli hit squad land at Dubai International Airport and fan out through the city to await further instructions... Most of the operatives here are members of a secretive unit within the Mossad known as Caesarea, .... "If the Mossad is the temple of Israel's intelligence community, then Caesarea is its holy of holies."

In the course of reporting this story, GQ has learned that this is Caesarea's second attempt to kill Al-Mabhouh. On a previous trip to Dubai two months earlier, in November 2009, the same team tried to poison him. It is not known precisely how the team administered the toxin in their first attempt, though the suspicion is that they either slipped it into a drink or smeared it on one of the fixtures in his hotel room. Al-Mabhouh fell mysteriously ill but eventually recovered ...

Al-Mabhouh has been on the Mossad's list of assassination targets since 1989, after he and an accomplice named Muhammad Nasser abducted and murdered two Israeli soldiers...... The need to eliminate Al-Mabhouh, however, has only intensified over time,.... In the mind of Mossad chief Meir Dagan, liquidating Al-Mabhouh is worth the risk of sending such a large team on a mission into a hostile country, though the wisdom of this choice will be severely questioned in the aftermath of the job....

In 1997 the Mossad tried to assassinate Khaled Mashal, the political leader of Hamas, by spraying a chemical agent on his ear as he walked down a street in Amman, Jordan. The mission failed..... In a humiliating blow to the agency, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was forced to admit that the Mossad plot had been a terrible failure. For the next several years, morale within the agency plummeted, and its reputation for daring and success was tarnished.

Then, in 2002, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon tapped Dagan, a former military commander with a reputation for ruthless, brutal efficiency, to restore the spy agency to its former glory and preside over, as he put it, "a Mossad with a knife between its teeth." "Dagan's unique expertise," Sharon said in closed meetings, "is the separation of an Arab from his head." Dagan immediately announced that the Mossad would devote most of its resources to what he considered the two key threats to Israel's survival: the Iranian nuclear program and terrorism from the Iranian-supported groups Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

The number and frequency of covert operations increased dramatically. There were several acts of sabotage of the Iranian nuclear program: two mysterious crashes of Iranian aircraft associated with the program, fires breaking out at two important laboratories, damage inflicted upon Iranian nuclear centrifuges, and the disappearance of two Iranian scientists and the killing of a third. There was also a mysterious explosion at a Syrian plant where Scud missiles were being fitted with chemical warheads, and the Mossad is credited with the discovery of a nuclear reactor in Syria, built with North Korean assistance, whose existence the Syrian authorities had managed to conceal for over five years. (The Syrian nuclear facility was subsequently destroyed by the Israeli Air Force in September 2007 after the United States proved reluctant to do so.)

The number of complex targeted assassinations carried out by the Mossad also increased under Dagan. The most high-profile of these was the elimination in Damascus of Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah's military chief..... Dagan's Mossad is also believed to be responsible for the death of General Mohammed Suleiman, a close aide of Syria's President Bashar Al-Assad, who headed that country's nuclear program and handled military cooperation with Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah....

Because of these successes, Dagan's tenure as director of the Mossad was repeatedly extended, ...Dagan is also reported to have stated on several occasions that he does not believe there is anyone within the Mossad today who is worthy to replace him.

Several Mossad operatives who have attended meetings in Dagan's office describe a ritual that he goes through when preparing a team for a dangerous mission. During the meeting, Dagan points to a large photograph hanging on his office wall of a bearded Jew wrapped in a prayer shawl, kneeling on the ground with his arms in the air. The man's fists are clenched, and his piercing eyes look straight ahead. Next to him stand two German SS officers, one holding a club and the other a pistol. "This man," Dagan says, "was my grandfather, Dov Ehrlich. ......I can to ensure that something like this will never happen again."

··· (continue, here)"

" اذا تحرك حزب الله او اي طرف آخر على الارض فسيكون خاسراً ولن يحقق اهدافه وذلك سيضعه بمواجهة القوى الامنية".

جعجع شرح ان زيارته للسعودية "بدأت شخصية لحضور زفاف الامير عبد العزيز بن فهد وكنا نفكر بالاعتذار لارتباطات في لبنان ولكن اتصل بي صديق من المملكة قال لي انهم يريدونني ان آتي الى المملكة لاسباب أخرى غير الزفاف فذهبت وأجريت محادثات مع عدة مسؤولين في الرياض"، لافتاً الى انه " لم تكن عملية التسوية حول المحكمة الدولية في المملكة واردة لدى الملك السعودي حتى قبل ذهابه الى نيويورك للعلاج، في حين ان الفريق الآخر يتحدث منذ 3 اشهر عن تسوية انتهت ومن هنا لا اعتقد ان هناك اي شيء جدي جاهز بعد"، لافتاً الى ان " الحريري اخذ الموقف الجريء وهو يواجه كل الضغوطات عليه ولن يتخلى عن اي من مبادئه".

وعن مرحلة ما بعد القرار الظني، سأل جعجع " اذا نُشر القرار الاتهامي ماذا يحصل؟ سنأخذ القرار ونقرأه ويستطيع الفريق الآخر ان يقول ما يريده اما نحن فعلى ضوئه سنتعامل معه. الفريق الآخر حر برأيه لكننا احرار برأينا ايضاً والامور تقف عند هذا الحد ولا نتخوف من اي تحرك على الارض فهذه الايام ذهبت وهناك حد ادنى من الدولة موجود".

وعن امكانية حصول 7 ايار جديد، قال جعجع "ان الفرق بين 7 أيار 2008 والوقت الراهن هو انه يوجد الآن تركيبة امنية كاملة ورئيس جمهورية موجود وسلطة سياسية كاملة وهناك اكثرية لا تقبل العبث بالسلم الاهلي، وما يسميه الفريق الآخر شهود الزور، ورغم كل ضغوطات هذا الفريق فهناك 20 وزيراً يرفضون التصويت على هذا الملف كي لا يُحدث شرخاً فهل سيقبل هؤلاء الوزراء المس بالسلم الاهلي؟".

وأكّد ان "لا احد يفكّر ان هناك اي مكان لدوحة 2 والفرقاء السياسيون لن يقبلوا تحت اي ضغط بذلك".

جعجع رأى انه " اذا تحرك حزب الله او اي طرف آخر على الارض فسيكون خاسراً ولن يحقق اهدافه وذلك سيضعه بمواجهة القوى الامنية".

وعن لقائه بالعماد قهوجي الاسبوع الماضي، قال جعجع "كنت اتابع بيانات قيادة الجيش ووجدت فيها نفساً مختلفاً عن السابق، انا ارى انه لدينا سلطة سياسية مختلفة فالرئيس سليمان يُساير في امور عدة لكن هناك خطوط حمراء لا يُساير فيها ومنها موضوع السلم الاهلي اضافة الى رئيس الحكومة وثلثي الحكومة"، مشيراً الى ان " حصول اي مس بالسلم الاهلي هو ما يؤدي الى انقسام الجيش وليس العكس".

وأضاف " تفاجأت ايجاباً بالجنرال قهوجي فهو واضح جداً انه اذا قررت السلطة السياسية عدم المس بالسلم الاهلي فمن واجب الجيش تأمين عدم المس بالسلم الاهلي"، سائلاً "اذا "فرط" الوضع في البلد من سيعيد لملمته من جديد؟ هذه حكمة مهمة لذلك انا لست قلقاً اضافة الى ان هناك لبنانيين يرفضون كل ذلك".

جعجع اعلن انه "ليس متخوفاً من مرحلة ما بعد القرار الاتهامي لكن شدّ الحبال سيستمر، وهذا لا يعني انه لا تجري اي امور بالمطلق، فقد تحصل بعض الامور هنا وهناك لكن لن تذهب ابعد من ذلك".

Fatah's al Maqdah: "Hariri tribunal might accuse Lebanon's Palestinians..."

"...munir Al-Maqdah, commander of Fatah's general headquarters in Lebanon, on Tuesday stressed that Palestinian factions in the country "will not take sides" in any conflict among the Lebanese."We will support the unity of Lebanon and the Lebanese," Maqdah added in a radio interview.As he did not rule out the possibility that indictments expected to be issued soon by a U.N.-backed court might accuse "the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon," Maqdah voiced concerns over the possible repercussions of the indictments "because all international tribunals are politicized."Asked whether Palestinian groups would accept to surrender their weapons to the Lebanese authorities, Maqdah said: "The Sabra and Shatila massacres are still before our eyes and the Israeli aggressions against us are persistent and there are armed Israeli settlements."..."

"Israel fires into South Lebanon..."

" Israel renewed its military exercises Tuesday by firing ammunition into Lebanon in a continuation of several weeks of muscle-flexing maneuvers.
The National News Agency (N.N.A.) reported that Israeli patrols had fired on Lebanese territory for several hours until eventually ceasing Tuesday morning.
“[The] Israeli Army fired Monday night and Tuesday dawn random shots from its location on occupied Shebaa Farms for more than half an hour,” the N.N.A. said. ..."

Bashir Gemayel’s long prediction ...

"... we refuse to be put on a par with the Copts of Egypt, or the Christians of certain Arab countries.”

'Protectors'

Today Gemayel is remembered by many Christian Lebanese, especially those who live abroad, as a patriot and romantic icon of his people. Others recall his name only because his assassination in 1982, after having been elected president of Lebanon, provoked the Sabra and Shatilla massacres.

The Gemayels are an important Lebanese political family. Bashir’s father Sheikh Pierre Gemayel was the founder of the Phalange party, and his brother Amin served as president of Lebanon from 1982 to 1988. Amin’s son, also Pierre, was assassinated in 2006. Amin was in the news again on January 3, when he reacted angrily to the murder of Christians on New Year’s Eve in Alexandria, Egypt: “Massacres are taking place for no reason and without any justification against Christians. It is only because they are Christians.”.."

EGYPT: "stability & succession"

Oxford Analytica/ Excerpts: 

"... Some news agencies have reported that an al-Qaida-linked group called Markaz al-Mujahideen has claimed responsibility for the attack. The bombing follows calls by al-Qaida affiliates in Iraq for attacks on Christians, and has caused a sharp escalation of the sectarian problem in Egypt. ... The January 1 bombing represents a dual challenge for the government. The possibility of al-Qaida inspiration or even involvement in the attacks presents the challenge of securing Egypt against the threat of international Islamic terrorism, previously unsuccessful in gaining a foothold in the country. Yet al-Qaida-inspired or affiliated organisations can only gain support if there is discontent on the ground. The bombing thus highlights the need to combat the Muslim-Christian tensions that have made Egypt a target.....  the Sinai region has continued to experience terrorism, with tourism as the main target and major attacks in 2004, 2005 and 2006. The government has tended to blame rebel Bedouin groups or infiltration by Hamas and Hizbollah operatives.  There have been indications that terrorist activity could move outside the Sinai and alter its targets .... Alexandria has a strong MB and Salafist presence; while the MB has officially condemned the bombing, many of its members have been involved in sectarian violence, and some may be expected to become more radical as the movement is politically marginalised. In contrast to the spiralling trend of small-scale disputes elsewhere, Alexandria has witnessed sectarian incidents that appear to be deliberately incited..... Despite the serious deterioration in Church-state relations, the former needs protection from the state more than ever. Moreover, many Copts understand the value of the Pope's relationship with Mubarak. Yet much of the Coptic anger following the attacks is directed at Mubarak for failing to protect Christians. Pope Shenouda will have to let some protests happen, although he will attempt to control their levels. ....... hostile sentiments were already deeply held, and that the Alexandria bombing seems aimed at igniting these sentiments. Confrontations are likely to increase, possibly to the extent of the 1970s clashes -- yet the nature and possible international dimensions of the latest attack threaten a more complex and serious escalation. 

 

Government response. The government has been quick to blame foreign terrorists, as may be expected from an administration whose credibility has been further eroded by the November elections. Mubarak is already referring to a renewal of the anti-terrorism campaigns of the 1990s, suggesting an imminent severe security crackdown. The outcome will test the strength of the government, and of the prospects for the succession of Mubarak's son, Gamal, who is touted as the candidate to continue the stability, and protection of Copts, of the Mubarak era -- both of which are now threatened. If an escalation of sectarianism is avoided, both Mubaraks will be strengthened; if not, anger against them will increase -- and so far 'undecided' regime figures may choose to favour a military strongman rather than Gamal for succession. In the longer run, the government has persistently dealt with sectarian tensions purely as a security problem. While the crackdown has the potential to control or moderate violence, the failure to address the cultural and social roots of the problem will ensure that underlying tensions continue..."

Dear Mr. President; The people of Israel will be eternally grateful ....

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the people of Israel, I am writing to you to request clemency for Jonathan Pollard.

At the time of his arrest, Jonathan Pollard was acting as an agent of the Israeli government. Even though Israel was in no way directing its intelligence efforts against the United States, its actions were wrong and wholly unacceptable. Both Mr. Pollard and the Government of Israel have repeatedly expressed remorse for these actions, and Israel will continue to abide by its commitment that such wrongful actions will never be repeated.

As you know, Mr. President, I have raised the question of Jonathan Pollard’s release numerous times in discussions with your administration and with previous U.S. administrations. Previous Israeli Prime Ministers and Presidents have also requested clemency for Mr. Pollard from your predecessors.

Since Jonathan Pollard has now spent 25 years in prison, I believe that a new request for clemency is highly appropriate. I know that this view is also shared by former senior American officials with knowledge of the case as well as by numerous Members of Congress.

Jonathan Pollard has reportedly served longer in prison than any person convicted of similar crimes, and longer than the period requested by the prosecutors at the time of his plea bargain agreement. Jonathan has suffered greatly for his actions and his health has deteriorated considerably.

I know that the United States is a country based on fairness, justice and mercy. For all these reasons, I respectfully ask that you favorably consider this request for clemency. The people of Israel will be eternally grateful.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Netanyahu

Asian aid convoy arrives in Gaza

"... Egyptian authorities allowed entry to only 108 after denying visas to Iranian and Jordanian delegates...."

Mahmood Abbas' brother dies in Syria

".. Atta Abbas, among the first generation of Fatah movement, died of a heart attack here on Monday and was buried in Martyrs Graveyard in the Yarmouk camp for Palestinian refugees near Damascus, Mahmoud al-Khalidi, the Palestinian ambassador to Damascus was quoted as saying..."

Mossad recruiting heavily in the ...........wild!

"... The accusations went viral, with hundreds of posts on Arabic-language websites and forums claiming that the "Zionists" had trained these birds for espionage.The Sinai regional governor last month suggested that a shark that killed and maimed tourists on its Red Sea port may have been intentionally released by Israeli agents in order to sabotage the country's tourist industry."What is being said about the Mossad throwing the deadly shark in the sea to hit tourism in Egypt is not out of the question. But it needs time to confirm," Mohamed Abdel Fadil Shousha said, according to the British Sun newspaper...."

Daniel Pipes & Israel behind him: 'Saudi Arabia is more tolerant...'

"... The state under Abdullah has promoted a more open and tolerant Islam but, Meijer argues, “it is obvious from the ikhtilat debate that the battle has not been won. Many Saudis are fed up with the inordinate interference of religious authorities in their lives, and one can even speak of an anti-clerical movement. The liberals, however, speak a language that is alien to the world of official Wahhabism and the majority of Saudis and is therefore hardly likely to influence them.”..."

"So what?"

يقول بعض عارفي الحريري إن الهدوء يحكم ردود أفعال الأخير. وهو لم يخرج عن طوره، حتى في أحلك أيام أيار 2008، عندما كان شبه محاصر في منزل عائلته بقريطم، بعد انهيار ذراعه الأمنية. وفي هذه الأيام، يواجه الحريري المستنقع الذي يشدّ تياره إلى الأسفل، مستنداً إلى استراتيجية عنوانها: So what! (الترجمة الأقرب إلى معنى هذه العبارة هي: «وإن يكن»، أو «شو يعني»!).فإزاء الواقع السلبي، سياسياً وتنظيمياً وشعبياً، المحيط بالحريري، لا يزال الرئيس الشاب متفائلاً. وتفاؤله مبنيّ على نقاط قوة ما لا يملكها أحد غيره، بحسب المقرّبين منه.التيار مترهل، so what ؟ فالحريري يملك حيثية شخصية شعبية وسط الطائفة السُّني يجاريه فيها أحد. وهو السياسي الوحيد القادر خلال شهر واحد (شهر رمضان) على استقبال 30 ألف شخص إلى مائدته في قريطم. وهؤلاء، يصافحهم الرئيس فرداً فرداً، علماً بأنهم يمثّلون الطائفة السُّنية جمعاء، فمنهم زعماء الأحياء والمخاتير ورؤساء البلديات والموظفون البارزون في الدولة والقضاة والضباط والنواب والوزراء الحاليون والسابقون والمديرون العامون وكل من يملك حيثية شعبية وعائلية. عملياً، «هو يلتقي كل أبناء الطائفة السُّنية خلال شهر رمضان»، يقول أحد المطّلعين على ما يدور في وادي أبو جميل. وبرأي الأخير، فإن من يواجهون الحريري داخل الطائفة (باستثناء جمعية المشاريع الخيرية الإسلامية) عاجزون عن جمع 500 شخص بيروتي في لقاء سياسي واحد. وخارج بيروت، ليس ثمة من يهدد نفوذه داخل الطائفة. «نجيب ميقاتي ومحمد الصفدي لا يريدان خوض مغامرة ضده. عبد الرحيم مراد وأسامة سعد في البقاع وصيدا، لكل منهما حجمه الذي إن لم ينقص فلن يزيد، وكذلك الأمر بالنسبة إلى الأحباش». ويؤكد مقربون من الحريري أنه قادر على استرجاع كل من ابتعد عن تياره خلال العامين الماضيين، وخصوصاً أن معظم هؤلاء لم ينتقل إلى الضفّة الأخرى. وبرأيهم، إن الحريري قادر على اكتساح كل المناطق ذات الأغلبية السُّنية، في أي انتخابات تجرى. وبسبب الخطاب السياسي العالي النبرة السائد حالياً، «بإمكان الحريري استعادة كل البلديات التي خسرها في الانتخابات الأخيرة».هذا شعبياًَ. أما في الدولة اللبنانية، فتأخذ نظرية «So what» حيّزاً أكبر. يسأل أحد المقربين من الحريري: «كل ما جرى خلال السنوات الماضية، هل أضعف قدرة سعيد ميرزا أو أشرف ريفي أو وسام الحسن أو عبد المنعم يوسف على التحكم بالإدارات التي يمسكون بها؟ وهل بإمكان أيّ كان تعيين موظف في وزارة المال من دون رضى الحريري؟ وهل بإمكان أي مرسوم في الدولة أن يبصر النور من دون توقيع ريا الحسن؟ وهل تتجاهلون عشرات الإدارات والمؤسسات الرسمية والخدماتية التابعة مباشرة لرئيس الحكومة؟». يضاف إلى ما قيل، «حلفاء أثبتت الأيام أنهم لا ينفكّون عن الحريري، فضلاً عن كون بعضهم غير قادر على الابتعاد عنه». في المقابل، «ما الذي يمكن خصومنا أن ينفذوه، سوى التعطيل؟ لا شيء، إنهم فاقدون للمبادرة. والتعطيل يسري على الجميع».

 

هذا مختصر نظرة الحريري إلى الداخل اللبناني. أما خارجياً، هل ثمة من  يقدر على تسمية سياسي في العالم خارج أميركا، قادر على نسج اتصالات بالقدر ذاته الذي يملكه الحريري، من باكستان إلى دول الخليج إلى الدول العربية كلها، ومن روسيا إلى الولايات المتحدة، مروراً بأوروبا وبعض دول أميركا اللاتينية؟ وهل رأيتم رجلاً من خارج العائلة المالكة السعودية، يحظى بهذا الاهتمام من الملك الذي يحضنه؟ ومهما قيل عن إقفال «الحنفية» المالية السعودية عن حوض سعد الحريري، فهل ثمة من يتوهم أن الملك السعودي سيسمح بانكسار رئيس الحكومة في لبنان؟ وهل ثمة سياسي واحد في العالم يُحاط بالحفاوة ذاتها التي يلقاها الحريري الابن في دولة مثل روسيا، هي في موقع الحليف المفترض لخصومه السياسيين؟ يطرح أحد عارفي الحريري هذه الأسئلة، قبل أن يجيب نفسه بالقول:

إن سعد الحريري، بقدراته المالية وعلاقاته، هو واحد من أعضاء «النادي الحاكم» في العالم. ثم يحدثونك عن التراجع والانهيار، إيه so what؟  

"Three Decades of a Joke That Just Won't Die"

"...   When Mubarak came to power after Sadat's assassination, he was received with a mixture of relief and skepticism -- relief because he appeared to be a steadier hand than Sadat, who grew increasingly paranoid in the year before his death, and skepticism because Mubarak was the opposite of anything like the charismatic leadership that Sadat and Nasser embodied. Mubarak was also, at least early on, something of a joker himself. Not long into his reign, he quipped that he had never expected to be appointed vice president. "When I got the call from Sadat," he told an interviewer, "I thought he was going to make me the head of EgyptAir."

For decades many derided Mubarak as "La Vache Qui Rit" -- after the French processed cheese that appeared in Egypt in the 1970s along with the opening up of Egypt's markets -- because of his rural background and his bonhomie. The image that dominated Mubarak jokes during that period was that of an Egyptian archetype, the greedy and buffoonish peasant. One joke I remember well from the 1980s played off Mubarak's decision not to appoint a vice president after he ascended to the presidency: "When Nasser became president, he wanted a vice president stupider than himself to avoid a challenger, so he chose Sadat. When Sadat became president, he chose Mubarak for the same reason. But Mubarak has no vice president because there is no one in Egypt stupider than he is."

THE JOKES TURNED BITTER in the 1990s as Mubarak consolidated his power, started winning elections with more than 90 percent of the vote, and purged rivals in the military. One oft-retold story had Mubarak dispatching his political advisors to Washington to help with Bill Clinton's 1996 reelection campaign after the U.S. president admires Mubarak's popularity. When the results come in, it is Mubarak who is elected president of the United States.

But Mubarak jokes really settled into their current groove in the early 2000s, when Mubarak entered his mid-70s and a nationwide deathwatch began. One joke imagines a deathbed scene, the ailing Mubarak lamenting, "What will the Egyptian people do without me?" His advisor tries to comfort him: "Mr. President, don't worry about the Egyptians. They are a resilient people who could survive by eating stones!" Mubarak pauses to consider this and then tells the advisor to grant his son Alaa a monopoly on the trade in stones....

 

The Internet has opened new avenues for humor. One-line zingers that used to be circulated by text message are now exchanged on Twitter, while on Facebook fake identities and satirical fan pages have been established for the country's leading politicians. Widely circulated video mash-ups depict Mubarak and his entourage as the characters of a mafia movie or unlikely action heroes, including one spoofing a Star Wars poster with Mubarak standing in for the evil Emperor Palpatine.

But the bulk of today's jokes simply stress the tenacity with which Mubarak has held onto life and power. Hisham Kassem, a prominent publisher and liberal opposition figure, told me this recent joke:

Hosni Mubarak, Barack Obama, and Vladimir Putin are at a meeting together when suddenly God appears before them.

"I have come to tell you that the end of the world will be in two days," God says. "Tell your people."

So each leader goes back to his capital and prepares a television address.

In Washington, Obama says, "My fellow Americans, I have good news and bad news. The good news is that I can confirm that God exists. The bad news is that he told me the world would end in two days."

In Moscow, Putin says, "People of Russia, I regret that I have to inform you of two pieces of bad news. First, God exists, which means everything our country has believed in for most of the last century was false. Second, the world is ending in two days."

In Cairo, Mubarak says, "O Egyptians, I come to you today with two pieces of excellent news! First, God and I have just held an important summit. Second, he told me I would be your president until the end of time."

Kassem quips that the Mubarak regime's main legacy may be an unparalleled abundance of derision about its leader. "Under Nasser, it was the elite whose property he had nationalized that told jokes about the president," he told me. "Under Sadat, it was the poor people left behind by economic liberalization who told the jokes. But under Mubarak, everyone is telling jokes."

Yet an increasing number of Egyptians no longer think their country's situation is all that funny, and they are turning the national talent for wit into a more aggressive weapon of political dissidence. The anti-Mubarak Kifaya movement has used humor most poignantly to protest the indignity of an entire country becoming a hand-me-down for the Mubarak family, as the leader presses on with plans to anoint his son Gamal as his heir. Other protesters complaining about the rising cost of living and stagnating salaries use cartoons to depict fat-cat politicians and tycoons pillaging the country. And since the beginning of 2010, Nobel laureate Mohamed ElBaradei, former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency and a potential presidential challenger, has become a symbol of the kind of dignified leadership the Egyptian opposition has sought for decades. Notably, he recently scolded Mubarak for an inappropriate joke about a ferry crash that killed more than 1,000 Egyptians in 2006.

But even if Egypt's democrats fail to prevent the inheritance of the presidency, they will certainly keep making fun of Mubarak's son Gamal. One epic satire comes in the form of a popular blog called Ezba Abu Gamal ("The Village of Gamal's Father"). The blog is a collection of entries, usually from the perspective of Abu Gamal, mayor of a small village. He is constantly being nagged by his wife to promote his son, about whom he has misgivings; he doesn't understand all this talk about reform and laptops and so on. It is a biting portrait for those initiated into the details of Egyptian politics. Mubarak's "cunning peasant" persona re-emerges and Gamal is depicted as a wet-behind-the-ears incompetent manipulated by his friends, while countless ministers and security chiefs make appearances as craven village officials. Were it publishable in Egypt, it would make a hilarious book. ..."

"For Muslims, the problem is that the frustration with the US is so deep they are just happy it is failing..."

"...The Americans are not going to win. They have already lost. For Muslim nations, the problem is that the frustration with the United States is so deep they are just happy it is failing. But they don't understand that what could come out of Afghanistan might be worse than what we had before. ..."

Assad meets US Jewish leader (Schenker weighs in)

"... “Syria is very complicated place and an important country in region, and it’s important to see what can be done in the future,” Hoenlein said. “I meet with a number of Arab leaders, if they trust you, they talk to you. I don’t hide my agenda or what I am or what I believe.”
Syria analyst David Schenker of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy said the paradigm of Israeli prime ministers sending private American envoys to Damascus has a precedent, noting that in the late 1990s Netanyahu sent American Jewish philanthropist Ron Lauder to Damascus as his emissary. Schenker said Israel employs the (secret American) envoy model because Syria won’t hold direct negotiations with the Israelis.
He also interpreted Hoenlein's description of his trip as a "humanitarian mission" as suggesting the trip had less to do with Netanyahu exploring a Syria-Israel peace track than trying to secure Shalit's release. 
“It doesn’t appear to me that the Israelis believe that it is a particularly opportune time for peace negotiations with Syria,” Schenker said, noting reports in the past year of Syria allegedly sending increasingly sophisticated weaponry to Hizbollah in Lebanon.
At the same time, Schenker added, “there are smart people who believe that Syria is so driven by the desire to improve its economy that it needs better relations with the United States, and that a peace treaty with Israel is a way to restore relations with Washington.”...."

Netanyahu: "the truth is ..."

"We did everything, including implement a nine month freeze and when the Palestinians got into gear towards the end of the freeze, the first issue they raised was a three month extension of the freeze. "The truth is that Israel was prepared to extend the freeze, in spite of reports to the contrary," Netanyahu said. The prime minister noted the discussions he held with the US ahead of the expected freeze extension: "I told Obama that I can take the issue to the cabinet and get the cabinet to pass a freeze extension and then I got a message from the Americans to forget the issue. ...... the US said that it wouldn't lead to a positive situation, rather it would lead to an endless path of freeze following freeze. And yet, I agreed to that."

An Nahar is happy with Netanyahu's 'pledge': "We're Not Interfering in Lebanon"

"Israel is keen not to interfere with the current events in Lebanon in order to avoid giving any pretext for igniting the border, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Monday....., Netanyahu noted that "the main problem in Lebanon is that Iran has tightened its grip on that country, in addition to its arms supplies to Hizbullah."

GREAT: "Mideast 'peace process' to resume!"

Now we're getting somewhere!

"... Washington Middle East hands said the Obama administration has only itself to blame if it expected Barak to deliver his right wing prime minister given both their ideological differences and their long track records with Washington.
"Sure it is true that Barak overstated his ability to persuade Bibi," one veteran Washington Middle East hand said Sunday on condition of anonymity. "Quite frankly, that was apparent months ago. Nobody on our side should be surprised. Ultimately we only have ourselves to blame."..."

"... I see the glass as half full, yes, I mean people are arrested . . . but..."

"... Back to Bahrain for a moment. The "entire picture" Clinton referred to is that virtually no one, outside the Bahraini royal family and the State Department, shared her judgment that the parliamentary election was "free and fair." The dissidents are still on trial; their defense lawyers resigned en masse last month because of the court's refusal to consider any of their motions...."

"..Israel hawks have doomed themselves to the hell of Sisyphus, forced to roll the same stone up the hill over & over again

"...The memos reveal that none of the goals of Israel’s 2006 war on Lebanon and its 2008-9 war on little Gaza were achieved, and that both Hamas and Hizbullah have effectively re-armed. What makes Ashkenazi think things would be different this time? Israel hawks have doomed themselves to the particular hell of Sisyphus, forced to roll the same stone up the hill over and over again with no hope of ever balancing it on the summit.
You know, Israel could have a peace treaty with Syria and Lebanon tomorrow by giving back the Golan Heights and the Shebaa Farms, and by accepting a two-state solution. Instead, its Dr. Strangeloves are planning out massive bombings of areas thick with innocent civilians and willing to subject Tel Aviv to two months worth of rocket fire.
Nor will the United States be held harmless from the blowback in the region caused by another Israeli war of aggression. Before September 11, Israel hawks used to make fun of Americans who warned that eventually there would be hell to pay for the Israeli strangulation of the Palestinians (for the argument, see this posting). And, imagine what a war would do to gasoline prices and to the world economy. My deepest fear is that US support for Israeli militarism, and the terrorism that support inevitably engenders, will be what finally finishes off the civil liberties enshrined in the American Constitution. ..."

A moratorium for military action but not for settlements

".... A US diplomatic cable in 2005 released by WikiLeaks quoted an Israeli government official as warning US officials to take Israeli time-lines on Iranian capabilities with a pinch of salt. The cable quotes a senior Israeli foreign ministry official as noting wryly that his government, in 1993, had "predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998 at the latest".
A second cable covering a 2009 meeting in which an Israeli general warns that Iran will be able to build its first weapon by 2012, a US official observes: "It is unclear if the Israelis firmly believe this or are using worst-case estimates to raise greater urgency from the United States."
The assessments offered by Israeli leaders to American officials over the past two decades have certainly been heavy on unfounded alarmism.....Washington remains unlikely to launch an unprovoked attack on Iran over its nuclear programme. The US defence secretary Robert Gates has long argued that the potentially catastrophic risks of such action outweigh the gains, which are temporary at best. Therein lies the problem: Israel's voters have been told, to quote Mr Netanyahu in 2006, that "it's 1938 and Iran is Germany". So they'll expect their leaders to act if Washington doesn't. After all, the very idea of Israel is that Jews can't depend on others to save them from annihilation, so if its citizens believe that Iran is a reincarnation of Auschwitz, they will demand action.
Alarmist Israeli rhetoric may be designed to press Washington, but it potentially paints Israel's own leaders into a corner. They, too, know that Iran is not the threat painted in the more apocalyptic rhetoric. A little over a year ago, Mr Barak said publicly that "Iran does not constitute an existential threat against Israel," adding that "Israel is strong, I don't see anyone who could pose an existential threat."
Then again, Mr Barak had made clear to Goldberg that he believed that the greatest danger was that alarm at the idea of an Iranian nuclear weapon would prompt Israel's best and brightest to emigrate. If Israeli voters believe, as Goldberg suggests, that a "point of no return" was passed with the New Year and there are no air strikes in the spring, they may begin to doubt their government's ability to protect them...."

WikiLeaks:Hezbollah threat to Israel: 'Acute', unlike that of Iran ...

"... Ashkenazi told the delegation that "rocket threat against Israel is more serious than ever. Therefore, Israel has a strong emphasis on missile defense." He added that although the Iranian threat is serious, the threat from Hamas and Hizbullah, which are funded by Iran, is most acute. Their rockets are more accurate than Iran's, due to their proximity to Israel. "We therefore believe," Ashkenazi said, "that the next war will take place in the same areas where the previous wars occurred," Lebanon and Gaza. According to the cables, Ashkenazi said that Hizbullah has over 40,000 rockets, most of which can reach any point within Israel, and Hamas has the ability to strike Tel Aviv.Disruption of daily life in Tel Aviv is a major goal of Hizbullah and Hamas, and their weapons stockpiles indicated to the IDF that they are aiming for a lengthy conflict with Israel in which they plan to send a "massive number" of rockets into Israel daily. The chief of staff explained that anti-missile defense systems can not cover the whole country...."

EXCELLENT news: 'Only' 4000 Iraqi civilians killed in 2010' ... And fewer by US forces!

"... Iraq Body Count (IBC) recorded 4,008 civilian deaths from violence in 2010 (compared to 4,680 in 2009).........Non-combatant Iraqi deaths resulting directly from actions involving US-led coalition forces were half as many as in 2009, ......"

".. But it is the first time we are announcing it.."

"... "Many spy planes and ultra-modern aircrafts of our enemies have been shot down (by our forces) ... We have also shot down two spy planes in the Persian Gulf," said commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the elite forces' aerospace unit."But it is the first time we are announcing it." He did not say when the aircraft had been shot down, but described them as "western drone reconnaissance" aircraft...."

"J'Accuse!"

Thanks AngryArab:

"...I accuse those state bodies who believe that by bolstering the Salafi trend they are undermining the Muslim Brotherhood, and who like to occasionally play to bigoted anti-Coptic sentiments, presumably as an excellent distraction from other more serious issues of government. ..."

US in secret talks with Syria

"... Sources said that Obama adviser Denis Ross told the US administration that he found "Syria ready to move away from Iran and reduce relations with Hezbollah and Hamas, and work with the United States in the fight against terrorism."..."