" ... The Israeli political leadership -- in government as well as in the opposition -- refrains from addressing this very complex dilemma except by making brief vague statements. The military and intelligence communities are under strict instructions to avoid making remarks except to affirm that Israel is preparing itself for "any eventuality." They also refuse to take part in off-the-record briefings related to Israel's possible response to the challenge. The Israeli media has not generated a public debate on the pros and cons of military action -- partly in view of censorship restrictions. Even members of local think tanks and academic circles prove reluctant to venture into this domain.........
Israel has no great appetite for taking on Iran on its own, recognizing the difficulties involved in an attack as well as the potential that Iran could retaliate either with its Shehab-3 missiles, already operational, by embarking upon a large-scale terrorism campaign, or by having Hizballah ignite a conflict on the Lebanese front. Many view the military option as the "worst possible course" other than tolerating an Iran equipped with nuclear warheads. The Israeli leadership would, therefore, prefer action by the United States to stop Iran from acquiring a bomb either through diplomatic dialogue, effective sanctions, or -- if it came to it -- military strikes. Needless to say, a U.S. attack is bound to be much wider in scope and more devastating than any blow delivered by the Israel Defense Forces.
At the same time, many in Israel feel strongly that the country does possess the military capability to launch a successful strike against a limited number of Iranian nuclear installations to delay the pace of Iran's nuclear program by at least a couple of years. At least some in Israel believe that Iranian reprisals would be more restrained than public warnings from Tehran might indicate, and that Hizballah may attempt to employ its long-range Iranian missiles in a manner that would not necessarily lead to full-scale war. The argument would be that although the organization's long-range missiles are effectively under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force, Hizballah's leader Hassan Nasrallah would hesitate to provoke the Israelis into undertaking an all-out counteroffensive. Some Israelis argue that Iran would not necessarily retaliate against the United States and its Arab allies in the Gulf or Iraq for fear of compelling President Obama to strike back.......
Assessing Iranian missile power, Israelis tend to believe that as time passes Iran's ability to launch more missiles simultaneously will grow considerably. In the near term, they feel Iranian retaliation would essentially entail a repeat of the first Gulf war experience in 1991, when Israel had to absorb forty Iraqi Scuds -- mainly directed against Tel Aviv and Haifa -- with minimal casualties. The Iranian air force simply does not have the ability to reach Israel, and a naval attack of any sort is a remote possibility......
The current assessment in Israel is that although the Iranian regime long ago decided to get "within reach" of a bomb and is doing its utmost to move toward this objective, no decision has yet been made to go for a "breakout." The reason is that Iran would not risk the consequences of a breakout for a bomb or two but rather would only contemplate such a dramatic step when it had enough low-enriched uranium for a modest "arsenal" of about a half dozen bombs. In effect, Israel shares the assumption that very limited time still remains, though without much hope, for attempts to persuade Iran to halt its pursuit of atomic weapons.
Yet, for Israel, not only the purely nuclear clock is ticking. Aside from watching the speed with which the Iranians assemble a "mini arsenal," Israeli strategic planners have their eyes on another ticking clock: that marking the pace of Iranian efforts to improve defenses for their most sensitive targets, whether by burying them underground or by trying to make them otherwise immune to attack by air forces or by Israel's missile force. Israel's decision on whether to go it alone will depend greatly on its estimation of the likelihood that a strike would succeed. Thus, a concern may be Iran's successful protection of its installations, which could force Israel to make an early decision.
Israelis are concerned that a nuclear Iran will trigger an arms race among neighboring Arab states. They suspect Saudi Arabia may already have tacit understandings with Pakistan regarding some form of nuclear assistance, and the Israeli intelligence agencies are closely watching moves by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and others to develop nuclear programs for so-called peaceful purposes. The Arab media is rich with calls to have a "Sunni Arab bomb" to counter Iran's quest for hegemony with a "Persian Shiite bomb."
One scenario advanced by Israelis assumes that the Iranian leadership may resolve to "hang in" for a considerable period just below the weaponization red line, while upgrading and broadening its technical capabilities and enjoying the political clout associated with being an "almost" nuclear power. One good reason for the Iranians to "hang in" would be to wait for the development of future generations of long-range missiles. This scenario would translate into an extended period of regional tension and uncertainty.
As Israelis monitor the ups and certainly the downs of the current negotiations of the so-called P-5 + 1 with Iran, they will not rush their decisions. Those Israelis charged with following Iran are convinced that, at present, a deal could prove elusive. This means the time for Israel to determine its course may come by around mid-2010."
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