Libya: The messy collapse ...

Oxford Analytica; excerpts;

"... Soldiers held their ground in Tripoli after fierce clashes last night, as the government's control narrows geographically amid increasing regime and diplomatic defections.

... The uprising in Libya has grown and spread rapidly, in part because the security forces have responded so violently, which has emboldened protestors and opposition... Protests occurred in western Libya (for example in Zintan) as early as February 17, before spreading to Tripoli, where the final battle may now be concentrated. Crowds initially numbered in the low hundreds to the low thousands. As confidence grew, protestors increasingly called for the overthrow of the regime... After security forces killed more than 20 protestors, February 18 saw imams refusing to deliver authorised sermons, and some spoke out against the regime. Defections by tribal leaders, military, police, clerics (including the country's most senior cleric, Sheikh al-Sadiq al-Gheryani), and government officials (notably Libyan diplomats at the UN and the Arab League), have created a rapidly growing tide against the regime.

Regime response. After initially announcing some token concessionary measures (such as a prisoner release and promises of salary increases and tax reductions), the government has launched a major crackdown:

Force. It has used small arms, heavy weaponry, helicopters and fighter jets against the protestors. It has relied heavily on Libyan loyalist and mercenary army brigades -- in effect a praetorian guard, similar to the 'Islamic Legion' which Qadhafi set up in the 1970s. There have been claims that prisoners were released from al-Kuwayfiya Prison in Benghazi, and given money to fight for the regime. Qadhafi's sons (at least Saadi and Khamis) are believed to be directing some army brigades. His most prominent son, Seif al-Islam, made a rambling televised speech on February 20, claiming that there was an international plot to divide the country and warning that the government would fight to the end.

..... The cost in lives has spiralled rapidly. The total number killed runs into the high hundreds, with a risk of further losses. The overwhelming majority of casualties have been civilians, but there have been cases of security forces being executed for refusing to carry out orders, and several killings of security forces by protesters have been reported.

End game. What happens after the demise of the regime may be slightly influenced by the manner and speed of the overthrow:

Fight. The core of the regime may fight to the bitter end, most likely in Tripoli or possibly attempting to retreat to Sirte or Sebha. International calls for the departure of Qadhafi, and threats of international action and consequences for further atrocities, may help to split the army away from Qadhafi, accelerating the collapse.

Flight. Qadhafi and his family may try to flee, for example to a neighbouring sub-Saharan country. However, they now have very few options for where they can reach and avoid being brought to justice in due course.

Rapid collapse. A rapid final collapse would cause the least overall damage. This could occur through escalating defections and resignations in the army, and the rapid flight, capture or killing of the Qadhafis and loyalist 'men of the tent'. This path of events would make for an easier environment for national dialogue among opposition and civic groups and the formation of a caretaker administration.

Prolonged collapse. A drawn out, prolonged collapse would be most damaging, both in the human cost during the collapse, and potentially afterwards. It could comprise prolonged battles or sieges, army splits, massacres and random killings. This path of events would carry a risk of a vengeful and bloody aftermath, perhaps with lynchings of ex-regime members and possibly a retaliatory campaign of sabotage against those trying to establish a new administration. A prolonged collapse would delay the formation of a new administration and cause more disruption to the economy.

Aftermath. Besides the speed of the collapse, a combination of positive and negative factors will influence the aftermath:

Positive factors. The most important factors will be the organisation and goodwill of Libyans involved in or supporting the uprising. Beyond this is the deeper social and historical fabric of Libya, including feelings of nationalism, regionalism, tribal affiliation and religious unity, which have played a positive role in the uprising. While risks remain of divisions, at present, Libya's historical regionalism (Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania) and associated regional leaderships, stand more to help than to divide the country -- as illustrated by protestors in Tripoli voicing their determination to stand with Benghazi.

Negative factors. Compared with Egypt and Tunisia, Libya has no experience of multiparty politics and elections and no constitution. Formal civil society organisations are scarce, and international organisations focused on governance and human rights are largely not yet present in Libya......

Foreign relations. The failure of Western governments to do more to promote political reform in Libya under Qadhafi, while pursuing lucrative business opportunities, is resented by some Libyans, and some have criticised Europe and Washington of being slow and timid in responding to the violence. However, beyond seeking some redress, a post-Qadhafi government will seek positive relations with Europe, the United States and its North African neighbours, not least because of the economic and political benefits..."