"...Without Syria, Saudi Arabia doesn't have a chance in Lebanon.

Elias Muhanna (QifaNabki) flagged this inteview from MeowLebanon:
"...

How did Iran’s role evolve in Lebanon over the last decade?
Baer: In 1982, the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] arrived in Lebanon with the express purpose of driving out the Americans and the French. Having forced them to withdraw their forces, Iran consciously turned its energy to driving out the Israelis. Currently, Iran is supporting Hezbollah’s shift to becoming a force for stability. Iran intends to prove that it is not only a revolutionary, anti-colonialist force but also one that can govern – or, in Hezbollah’s case, a backer of a local force that can govern.  

You say in your book that Iran was able to win the hearts of the Lebanese and Palestinian people by adopting national causes they can relate to, i.e. the struggle against Israeli occupation. Did the end of Israeli occupation over Lebanon weaken the Iranian argument of legitimacy?
Baer: Yes, the Iranians have a reduced role in Lebanon now that the war is more or less over. But the point remains the vast majority of the people in the Middle East look at Israel as an occupying military power, and the irreducible fact is that Iran (and Hezbollah) took it on and won. Samson and Goliath; that distinction will serve Iran for a long time. 
 
Do you believe that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s visit to Lebanon with Saudi King Abdullah a few weeks ago is an indicator of Saudi’s attempt to curb Iran’s power over Lebanon? How successful was that?
Baer: The great divide in the Middle East is Saudi Arabia and Iran. If Saudi Arabia's influence in Lebanon were to completely vanish, it would be a great loss. What Saudi Arabia is trying to do now is bring Syria back into its fold, counting on [it] for helping with Lebanon. Without Syria, Saudi Arabia doesn't have a chance in Lebanon.

How far would such an alliance go? Is it threatening for Hezbollah?
Baer: Syria will never abandon Hezbollah. The Party of God is an integral piece of its armature of military defense, and no amount of Saudi money will change this reality.

In your book you spoke at length about Hezbollah military commander Imad Mugniyah, describing him as “freelancer,” someone Iran could not completely rely on. What type of relations did Iran maintain with Mugniyah before his death? What about his role within Hezbollah?
Baer: Mugniyah was a fighter. He bridled at Iranian caution and wanted to carry the war to the West Bank and Gaza - and even Western Europe. At the same time he was considered untouchable in Tehran, an icon of the Islamic Resistance.

What is your take on his assassination in Syria in 2008?
Baer: I've heard all the theories, but in all honesty I don't have an answer.

How do you view accusations of the possible involvement of Hezbollah members in the 2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri?
Baer: Let's wait until the evidence comes out.

Could party members be involved without the knowledge of Hezbollah or Iran?
Baer: I've been in and out of Lebanon for 25 years, and I have to admit there's no better country in the world for making and hiding conspiracies. I can make a convincing case that Arafat assassinated President Bachir Gemayel [in 1982 through the Syrian Social Nationalist Party], but most people would scoff at the idea. Sometimes we never get answers.

Do you think that the argument of Hezbollah’s possible involvement in the Hariri assassination would serve Israel’s objectives? How would this translate across the Middle East?
Baer: I don't see a clear case that Hariri's assassination served anyone's interests, neither Syria’s nor Israel's. Both countries need a stable Lebanon, with a strong central government. Taking the decision to assassinate Hariri must have involved an extraordinary set of circumstances - ones I can only speculate on."