The Sunni Community and Hariri’s 'Future Current'

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Saad Hariri, who inherited from his father the mantle of

leader of the country and of the Sunni community, faces

an unenviable task. His first challenge is to reverse the

sectarian-based identification and mobilisation which

served him so well in recent years – and culminated in his

decisive triumph in the 7 June 2009 legislative elections –

but no longer can constitute his principal political asset.

Insofar as he heads a national unity government, the

prime minister can rule efficiently only if he minimises

heretofore dominant confessional and political fault-lines.

It will not be easy. Defiance and rejection of the Shiite

Hizbollah movement, Syria and Iran played a critical part

in his political ascent, providing him with powerful do-

mestic and international backing. Moreover, the underly-

ing local and regional factors that fuel these sentiments

remain largely unresolved, making it difficult for Hariri

to moderate his Sunni base or bring along his foreign

backers.

Hariri’s difficult internal and external repositioning is

compounded – and this represents his second major chal-

lenge – by the fact that both arenas remain highly fluid

and unsettled. Lebanon’s incipient normalisation with

Damascus is a gamble, necessary yet risky nonetheless.

Hostility toward Syria among the country’s Sunni com-

munity convinced of the regime’s role in Rafic Hariri’s

assassination and chafing after decades of Syrian domina-

tion, still runs deep; several of Lebanon’s foreign supporters

are uneasy about Damascus’s regional posture; and the two

countries almost certainly will face tremendous obstacles

in their quest for more balanced relations. Resumption of

Israeli-Lebanese hostilities – a possibility not to be dis-

counted – almost certainly would revive the contentious

issue of Hizbollah’s weapons which has been set aside

since the new Lebanese government’s inauguration.

Hariri’s third challenge is that he leads a unity govern-

ment which, in many ways, is unprecedented and thus

whose sustainability is unknown. Historically, Lebanon

has tended to be ruled by broad coalitions. But these have

involved lopsided power-sharing arrangements in which

some political parties in effect were in control at the ex-

pense of others. In contrast, the current government faith-

fully reflects the actual balance of power. The outcome of

a prolonged political impasse and institutional paralysis,

the cabinet must prove it can produce something quite

different. In other words, even assuming foreign actors

refrain from destructive interference, the dysfunctional

political system could well generate sufficient crises and

deadlocks on basic issues of governance to render Hariri’s

self-proclaimed priority – the country’s economic recov-

ery – a pipe dream.

Lastly, the Future Current – whose influence and promi-

nence grew under circumstances of exceptional communal

mobilisation – is facing the re-emergence of a traditionally

more fragmented, diverse Sunni landscape. Local leaders

and Islamist movements seek to reassert their authority,

question Hariri’s leadership or resist his domination. A

more pluralistic, diverse Sunni community would not nec-

essarily be a bad thing, arguably signalling the transition

toward a more peaceful, less polarised form of politics. But

it also could vastly complicate the prime minister’s task....

..... Hariri (Rafic) had established himself as an important

Sunni leader: he had helped the community acquire a more

equitable share of power through the Taef accords and,

because so many Sunni figures had died during the war, he

filled the vacuum. An observer of the Sunni scene said:

Many Sunni representatives were killed during the

war, among them sheikh Sobhi Saleh; Nazem al-Qadri

[a member of parliament]; prime minister Rachid

Karameh; and mufti Hassan Khaled. These murders

left Sunnis to themselves, unprotected, more frag-

mented, marginalised and exposed than other, more

structured communities. Sunnis largely were excluded

from political life, for example during the 1985 tripar-

tite agreement. The three-way agreement was reached with Syrian support by

Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader; Nabih Berri, head of the Shiite

Amal movement; and Elie Hobeika, head of one of the Lebanese

Forces’ branches. It sought, but failed, to end the civil war.

Hariri faced three important obstacles. First, insofar as the

vision was very much his own, the line separating public

policy from personal interests had a tendency to blur.

As a result, he stood accused of promoting his own busi-

ness at the expense of the broader good, in particular

when private companies he owned either in part or in full

undertook colossal public works – not always in full

transparency. This was coupled with a broader and

oftentimes vehement critique of his economic policy: a

laissez-faire approach and a monetarist policy aiming at

exchange rate stabilisation that some viewed as overly

costly in social terms and massive public expenses that

saddled the country with heavy debts.

Secondly, his project depended to a large extent on a

peaceful regional context and in particular avoidance of

renewed Arab-Israeli warfare. This was critical in ensur-

ing that Lebanon attracted investments, businessmen and

tourists. In the early 1990s, this seemed possible. The

civil war had come to a close, the Israeli-Arab peace

process was launched, both Iraq and Iran appeared to be

contained, and three-way coordination between Saudi

Arabia, Egypt and Syria had significantly improved. In

1996, Hariri drew on his broad regional and international

network to help end Israel’s “Grapes of Wrath” operation

in Lebanon.

In 2000, however, whatever prospects existed had dark-

ened substantially with the collapse of Israeli-Syrian and

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the outbreak of the

second Palestinian uprising, followed by the elections of

George W. Bush in the U.S. and Ariel Sharon in Israel,

neither of whom appeared particularly keen to relaunch

peace talks.

Finally, Hariri’s gambit hinged on Syria’s goodwill,

whose presence in and influence over Lebanon were

enormous, intrusive and internationally sanctioned. The

very fact of his prime ministership reflected an under-

standing between Damascus and Riyadh which recog-

nised the primacy of Syrian interests in Lebanon, while

giving Saudi Arabia a role through Rafic Hariri.

In and of itself, Hariri’s economic policy hardly was in-

imical to Syrian interests. ....... At the outset

at least, Hariri tried hard to accommodate his neighbour.

Tensions between Hariri and Syria began to surface in

1998. These likely were caused by several interrelated

factors. To begin, Hariri had acquired an extraordinary

stature as de facto head of state, bringing together broad

Sunni support, a national vision and powerful interna-

tional backing.... Eager to cut him back to size, Damascus took

advantage of the increasing difficulties encountered by

Hariri’s economic project. The political transition in

Damascus also played a part; Hafez al-Assad, sick and in

his final years, almost certainly was seeking to consoli-

date his regime’s position in Lebanon prior to handing

power over to his son, Bashar.

The most tangible phase of the crisis occurred in Novem-

ber 1998, when Syria orchestrated the election to the

presidency of Emile Lahoud, former army chief of staff.

Lahoud immediately positioned himself in opposition to

Hariri; his inaugural address pointedly stressed “the pre-

eminence of the rule of law, the strengthening of govern-

mental institutions, the requirement for transparency and

accountability in the conduct of public affairs and the

promotion of social justice and equality”, all of which

were intended as indirect attacks on the outgoing prime

minister. Ultimately, Hariri ruled himself out and the

cabinet, led by Salim al-Hoss, was almost entirely reshuffled.

Tensions reached a new level when, after his triumph in

the 2000 parliamentary elections, Hariri regained the

prime ministership. This led to a stormy relationship with

the president, reflected in sustained domestic paralysis

and growing Syrian intrusion. Israel’s 2000 withdrawal

from South Lebanon simultaneously encouraged greater

Lebanese opposition to Syria’s military presence and

Hizbollah’s armed status, both of which were chiefly

justified by the continued occupation. Anti-Syrian criticism

ceased being a principally Christian affair, as others –

notably Walid Jumblatt, head of the Druze community –

joined their voices. The Syrian regime faced the U.S.

invasion of Iraq as well as heightened pressure from

Washington and Paris....

Hariri, under pressure, formed a more pro-Syrian gov-

ernment. Then, a year later, parliament extended Lahoud’s

mandate.... In American and French eyes, Syria had crossed a redline; in

Hariri’s, this was a turning point that pushed him to re-

sign the premiership and join the Lebanese opposition. ....

... on 14 February 2005, he was killed in

a massive explosion.....

......The event had sectarian implications: Rafic

Hariri’s death awoke deep, lingering fears among the

Sunni community which quickly rallied around his son,

Saad, and shifted its national, regional and wider interna-

tional alliances......

.... For Sunnis, the situation was more ambiguous. A number

of local leaders, including Omar Karameh in Tripoli and

Abdel Rahim Mrad in the Bekaa Valley, became Syria’s

unconditional allies. At the other end of the spectrum

were (relatively minor) pockets of resistance, chiefly

among Islamist activists who, in turn, were severely hit

by the Syrian-Lebanese security services.45 In Northern

Lebanon, principally Tripoli, Syria’s presence was tanta-

mount to an occupation, a reflection of Damascus’s alarm

at the prospect of an Islamist movement that eventually

could cross into its own territory.....

The intensity of the Sunnis’ reaction and their stunning

communal mobilisation cannot be explained solely by

anger at Syrian practices or loyalty toward Rafic. ....

...... a multitude of converging resentments, discom-

forts and anxieties: resentment at Syria’s ability to thwart

Hariri’s project; discomfort at the lack of any credible

alternative; and anxiety stemming from a more general

sense of vulnerability. The end result was a massive,

overpowering instinct of communal solidarity.....

Historically, Sunnis have tended to identify with the Arab

nationalist movement and to seek support in the wider

Sunni Arab world, an outlook manifested in the decision

to side with the Palestinians during the civil war. Rafic

Hariri’s more specifically Lebanese project appealed to

many, and the collapse of Arab nationalism further eroded

the pan-Arab ideal. Still, the desire to belong to a wider

Islamic, Arab environment lingered. As a Sunni resident

of Bab Tebbaneh said, “to us, Lebanon remains an artifi-

cial construct with which we simply could not identify”....

... For the most part, Lebanon’s Sunnis have tended to con-

test Western regional policies. .....

they grew increasingly hostile to the U.S., viewed as

blindly supporting Israel and unsympathetic to Arab aspi-

rations. Anti-American sentiment deepened

further in reaction to President George W. Bush’s “war

against terrorism”, perceived by many as a struggle

against Islam.

The situation changed with the 2005 assassination of

Rafic Hariri. ..... Domestically, the

community entered into what a former Hariri aide dubbed

an “unholy alliance” with its historical foes, anti-Syrian

Christian parties.

The Future Current invoked two rationales to justify its

stark international and domestic realignment. The West

and particularly the U.S. were seen as indispensable part-

ners in what was emerging as an uneven, life-or-death

battle against Syria and its allies, Hizbollah and Iran.....

.... The Future Current’s international repositioning pro-

voked mixed reactions among its base. Although criticism

of Syria and its allies resonated widely, the defence of

Western and particularly American policy was a harder

sell. Many Future Current followers, while grateful for

Washington’s support, nonetheless accused the U.S. of

pursuing a foreign policy hostile to both Arab and Muslim

interests.

A Future Current member put it as follows:

“We need the Americans against Syria and Hizbollah,

but when it comes to Iraq or Palestine, we remain pro-

foundly anti-American”.....

....... Perhaps the most striking transformation in Sunni attitudes

since 2005 has been the intense sectarian polarisation and

hostility toward Shiites. Tensions had existed in the past,

but for the most part they had remained dormant ....

Several leaders of the moderate axis began to describe regional

tensions as a fight against a Shiite threat, ....

[May:2008:]

We cannot rely on the army. Amal and Hizbollah mili-

tants can enter any place they want and create disorder

before the army steps in. Our best and only response is

for our youth to take charge of protecting Sunni

neighbourhoods.

The Future Current’s response to growing popular pres-

sure was not to establish its own, centralised militia;

Hizbollah’s overwhelming military power would have

rendered any such endeavour futile and counterpro-

ductive. Instead, it created a private security organisa-

tion charged with protecting its leaders – a reaction to

the assassination of several March 14 figures between

2005 and 2007. It also recruited young militants to join

Future Current-funded and managed groups to defend

Sunni neighbourhoods......

Reacting to cabinet decisions it viewed as

undermining its operational capacity,109 Hizbollah and

some of its allies mounted a vast military manoeuvre.

Within a few hours, the movement was in control of

Sunni-dominated West Beirut. Saad Hariri was under

siege in his residence, his personal guard, and the Future

Current’s private security and other forces having been

routed. The Sunnis’ defeat was swift, unambiguous

and humiliating.

The May 2008 crisis carried several harsh lessons for the

Future Current. To begin, it was utterly outmatched by its

opponents’ cohesiveness, determination and advance

planning. Even within Hariri’s entourage, criticism con-

cerning the movement’s strategic choices was bitter and

rampant. Sunni militants who joined the fighting

blamed their leaders for “abandoning them”. Just as

importantly, the events attested to the impotence of the

Future Current’s foreign allies. The U.S., France and

Saudi Arabia watched passively from the sidelines as

Hizbollah flexed its muscles. During the subsequent Doha

negotiations, March 14, feeling betrayed, had little choice

but to accept most of the opposition’s demands which,

buoyed by the international community’s support, it had

resisted until then.

In a way, the outcome also marked the end of the Future

Current's brief flirtation with a military logic. ......

The domestic realignment was matched by regional and

international repositioning. After the Doha accord, France

broke ranks with the U.S. and rapidly normalised rela-

tions with Syria ...The Bush administration itself,

although not fundamentally altering its stance, softened

its pressure on Damascus and disengaged somewhat from

Lebanon.... Riyadh adopted a more balanced approach and

encouraged normalisation of ties between Syria and

Lebanon, in particular by pressing Saad Hariri to visit

Damascus ....

...... the Future Current for now appears able to preserve its dominant position

among Sunnis. Continued uncertainly in the domestic and

regional arenas is likely to convince most that closing

ranks behind Hariri is still a priority. ......

There are indications that the chief prosecutor might

announce indictments sometime before the end of the

year,144 and speculation is mounting that he might impli-

cate Hizbollah members. Warning about the potential

implications of such allegations, Jumblatt compared them

to the “Aïn Remaneh bus” – an allusion to the attacks

that triggered the 1975 civil war.

The Future Current is both extremely centralised and

tremendously fluid. It has organised around patriarchal

figures – Rafic and then, to a lesser extent, Saad –, as-

signs important roles to Hariri family members148 and

works somewhat in the manner of a royal court in which

access to resources generally is a function of proximity to

the ruling family. At the same time, the Future Current

never established party-like organisational or ideological

structures (even though it formally registered as a party in

2007).149 It lacks a clear political program, ......

In so far as the Future Current has presented a unifying

vision, it essentially has been a negative one, predicated

on hostility toward Hizbollah and its local and foreign

backers....

Over time, however, the dominant traditional style of pa-

triarchal politics, combined with a lack of cadres, institu-

tions and internal coordination mechanisms, could prove

costly. Militants at times take actions without any

oversight. The Future Current’s support, powerful as it

is, remains, in the words of one of its parliamentarians,

“imperfect, fluid and fragile”. A local UN expert com-

mented: “Patron-client politics create erratic loyalty;

one’s allegiance quickly can shift against the leader, as

soon the leader stops providing funds”.

There also is a large gap between stated principles and

actual behaviour. The Future Current denounces others,

notably Hizbollah, for undermining the state, yet its

policies have differed little in their impact. It too has

stepped into the economic, social and security void left by

the state as a means of addressing constituent demands,

asserted influence over state institutions, encouraged a

sectarian discourse and sought out foreign assistance.

Such practices, followed by much of the political class,

perpetuate the state’s weakness. ......

The Future Current’s most acute dilemma today is that

the more it plays on and appeals to Sunni fears and inse-

curities – the more it retains its current system of patronage

– the less Hariri can aspire to a national role....

.....Under the circumstances, and under Saad Hariri’s

dual role as head of the movement and leader of the

nation, an important question is how long the Future Current

can maintain its quasi-hegemony. ....

Contrary to some expectations, Lebanon’s heightened

sectarianism did not boost the appeal of Sunni Islamist

movements. To the contrary: their popular support

waned even as confessional tensions rose......,

.... the Future Current held an obvious comparative advantage.

In contrast, most of the smaller Islamist parties lacked a

coherent political project, let alone a united leadership;

very few took proper account of the country’s multi-

confessional identity, political pluralism or relations to

the West.....

Many Islamist activists acknowledge they made a mis-

take in letting the Future Current monopolise the

scene. They now realise that the Current’s positions

and commitments are not always reliable. There is a

thirst for greater pluralism among Sunnis.....

1. Dar al-Fatwa’s religious author-

ity has waned due to charges of corruption routinely

levied by both religious leaders and ordinary citizens.

Secondly, and partly as a result, it has failed to impose

itself as the paramount supervisory and regulatory institu-

tion it is meant to be. The effect has been felt in the often

chaotic proliferation of small religious centres whose

diplomas Dar al-Fatwa refuses to validate and where

more militant, radical teachings can and do take place.....

Thirdly, and consequently, it has sought to compensate for its lack of

grassroots legitimacy through closer ties to the commu-

nity’s political leadership, letting itself be caught in the

country's political and religious polarisation. ....

notably by resorting to a more divisive and openly confessional rhetoric.....

2. Jamaa Islamiyya, the Lebanese branch of the Muslim

Brotherhood, is arguably the nation’s best organised

Sunni Islamist movement,.....

Since 2005, the movement has been somewhat at odds

with the community’s overall ideological stance.....

As the sectarian rift and Sunni distrust of Hizbollah deep-

ened following Hariri’s murder, Jamaa Islamiyya has had

to walk a fine line, .....building a stronger relationship with Jamaa

Islamiyaa and its relatively moderate brand of Islamism

proved beneficial to Hariri’s movement, for it satisfied

the Future Current’s more religious constituency without

alienating its Christian partners.....

3. Salafis

In 1995, a jihadi salafist group murdered the head

of the Ahbash, a pro-Syrian Islamic association, on the

grounds that it was heretical. In response, the Lebanese

and Syrian security services cracked down on salafists,

drawing little distinction between their violent and non-

violent expressions. This downward trend accelerated

as of 1999 following bloody fighting between a jihadist

group and the Lebanese army. Tens of militants, both

missionary and jihadi salafists, were arrested....

The Salafi movement experienced yet another setback

due to the international context. The 11 September 2001

attacks in the U.S., followed by a series of explosions in

Riyadh in 2003, prompted a significantly drop in out-

side financial contribution to Salafi mosques and learning

centres....

As Saudi support waned, Kuwaiti-inspired Salafism grew.

But for salafists, the picture remained bleak....

After a period of disarray, Salafism reemerged in the

wake of Hariri’s assassination. The Future Current re-

newed ties with Salafi leaders, joined in shared hostility

toward Syria and the Shiite community. The Future

As a general matter, Salafis exhibit intense hostility to Shiism.

In August 2008, several Salafi representatives – including Hassan

al-Chahal and Safwan Zu’bi – signed an agreement with Hizbol-

lah aimed at ending “sectarian incitement” and rejecting “all acts

of aggression.... But it came at a cost. In theory, Salafism rejects not only

active political participation but also allegiance to any

political leader not in strict conformity with its interpreta-

tion of Islamic law – a prohibition that is all the more

pertinent in Lebanon’s multi-confessional context.

Among rank-and-file Salafists, therefore, the perception

that some movement leaders had entered into deals with

members of the political class caused considerable dis-

quiet..........

Jihadi Salafism

Lebanese jihadi groups first emerged in the course of the

country’s long civil war. Prior to 1990, they essentially

comprised non-Salafi, Islamist movements calling for

armed struggle against Israel, as well as Palestinians

from refugee camps. Over the subsequent decade, the

return of fighters from the Afghan war contributed to the

emergence of a Salafi jihadist movement which flour-

ished chiefly among disadvantaged Sunnis from North

Lebanon and the Bekaa. The so-called Lebanese “Arab-

Afghans” were few in number yet found relatively

hospitable terrain....

The first concrete jihadi manifestation in the Bekaa grew

out of the return of another Afghan veteran, Mostafa

Ramadan (also known as Abu Mohamed al-Loubnani),

who is believed to have been close to the then-head of

al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi.... In 2005,

parliament amnestied several Islamists arrested in con-

nection with the Dinniyeh and Majdal Anjar incidents,

most likely in order to contain and co-opt various compo-

nents of the Sunni community at a time of intense sectarian

polarisation and confrontation.

Likewise, Bahia Hariri

provided funds to a Palestinian jihadist group, Jund al-Sham,

in the hope of achieving a temporary and fragile calm....

The case of Fatah al-Islam is the most apt illustration of

such ambiguities. Even as various parties accused one

another of promoting the movement,257 its history points

to collective responsibility. From the outset, Fatah al-

Islam’s emergence was visible to all, and its expansion

required at the very least extreme carelessness, if not

active involvement by Syria, the Future Current, Tripoli’s

missionary Salafist circles, Lebanon’s security apparatus

and various Palestinian factions in Nahr al-Bared.

Each, at one point or another, seemingly expected to

profit from Fatah al-Islam, even as it became increasingly

apparent that it was beyond anyone’s control. ...

Despite the political class’ recklessness and the state’s

short-sighted, overly security-based response, the jihadist

phenomenon for the most part has remained manageable.

To a large extent, this is due to its relatively confined

geographic space. In the Bekaa as in the South, Hizbol-

lah’s powerful presence effectively curbed the jihadists’

progress. In Tripoli and North Lebanon, the tragedy that

struck Nahr al-Bared has since held the jihadists in check.

Although many were outraged and radicalised by the harsh-

ness of state repression, the events led to an even sharper

level of surveillance and repression. They also high-

lighted the extraordinarily heavy cost of any future con-

frontation....