Next for Obama: The muscular foreign policy you didn’t expect?

FP/ here

".... When National Security Advisor Jim Jones meets tomorrow in an outreach session with most of his predecessors in the post, it is quite likely that the discussion they have will turn on the lessons learned from the past year. And the resulting drift may be surprising to some who have seen the Obama administration's last year as one that was fairly "soft" in the face of challenges.

Take the current contretemps with Israel. It is now clear to many around Obama that the Netanyahu administration -- which not only allowed Vice President Biden to be embarrassed on his recent visit with the unexpected announcement of additional construction in a disputed area of Jerusalem but has progressively made matters worse with tough talks on settlements ever since -- is not going to make it easy for the U.S. to help revitalize the peace process. The Israelis are negotiating with cranes and concrete in a way that makes other sorts of constructive talks less likely. So where does that lead?

To some who will be influential in advising the White House and shaping the view of the U.S. policy community, it may well lead to a stance where the U.S. plays a more aggressive role in establishing the terms of a settlement and then seeking to win support for those terms from other influential third parties, such as Arab nations in the region. If the Palestinians can't get their act together and the Israelis won't, you may well see the United States try to play an unprecedented role as an engine of consensus building on the Arab side and then returning in the position to be much tougher. Frankly, this is the strategy that the Netanyahu team is forcing on the United States, but it is one which could prove more productive than other failed past efforts.

In the same vein, on Iran, the administration has tested many avenues. Based on a widely (although not universally) held view within the U.S. government that military action against the Iranians to stop their nuclear program was an undesirable option, there has been an effort to craft meaningful sanctions. This effort, while earnest and possibly producing a near term sting for some in Iran, is almost certainly likely to be a failure. Which then leaves us with containment. While some argue this will work with any rational actors in the government, the problem lies with what happens if weapons were to fall in the hands of actors like Hezbollah, Iran's state-sponsored terrorist group or were it to trigger an arms race in the region that increased the likelihood of arms falling into the hands of a non-state actor? Containment can't stop this threat. Multilateral talks aimed at a more effective international arms control regime are a worthy idea, but unless there is broad consensus about effective enforcement mechanisms with teeth -- and there won't be -- this too will be useless. So where might this bring the Obama team?

Back to the idea of taking some kind of military action to slow the development of the Iranian nuclear program. Not a war but some meaningful strikes -- ideally ones that suggest to the Iran people the danger in which the current regime is putting them. (While walking the fine line of not strengthening the regime through such action.)

Certainly, this is not a best case option but it is also clear that putting it back on the table in a serious way increases the likelihood of effectiveness of virtually all other options, many of which are likely to be pursued in parallel at the same time. This approach is likely to be best presented in "belts and suspenders" form saying the United States seriously reserves the right to use force to protect its interests and at the same time the United States will work with regional allies like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Afghanistan to create the ability to swiftly take action against any Iranian regime that is even poised to use nuclear weapons... or which acts through some non-state partner.

Would regime change be the best possible option in Iran as Richard Haass at the Council on Foreign Relations has compellingly argued? Yes. But we're notoriously bad at making regime change happen and often produce unintended consequences or blowback from our efforts in that regard so it alone cannot constitute the totality of a strategy. The military option seriously must remain on the table and while it is unclear where the administration is headed on this, it is clear that both Secretaries Clinton and Gates remain more open to the option than others.

The story is likely to be the same worldwide whether in dealing with the Chinese on economic issues or in taking tough stances with our "allies" in Baghdad, Kabul or Islamabad. There is evidence of such a shift in each of these areas. It's not exactly the flower petal strewn world of engagement and "can't we all get along" that some saw from Obama but it is, it evolves in this direction, a sense that as in his dealings with the U.S. Congress and his Republican opposition, Barack Obama is first and foremost a pragmatic president who is capable of learning and adapting on the job.