OxFan: "... Momentum from events & assumptions of the Bush era, will continue to restrict the Obama's choices ..."

[OXFAN: Excerpts:]

"... Strategic summary

• The administration has no 'grand theory' of how the Middle East works, unlike its predecessor. (I wonder what that previous 'theory' included)
• US policy in 2009 has often been hostage to events, such as the outcome of Israeli and Iranian elections, and Palestinian infighting.
• Washington will continue to offer Tehran an opportunity for a more positive relationship, but will also push for tighter sanctions.
• The administration will push hard to maintain its Iraq troop withdrawal timetable, but it could slip.
• The core of the immediate problem in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is political, rather than diplomatic.....

The war in Iraq and the push for democratisation in the Arab world (both of which were precipitated by the September 11, 2001 attacks) intimately tied the Bush administration's foreign policy legacy to the Middle East. In its later years, there was never any question where the administration's priorities lay. The Obama administration has not sought to link judgment of its political and policy success to the Middle East -- at least not to the same degree -- but will find itself tied to the region in this respect in 2010.

Policy preoccupations. Most frustrating for the White House is that dramatic regional policy reversals have not led to dramatically improved results, in terms of achieving US objectives:

1. Israel-Palestinians. Obama sought to signal early that the Bush approach of polite disengagement, combined with being tough on Palestinians and understanding toward Israelis, was over. In his first week in office, Obama called the major leaders in the region, pledged his involvement, and named former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell as his special envoy. However, Israeli elections in February, followed by month-long negotiations over forming a government, stalled the new White House initiative:

• Advantage Netanyahu. As 2009 closes, the Israeli government believes it has got the better of Obama. Determined not to make any significant agreements with a weak and splintered Palestinian National Authority (PNA) , Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has won broad public approval in Israel, while Obama's standing in the country has plummeted. Regardless of whether PNA President Mahmoud Abbas makes good on his threat to resign, Hamas appears entrenched in Gaza and Palestinian politics are melting down.
• Potential US initiatives. Obama has no good options in 2010. He could opt to become even more personally engaged, but this would be high risk given current political conditions. Another route would involve floating a US-backed proposal, forcing each side to react to it. Such a strategy has been mooted since the summer, but has not been executed. A third option would quietly de-emphasise the issue on the president's agenda, leaving negotiations to lower-level officials. In 2010, greater personal involvement seems unlikely, but abandoning the issue is unthinkable given Obama's keen desire to connect with Muslim audiences.
• Politics before diplomacy. Whatever the president does, his policy may need to focus on a pre-eminent truth: the core of the immediate problem is political, rather than diplomatic. There is no conceivable deal right now that either side could gain public support for signing up to, and neither leader is inclined to conclude an agreement with his opposite number. Altering these conditions, rather than constructing an 'ideal' agreement that meets the needs of each side, may need to be the first priority.

2. Iraq. Whereas Bush seemed to think about Iraq constantly, the issue appears to figure little on the agendas of most of the Obama administration's senior national security officials. With great uncertainty surrounding the elections scheduled for January, it is possible that a collapse in conditions in Iraq would prompt the United States to slow its troop withdrawal timetable. Yet, it seems unthinkable that the US military would contemplate a long-term presence in Iraq, and US goals for the country have been dramatically scaled back from the enthusiasms of the Bush era.

Many US government officials currently working on Iraq foresee a future not much different from the present, with a weak Shia-led government that incorporates some Sunnis but is wary of them, a Kurdish region that is ambivalent about its role in the future of the country, and outside powers supporting proxies there in an effort to advance their own interests. The oil industry is likely to expand, but such expansion will be hampered by sustained political uncertainty.

3. Iranian imponderables. The administration has made good on its pledge to engage the Iranian leadership. Working closely with the IAEA and European partners, it has sought actively to strike agreements with Iran on nuclear issues, most notably on the proposal to reprocess Iranian low-enriched uranium. However, the shift in US strategy has not been met with a shift in Iranian strategy:

• Limited leverage. Given the political unrest visible in Iran since the June 2009 elections, and the relatively poor insight that most foreign governments (including the United States) have into the inner workings of the regime, it is difficult for Washington and its allies to devise strategies to change Iranian behaviour.
• Medium-term approach. The most likely route forward is a new round of sanctions targeting the financial sector, a series of informal inter-governmental agreements that quietly make things harder for Iran, and a continued effort by the US government to provide the Iranians with the opportunity for a more positive relationship.
• Chinese interests. As 2010 mid-term elections draw closer in the United States, Congress is likely to pass additional sanctions legislation intended to block investment in the Iranian energy sector. Given increased Chinese interest in that sector, and the importance of China to any multilateral sanctions regime, the administration will find itself walking a difficult line.

Coordination problems. Unlike its predecessors, the Obama administration has no grand theory of how the Middle East works, but this has made prioritising among its various challenges more difficult. In addition, lines of authority seem muddled:

• With Mitchell and Richard Holbrooke as special envoys for the Arab-Israeli conflict and Afghanistan-Pakistan, respectively, and Dennis Ross as a special assistant to the president for an ill-defined 'Central Region', it is sometimes unclear who is reporting to whom.
• National Security Advisor James Jones has not identified a clear concept of the country's Middle East strategy, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appears to be seeking to make her imprint in the more promising environs of Asia.
• Secretary of Defense Robert Gates seems preoccupied with broad issues such as force structure and procurement reform, and dealing with immediate crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the military leadership is still adjusting to greater fiscal constraints.

.... The Bush-era US approach to the region has clearly ended, as the Obama administration has departed significantly from many of its policy approaches and assumptions -- but this has not yet produced better results from Washington's perspective. Momentum from events unleashed under Bush will continue to restrict the Obama administration's choices, and its possibilities, in 2010. "