Lebanon: Obstacles to effective actions ...

OXFAN Excerpts:

Five months after the parliamentary elections of June 7, Lebanese rival blocs finally agreed to form a government of national unity. In spite of the victory of his March 14 coalition in the June elections, Prime Minister-designate Saad al-Hariri has been compelled to reach out to the March 8 opposition bloc led by Hizbollah, in a bid to avoid a repeat of the crises and confrontations of the past years, which paralysed the government and put the country on the brink of civil war.

Contentious talks. The rival parties agreed early on the power-sharing formula for the 30-member unity cabinet that gives 15 seats to the March 14 coalition, ten seats to Hizbollah and its allies, and five seats to the president's appointees. Nevertheless, coalition talks stalled for months over the distribution of portfolios and the choice of ministerial candidates....

The breakthrough in the talks with Aoun, as well as the resolution of other minor difficulties, are reported to have been helped by behind-the-scenes pressure on the rivals by Syria and Saudi Arabia. While these states are close to different blocs -- with Syria backing the opposition, and the Saudis closer to the pro-Western March 14 -- their own bilateral relations have been improving recently, allowing for greater concord in their approach to Lebanon.

.....For its part, March 14 received, among others, the Finance and Economy Ministries, along with Justice, Education and Public Works. President Michel Suleiman was allotted two vital ministries: Interior and Defence.

Elusive consensus. The 15-10-5 power-sharing formula on which the unity government is based theoretically denies an absolute majority to March 14 and a veto power to March 8, while allowing Suleiman to play the role of arbiter:

• The formula is intended to prevent the two rival parties from pushing through their own agenda, encouraging them to seek a consensus on all major issues.
• However, given opposing viewpoints of the two rival coalitions on most domestic and foreign issues, the formula in effect grants veto power to each one, since they can block an agreement on any contentious issue, or at the very least drag out discussions indefinitely.

At best, the power-sharing formula can help to ease tensions and bring, in the short term, a measure of stability, by allowing the two rival coalitions to negotiate their differences within state institutions instead of facing off in the streets. However, the formula is also a recipe for endless delays in decision-making and stalemate.

Moreover, past experiences in unity governments have not been encouraging and they have failed to provide a guarantee against more violent means of confrontation. In 2006, Hizbollah boycotted the government, initiating a crisis that dragged on for several months and ended with a show of force by the Shia militia in the streets of west Beirut in May 2008.

Risks and challenges. Hariri has recognised these risks and warned that the new unity government could still "turn into a replay of our past failures." Indeed, the risks of government stalemate or failure abound given the host of delicate problems it faces:

1. Economic crisis. Hariri has indicated that one of the priorities of the new government will be to address the issues of Lebanon's massive national debt -- which is projected to top 50 billion dollars this year. In addition, it will work to implement a series of reforms pledged by the government at the 2007 Paris III Donor Conference, including the privatisation of the lucrative mobile telephone sector and the overhaul of the heavily subsidised electricity sector, which is draining state resources.

However, the opposition parties have blocked all previous attempts to push ahead the privatisation plans and other pledged reforms -- and the Telecommunications and Energy portfolios are in their hands. Any progress on these issues, which has eluded successive governments since 2005, promises to be slow and difficult at best.

2. Hariri tribunal. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon in The Hague, set up to prosecute those responsible for the assassination in 2005 of Hariri's father, former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, is another potentially explosive issue. The tribunal is expected to issue its indictments in the coming months.

This could seriously embarrass the government, which is already split over the issue....

3. Relations with Syria...... Suleiman is visiting Damascus today, and Hariri is reported to be planning his own visit soon, signaling a further thaw in relations....

4. Regional context. Even though the formation of the national unity government has been aided by the recent Syrian-Saudi rapprochement, several other foreign and regional issues could strain relations between the rival coalitions. They hold opposite views on regional and international policy, including the Arab-Israeli peace process and the standoff over Iran's nuclear programme.

5. Hizbollah arms. Finally, the question of Hizbollah's weapons, which underlie the Shia party's clout on the Lebanese scene, remains a key divisive issue. Although Hizbollah has agreed to put this issue up for discussion in a national dialogue, it has urged the government not to attempt to deal with the "big issues" first -- most likely referring to its weapons stockpile -- and it is unlikely that it will agree to disarm anytime soon..."