"Abbas's 'self-inflicted setbacks' & a standing that is unlikely to recover"

[OXFAN: Excerpts]

"...... Mahmoud Abbas's domestic credibility has collapsed following his decision to advocate the delay of a vote on the (Goldstone) report at the UNHRC. His ability to continue in his position of leadership is now seriously in question.

• The Goldstone Report accused both Israel and Hamas of committing war crimes, with an emphasis on Israeli misconduct.
• It recommended that the UN and International Criminal Court provide a remedy if Israel fails to do so within six months -- providing Palestinians with a rare opportunity to hold Israel accountable for its actions on the level playing-field of international law, rather than the tilted plane of US-sponsored diplomacy.

Israel had firmly rejected the report, ...... Abbas made the highly controversial decision to advocate a six-month delay of the vote on the report -- and the UNHRC followed his lead. 

Palestinian outrage. The response was fast and furious, with Palestinians across the political spectrum denouncing Abbas's conduct, seeing it as weakness at best, or collaboration and treason at worst. The controversy grew when it emerged that Abbas had acted without consulting the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) Executive Committee, the PNA or the Fatah Central Committee (FCC). 

Abbas's stated reason -- that a delay would allow him to produce an implausible UNHRC unanimity on the report -- did not help. The establishment of a PLO committee to investigate the affair also misfired -- .......This takes place alongside other apparent failures, leading to a crumbling of Abbas's authority:

• Abbas was persuaded by US President Barack Obama to meet Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in New York last month, despite his prior insistence that he would not negotiate without an Israeli settlement freeze. Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat was left scrambling to explain that there is a fundamental difference between talking and negotiating.
• Abbas's failure to achieve results was highlighted by the success of Hamas in securing, through indirect negotiations, the release of 20 Palestinian female prisoners this month.
• The PNA has appeared powerless in East Jerusalem.
• Abbas's move on Goldstone follows a familiar pattern, including his support of the Oslo peace process, his resort to foreign sponsorship in his rivalry with Yasser Arafat and Hamas, his denunciations of armed resistance and his suppression of anti-war demonstrations during the Gaza conflict.

Inside Fatah. The irony is that Abbas in August reshuffled the FCC and PLO Executive Committee,  ......Thus far, they have indicated that the price Abbas will have to pay will be a cessation of his policy unilateralism -- the key issue being a refusal to resume negotiations without a settlement freeze. There is also considerable pressure for heads to roll from among Abbas's inner circle. 

Should this not materialise, or the crisis escalate further, attempts to depose Abbas will certainly become an option. Inadvertently, Abbas's determination to enhance his own authority may have set the stage for his political demise. 

Reconciliation. The most vocal response came from Hamas. Despite the movement's earlier denunciations of the report's conclusions about its own conduct, Hamas called Abbas a "traitor" and "criminal", amid calls to place him on trial and revoke his citizenship. Gaza's streets were plastered with Abbas posters against which residents were invited to fling footwear and curses. 

The controversy has produced a severe escalation of the Fatah-Hamas schism and put paid to the prospects for an Egyptian-mediated reconciliation agreement for the time being .... Hamas has now insisted it will not conclude an agreement until there is "accountability" for the affair, and mechanisms devised -- including PLO reform -- to prevent a repetition.

While the expected fruits of reconciliation -- such as an easing of the Gaza blockade -- are increasingly urgent for Hamas, it realises that postponement may allow for an improvement of terms. Meshal seems to have concluded that Abbas is now so weak that, if reconciliation is put off for a month or two, Fatah will remove him. This logic, implying that the current issue is basically a conflict between Abbas and Fatah, flies in the face of Abbas's attempts to present it as a PNA-Hamas problem. 

Election prospects. October 25 is also for technical reasons the last possible point to announce national elections for the planned date of January 25. It would be exceptionally foolish for Abbas to announce the elections without reconciliation, prepare to conduct them in the West Bank only and submit his candidacy: the Central Elections Commission may well submit its collective resignation. Yet there are indications that this is what he intends to do, and is even being advised to do by key Fatah and PLO officials and some advisors. Abbas's self-inflicted setbacks since the Fatah General Conference have undone his gains with surprising rapidity...."