Iran tells IAEA it is building 2nd enrichment plant ... after 'Western intelligence agencies penetrate the secrecy veiling the site...'

Reuters, here

"Iran has told the U.N. nuclear watchdog it has a second uranium enrichment plant under construction, a belated disclosure sure to heighten Western fears of an Iranian bid for atom bombs.

The International Atomic Energy Agency said on Friday Iran had revealed the existence of the plant to IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei on Monday, just as six world powers and Iran prepare to discuss its disputed nuclear drive on October 1......

Iran was previously known to have one enrichment plant, a vast underground hall at Natanz where it has stockpiled low-enriched uranium in a rapidly expanding operation with almost 9,000 centrifuges installed.... The Natanz plant is under daily surveillance by IAEA inspectors. Iran concealed the site and other sensitive aspects of its enrichment program from U.N. non-proliferation inspectors until the Iranian exiles blew the whistle in 2002....

A U.S. official also confirmed a New York Times report that said Washington had been tracking the secret project for years and Obama decided to go public after Iran learned in recent weeks that Western intelligence agencies had penetrated the secrecy veiling the site..."

Former blogger 'b' comments:

Probably a smart move.

1. Under the NPT obligations Iran signed it has to announce nuclear facilities to the IAEA only 6 month before introducing nuclear material to such a facility. The alleged "secrecy" is thereby a non issue as the facility is not yet in use and was announced to the IAEA on Monday.

2. The NYT says it is a small site for only 3,000 centrifuges. Such a site does NOT make sense to be used as a secondary for the big 50,000 centrifuges (planned end state) site in Natanz.

3. Ahmedinejad asked yesterday for U.S. supply for the Tehran research reactor which was launched with U.S. help in 1968. That 5 MW reactor has medical and scientific use. It runs with medium enriched Uranium - i.e. 18-20% enrichment - and is under IAEA control.

4. Iran can not make, without some serious re engineering, such fuel in Natanz.

5. An extra 3,000 centrifuge site makes perfect sense to enrich especially for the Tehran research reactor.

6. Now Iran can say: "Either sell us fuel for the research reactor or we, unfortunately, will have to make that fuel ourselves at the new site."

Clever chessplayers ...