Monday, August 24, 2009

LEBANON: "Hariri waiting for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to indicte Hizbollah"


OXFAN excerpts:


Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun has been at the centre of the latest crisis in government formation:
  • On August 16, Aoun demanded that his Reform and Change bloc be allotted the Interior Ministry and that caretaker minister Gebran Bassil, keep the Telecommunications Ministry for another term. ....... prompted March 14 to criticise Hizbollah's inability or unwillingness to mediate.
  • Saad al-Hariri has signalled that he is unlikely to accept Aoun's conditions, suggest(ing) that the deliberations over a new cabinet will be postponed until after the end of Ramadan in late September. 
Syrian strength. As ever, domestic political wrangling in Lebanon reflects regional power struggles between Syria and Iran on one side, and the United States and the Sunni powers on the other:
  • Courtesy of US rapprochement, Syria has moved decisively out of the cold, and returned to its favoured position as the necessary diplomatic bridge between Iran and the West.
  • Damascus' relations with Saudi Arabia have yet to improve, ....
  • Syria's relations with Egypt, another key ally of Hariri, have been deep-frozen.. 
  • On the other hand, Assad has moved to shore up relations with embattled Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad during a state visit . ...
  • A war of words between Israel and Hizbollah in late July, ...... added to regional tensions and emphasised disagreements between March 8 and March 14 on the sensitive issues of UN Security Council resolution 1701 and Hizbollah's weaponry.
Jumblatt's volte-face. Syria's strengthened position indirectly provoked the latest breakdown in government negotiations, when Druze leader Walid Jumblatt declared on August 2 that he would leave March 14. His aim was to hedge against Syria's rising influence, and his defection was widely seen as a victory for Damascus. 
Shifting alliances. Jumblatt, who is known for his ever-changing allegiances, has, since 2005, formed one-third of a strong coalition of Christian, Sunni and Druze opposition to Syrian influence in Lebanon, which has dominated Lebanese politics. Although it does not sound the death knell for March 14, Jumblatt's defection still marks a tide change in Lebanese politics and opens up opportunities for new alliances in the coming months:
  • Although Jumblatt has hardly embraced the Syrians, they are in a much stronger position in Lebanon. Hariri, now left with distinctly anti-Syrian Christian allies Amin Gemayel and Samir Geagea, may feel compelled to move towards a more conciliatory position, lest he alienate his Sunni constituency.
  • While taking no concrete action, Jumblatt has spoken with members of both March 8 and March 14, and is locating himself in a central position .....
  • In case a strong third bloc does materialise, Aoun may also be tempted to reconsider his alliance with Hizbollah.....
Hariri's options. .......  the onus is squarely on Hariri to form a government, but he is left with some hard choices following Jumblatt's defection. He has several options:
  • He could accommodate Aoun's demands, which would make him look defeated by Aoun and Hizbollah, but would leave March 8 with no legitimate reasons to oppose a quick government formation.
  • Alternatively, he could carry through a planned visit to Damascus, which has been postponed. Effectively this would mean giving up his resistance to Syrian influence on the government formation process, particularly as the Syrians have signalled that they want Hariri to visit Damascus before the cabinet is finalised.
  • Finally, he could continue to oppose Syrian pressure
Regional factors. Although March 14 would like to see a new government formed, Hariri appears ready to hold out for regional events which would tip the balance in his favour:
  • US President Barack Obama may unveil a Middle East peace initiative next month. While this might deflect attention from Lebanon, it could also prompt Syria to work with Saudi Arabia over Palestinian reconciliation and accept a new Lebanese government in return for inclusion in the peace process.
  • Hariri could be waiting for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to issue an indictment naming Hizbollah as a participant in the assassination of Hariri's father, ......
  • The turmoil in Iran following the June elections has split its leadership and weakened its ability to conduct regional politics. If Iran fails to meet the September deadline given by the UN to end its uranium enrichment programme, it would further isolate the regime, which could weaken Hizbollah and in turn pressure the group to accept Hariri's cabinet line-up.
CONCLUSION: The onus is on Hariri to find a solution to the cabinet crisis. If he chooses to accommodate Aoun's demand for a key ministry, he may be able to form a new government and hence avoid the more serious choice between openly accepting or rejecting Syrian hegemony. If not, deadlock is set to continue at least until the end of Ramadan."

No comments: