"The Administration is looking for is a `respectable outcome',"

MEPGS excerpts:    
Despite a number of setbacks, US policy makers are upbeat about the prospects for dealing with a wide range of Middle East issues.  Moreover, they are convinced now more than ever that issues from Arab-Israeli peacemaking to dealing with Iran's emerging nuclear capability are amenable to a region wide approach.  Still, they acknowledge, for example, it has taken more time than expected to show progress on the Arab-Israeli issue.        Administration officials (who?) admit they may have mishandled their approach to Israel.  While they point out that the right- wing government led by Prime Minister Benjamin ("Bibi")Netanyahu has been quietly making positive adjustments on the ground and has shown an awareness of the need to address the question of a settlement freeze, the Israeli public has been alienated from the Administration.  "I suppose we would have to expect some disappointment after sixteen years of being coddled," said one veteran US analyst.  "But with only five per cent approval rating [of President Obama's policies], we may have gone a bit too far."  Says another long time US official, "The Israelis need to be hugged.  We have failed so far on that score."  Or as another analyst says, "I'm not against putting pressure on Israel.  It just should look like it has a good purpose." The upshot has been that Prime Minister Netanyahu has not been blamed for the public tension between the two governments, as he was during his previous time in office.  "Bibi has done the best," says one European diplomat.      Also working against rapid progress in Administration plans for restarting Israeli-Palestinian peace talks has been the reluctance of Arab governments to step forward and play their "assigned" role in boosting the process.  Just this week, President Mubarak on his first visit to Washington in five years, made it clear that he expects a total freeze on settlement activity before Arab states would be willing to make gestures towards Israel.  Administration officials say that in private Arab governments have been more forthcoming.  However, arguably the most crucial Arab player, Saudi Arabia, has consistently said "no" both in public and in private. President Obama heard that hard line view personally from King Abdallah when he visited Riyadh just before his Cairo speech. Now, the best Administration officials are hoping for is that the Saudis, in the words of one well-placed source, "Stand on the sidelines and not actively undermine attempts to draw other Arab states in."      In the meeting with Abdallah, the President was also rebuffed on the question of the Saudis accepting Yemini detainees now held in Guantanamo, where they comprise nearly half of the prison population.  "There were lot of red faces around the White House, when the story got back on Abdallah's refusal," said one State Department official recently.  Some blame John Brennan, the President's top counter-terrorism advisor, who advanced the trip.  One veteran analyst suggested that Brennan, a former CIA station chief in Riyadh, may have relied too heavily on the words of Mohammed bin Nayef, Saudi Arabia's chief of counter-terrorism, who is highly regarded by US officials.  The son of the Kingdom's powerful Minister of the Interior, who is a half brother of the King and full brother of Crown Prince Sultan, is believed to have taken a pragmatic, non-political view of allowing the Yeminis to be sent to Saudi Arabia.  "I think he may have believed that these bad guys would wind up eventually in Saudi Arabia.  So why not have some control of them from the outset," says one long- time Saudi watcher.  However, says it is clear, says this analyst, that the King saw the issue through a political optic, where Saudi Arabia could be blamed for any future acts of terrorism against the US taken by these Yeminis once they were released from Saudi custody.      The continuing political turmoil in Iran also seems to have defeated the best analytic efforts of the US as well as the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.  Still, there is agreement, says one State Department official, that with Iran preoccupied with internal divisions, "The threat level has gone down."  He argues that "Iran hasn't stoked any fires in Bahrain or the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia," - both areas containing large Shia populations.  Some analysts argue that the US has gained the upper hand, noting the stronger stand taken by European nations since the election and the diminution of support for Iran by Russia and China.      Still, the Administration is expected to try to make an outreach to Iran.  As one veteran US official puts it, "If you go after Iran without first making a genuine outreach, then all you are doing in continuing Bush Administration policies.  You must prepare the ground."  But with the President's declared time line for engagement by the end of September rapidly approaching, US officials will be hard pressed to implement a strategy that does not rely on economic sanctions pretty soon, say most observers.  The initial focus may be on preventing oil imports to Iran.  Despite its vast oil reserves, Iran lacks refining capability for domestic needs.  A second area of vulnerability to exploit would be to pressure foreign facilitators of Iranian exports.  This would entail presenting major foreign companies with the choice of working the US market or Iran's.      There is little likelihood of significant new sanctions being adopted by the UN Security Council.  However, it is expected the US, joined by Britain and France will make the attempt.  "There will be a `food fight' at the UN," predicts one State Department official.  Clearly, there is no shortage of skepticism about the efficacy of any US plan.  As one veteran analyst puts it, "The Iranians have already entered the threshold sphere."  That leads many to conclude that Iran's nuclear program will continue to advance to a point where weaponization becomes practical, if not inevitable.  "I think what many in the Administration are looking for is a `respectable outcome'," says one Middle Eastern diplomat.  By that he means there are international safeguards in place that would be touted as a "robust firewall" between enrichment and weaponization.      Recently, less has been heard of the military option by Israel.  This may be due to the enhanced consultations between the two countries.  Well placed Israeli officials also say that a lot of the concern about Jerusalem acting independently has been generated by non-Israelis, speculating about their likely course of action.  In fact, some key Israeli officials are known to believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu would have to go along with any agreement the US makes.  "Independent military action in the face of US opposition is just not credible," says one Israeli official [However, these days the Israeli air force would not be hampered in the way it was during the 1991 Gulf war, say US experts.  Then, Israel did not retaliate against Iraqi missile attacks, in part, because the US would not share codes that would allow Israeli jets to avoid encountering American planes operating over Iraqi airspace.  "Now there are few, if any US planes operating over Iraqi airspace," says one analyst].  US officials, especially at the Pentagon, have made it clear that military action is not an option.  "Already fully engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has been made clear to us that the last thing the overstretched US military needs is a new battlefront," says one Gulf diplomat.