Obama’s Vietnam Plus?

[Via SST: here]

There appears to be a real possibility that Afghanistan could become, for President Obama, a repeat of how the Vietnam fiasco unfolded for Lyndon Johnson. An inherited war that the new president makes his own, the hope, fed by the Pentagon and the generals in the field, that putting in more troops would provide a quick victory and a triumphal exit, the conflict just grinding on, with more rosy promises by the generals (‘the light at the end of the tunnel’, victory ‘just around the corner’), and, even when he knew it was a lost cause, finding it impossible to pull out, until the unending war destroyed his presidency.
Obama does not seem to be getting good advice. What is occurring in Afghanistan and FATA (Pakistan’s tribal borderlands) is a Pashtun insurgency against a foreign occupation and the foreign-imposed Karzai regime. When devising a policy and a military strategy to deal with an insurgency, the first question that should be asked is: how widely and deeply is the insurgency embedded in the general population? If the answer is ‘Not too much’, then it is feasible to try and deal with it using a typical military COIN strategy against the insurgents, along with political and economic measures to win over the rest of the population. This is how the US stabilized the situation in Iraq after it stopped waging war against the Sunni population, and instead began to court, and even protect, it (it helped greatly that the remaining insurgents were mainly foreigners).
If the insurgency is well established within a large part of the population, then the above measures will not work, and another question needs to be asked: Are you prepared to wage war (not COIN!) on the general population (as the only means available to strike at the insurgency)? If the answer is ‘No’, then you must find a political solution to the problem. This was the answer of the British in Northern Ireland, and they finally did manage to arrange a political solution.
If the answer you are prepared to give is ‘Yes’, then the chances of success of the war you will need to wage on the general population will depend on the human and natural environment in which you will wage it, and whether you are prepared to invest in it the required time, resources and brutality. The US’s initial answer to the Sunni insurgency in Iraq was ‘Yes’, but, because they did not have sufficient resources to put in, their war was unsuccessful (in spite of some quite brutal operations, e.g., Fallujah). The same answer was given by the US in Vietnam, by Russia in Chechnya, by Pakistan in what is now Bangladesh, and, recently, by Israel in Gaza. Of these, only the Russians ultimately succeeded, because of the small size of the target population compared to the forces they put in, and the massive brutality of their operation. (Brutality by itself cannot assure success; otherwise both Vietnam and East Pakistan would have been victories, and Israel would by now have solved the ‘Palestinian question’).
If your answer is that you are not prepared to wage war on the general population, then your only recourse is to find a political solution. The Afghan insurgency is well embedded in the general Pashtun population. The US and NATO have said that they are not waging war on the Pashtun people. Yet, the policy and strategy that they are following is all over the place. They have encouraged President Karzai to explore a political solution, but are not prepared to face the fact that no such solution is possible with the Karzai regime being part of it. They wage a semi-COIN, semi-war military operation that cannot defeat the insurgency, and merely results in driving more people into the insurgents’ arms. They talk of winning hearts and minds through development projects, yet don’t have the troops to ensure security for them, nor the means, or even perhaps the will, to prevent most of the funds going into a few well-connected pockets. They have no agreed policy on how to deal with the opium industry (the world’s largest), which bankrolls the insurgency (but is also the sole means of livelihood for large numbers of people).
Now, the argument that his advisers and the generals seem to have sold to Obama is: Sure, we all agree there will ultimately have to be a political solution. But the Taliban have so far shown no interest in one, probably because they think they are winning the war. If we put in more troops there, we can wage more robust operations, while we get Pakistan to either seal the border or clean up FATA. After receiving some hard knocks the Taliban will realize that they cannot win, and will come to the negotiating table. This is delusional! The Taliban know that they can ultimately win just by keeping the insurgency alive and waiting out the invaders, as Afghan insurgents have done since time immemorial. Putting in more troops, or Gen Petraeus trying out his favourite COIN recipe, is not going to make much of a difference. This is not a COIN situation, nor are these extra troops going to change the force/people/area ratios to any significant degree. Also, the insurgent’s base in FATA can neither be blocked off nor cleaned up.
The only choice before the US in Afghanistan is either full-scale war on the Pashtuns, or a political solution that includes the insurgency (which is more than just the Taliban). Since the first is being ruled out, the latter is the only course open. The pre-requisite to any movement in this direction is to get rid of the Karzai clan, which has become a rapacious mafia, and is unalterably branded as Western stooges. For Afghans, the basis of the political resolution would need to be the expeditious departure of foreign troops, and a sharing of power among themselves. The US’s main aim is that, in the future, Afghanistan does not again become a haven and launching pad for al-Qaeda and other terrorists. This should be achievable through a political solution resulting in a loosely federal system that ensures that the Taliban cannot create a unitary state in which they achieve dominance, and gives other ethnic groups, and other Pashtun leaders, room to establish their own power centres. With the help of the ‘Northern Alliance’ provinces, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and its own proximate military power, the US can ensure that its aim is achieved in the new Afghanistan.
President Obama has to realise that there is no military solution possible in Afghanistan. Fruitless attempts to achieve one (or even to improve the negotiating position of the US or its Afghan protégés) will make much more difficult, if not quite unlikely, the only possible way out of this quagmire – a political resolution. It is either that, or a Vietnam style debacle.
If the war in Afghanistan is not quickly ended, the situation in Pakistan is likely to become beyond repair. Pakistan could then become a far bigger security problem for the US than Afghanistan ever was or could be. Pakistan has been a reluctant conscript in the US war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, in which it has been compelled to wage full-scale war on its people in FATA. The blowback from this (and the US war in Afghanistan) has added to the political instability in the country, as well as created a growing internal jihadi menace. Some settled areas adjoining FATA are in open rebellion (which the army has so far been unable to quell), while terrorist bombs go off periodically in the cities. The economy is in dire straits (an IMF bailout has just prevented its collapse), the central government is dysfunctional, politicians are lining their own pockets when they are not undermining each other, the bureaucracy is paralysed due to political meddling, corruption is
widespread, civil society is in disarray, the military is under considerable stress, while ordinary people are facing severe hardships in their daily lives.
All this provides fertile ground for jihadis to spread their message and further their cause.To turn this situation around the US must act soon. The adoption by the US of a political solution as the goal in Afghanistan will allow the Pakistan army to ratchet down, and then suspend, the offensive operations it is currently waging in FATA, which are quite unpopular in the country and also in the military. The ending of major military operations in Afghanistan, also unpopular in Pakistan, will deprive the jihadis of another emotional issue that they exploit. Freed of the distraction of the Afghan war, the US can focus its attention on the much bigger problem of Pakistan, and begin the difficult task of helping this pivotal country stop its downward slide into disorder and failure.
If the war in Afghanistan goes on for much longer (as the Obama surge seems to presage), then both Afghanistan and Pakistan are likely to become huge security problems for the US and President Obama in the not too distant future, much worse than they currently are. The shadow that would then once again fall across the land and over the White House would be not only that of Vietnam but, possibly, also of the collapse of the Shah’s Iran.

Brigadier F. B. Ali, January 2009