"...the Mumbai attacks may have originated much closer to home..."

"I sent along some thoughts earlier this morning to COL Lang regarding his Mumbai post and he asked if I’d allow him to post my remarks as a guest blog. My analysis is based on reading a number of varied open sources, both other’s analysis (Professor Cole’s at informedcomment.com, Cernig’s at Newshoggers.com, and both Carlos’ and Abu Muqawama at abumuqawama.com – and just so they don’t feel left out, the analysis by the other bloggers at the latter two sites is always excellent even though I don’t always agree with it), as well as primary open source material that I have read, some of which they also link too. My take on this is, of course, my own, and any errors in analysis are solely my own. A list of citations appears below my remarks if you’d like to see some of the source material.
One of the most interesting items that I think has been overlooked is that the Financial Times1, about twenty-four hours prior to the attack, reported that the (fairly) new head of the Pakistan military was publicly shutting down the ISI's political wing. My first thought was hmm, short order terrorist attack in India’s financial sector – take a developed plan and give it the green light to show who’s really in charge here: the ISI. As much of the analysis is now focusing on a Pakistani connection that first tied the ISI, then the ISI backed Kashmiri Lashkar e Tayibi, and now splinter elements from Lashkar to the attacks2. This is a very plausible line of analysis and should not be ignored.
As more information came in, however, I began to think this did not make as much sense. This led to more research to see what others have been saying. Based on material I I’ve read at a number of news sites, as well as analysis sites, I think that the arguments that the Mumbai attacks may have originated much closer to home need to be given plenty of attention. There is strong similarity between the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of India’s Naxalite movement3 or other recent indigenous Indian Muslim groups with those of the Mumbai attackers4. While there have been a large number of references to the Mumbai attacks as either al Qaeda or al Qaeda influenced because the attacks were coordinated, the evidence just does not seem to be there. Yes it was a large scale, attention grabbing event. Al Qaeda's hallmarks, if they even really have any - I'm in general agreement with Dr. Sageman rather than Dr. Hoffman, that al Qaeda is now nothing more than an entrepreneurial type of network not a corporate like entity (in fact I often argued at criminology conferences before and after 9-11 that al Qaeda was nothing more than a hyper active logistics, training, and funding resource for what had become a large, but loose, network of reactionary Muslim leaderless resistance groups) are some form of suicide attack. There were no suicide attacks in Mumbai5.

Moreover, the attackers never destroyed their boat, as evidenced by news footage of the Indian authorities finding it, which would indicate that some at least believed they could get away. This, of course, is a big worry as many are speculating that some might still be on the loose.6 There were even reports that at least some of the attackers were operating under the influence of alcohol. If true, this would cast further doubt on al Qaeda connections as drinking is obviously not an al Qaeda TTP. Moreover, there are also credible reports that no one in the village in Kashmir where the terrorist in custody is supposed to hail from has ever heard of the guy7.
My take is that all of the initial responses and reactions are going to be set in place and running even as our understanding of who was responsible and why the event occurred unravels. Eventually we're going to find out exactly who was responsible, but by then it may be too late. Why might it be too late? Because, as we often forget in all the coverage: the real targets of terrorism are not its immediate victims (the wounded and the dead). The real targets are the rest of us and the goal of the terrorists is to panic the rest of us into over reacting and doing things that we would never consider doing otherwise. In this case the intent is to cause the Indians to overreact politically, which has the potential to bring the more hard line and sectarian BJP back into power. Even if this doesn’t happen the calls have already begun for crackdowns and new security protocols. All of which could lead to an insecurity spiral on the subcontinent that brings with it the possibility for hostilities. Calls have already begun among the neo-Cons for American and international military intervention into Pakistan – before we are even sure who did what and where they came from. Such a response, like an Indian over reaction, would mean that the terrorists have been successful. And the real tragedy might be that this was a largely homegrown event, with semi-local actors who had been radicalized or reactionized by both real and perceived anti-Muslim bias on the part of the government in Mumbai and the Indian anti-terror authorities (the first casualty was, interestingly, the head of this outfit).

Adam L. Silverman, PhD is a Social Science Advisor with the US Army's Human Terrain System. His views are his alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Human Terrain System, the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command, and/or the US Army.