"High-jacking" Lebanon & the World: The 'Hariri Tribunal' carnival...

Michael Young (who, as we say in Lebanon, "still has a souk") inches closer to switching from the 'blame-Syria' to the 'Blame-Hezbollah' mode..... in a 'Happy' Foreign Policy, here

"We're happy to feature today an excerpt from Michael Young's new book, that explores the immediate aftermath of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri on February 14, 2005. I caught up with Young to hear his thoughts on how this event continues to reverberate, both in Lebanon and in the international arena. Here's what he had to say:

FP: How does Hariri's assassination continue to affect Lebanese politics today?

MY: ...........Indictments may come later this year or early next, and Lebanese political life is bracing for the consequences, given that although Syria likely gave the order and a suicide bomber actually carried out the attack, Lebanese parties -- many people in Beirut believe Hezbollah -- participated in some capacity. There is fear that an accusation against Hezbollah, if the party was indeed involved, or against other Lebanese might destabilize Lebanon. Still, the Lebanese authorities have a responsibility to go through with this, since from the outset those who supported the investigation and tribunal knew where it might lead, and saw these measures as a way of preventing similar killings in the future. On a more personal level, I feel that for the tribunal to truly succeed, it has to identify all the guilty, not merely low-level enablers. However, I'm not at all sure that this will be the outcome. (but that would do for Michael, bless his heart, as long as the 'low-level enablers' are members of Hezbollah)

FP: You discuss how Hariri's murder caused a fundamental split between the Lebanese Sunni community and the Syrian regime. Has this relationship healed with time, or do Lebanese Sunnis still largely hold Syria responsible for the death of Hariri?

MY: The Sunnis know who killed Hariri (headed by Sunni gliteratti such as Said Mirza & Mufti Qabbani), but the imperatives of Arab politics have intervened to alter the Sunni-Syrian relationship. Just over a year ago, Saudi Arabia began a reconciliation process with Syria--its intention to draw Damascus away from Iran, whose rise the Arab countries, particularly those in the Gulf, view as a threat to their own regimes. An implicit quid pro quo emerged, whereby the Saudis gave Syria greater latitude in Lebanon, in part to contain the pro-Iranian Hezbollah. The Syrians gladly took that offer in order to reimpose their writ in Beirut, but have offered little in exchange. Syria's regime has maintained its close ties with Tehran and continues to arm and support Hezbollah. A byproduct of that Saudi-Syrian rapprochement was a so-called ‘reconciliation' last December between Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, Rafiq's son who is politically beholden to the Saudis, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

FP: The Obama administration recently announced the appointment of Robert Ford as ambassador to Syria -- the first ambassador to the country since the United States withdrew its ambassador following Hariri's assassination. What was the U.S. reaction in response to this attack, and is its resolve to bring the perpetrators to justice waning?

MY: I don't see evidence that American interest in bringing the perpetrators to justice is waning, and from what I'm hearing that's not the case. But can we be sure? (but you're 'hearing' Michael, from say, Erich Follath? so you have to be sure?!) The Hariri investigation (which was independent, we should remember) was and is a complex case that has suffered from investigative flaws. Those shortcomings have tested the commitment of many countries, amid continued reluctance at U.N. headquarters to deal with the consequences of a potentially destabilizing investigation. I don't necessarily believe that Robert Ford's appointment is a sign that Washington has given up on the Hariri investigation. My problem with the step is that the Obama administration got nothing in exchange for that concession; but paradoxically that may only increase its interest in seeing the Hariri tribunal through, in the hope that the ensuing accusations allow it to squeeze the Syrians. That's not to say the indictments, if or when they come, will serve a specific political agenda, but there is no doubt that they will have political consequences. "

Michael Young's smear campaign against Abdo Saad & Amal Saad-Ghorayeb

Michael Young (one sour bubba) takes aim at three "myths" about Lebanon in his article: "Mostly, a divine victory for disinformation:" 1. That Lebanese overwhelmingly supported Hizbullah during last years war with Israel. 2. That Israel's decision to go to war in Lebanon was premeditated and preplanned, making it inevitable. 3. "That because Israel cannot accept defeat in Lebanon, it is bound to attack the country again in the future…. it gives Hizbullah an excuse to retain its weaponry."

Via SyriaCommenty read Young here and Josh Landis' remarks here.

Ghazi Aridi lacks courage on Syria & Hezballah, says Daily Star's Young

Moreover, Michael Young is not too happy with "some" in the Siniora government blaming Al Qaeda for the UNIFIL deadly attack. Young likes consistency. He seeks continuity: Blame Syria first, and see what happens!

"The oddest statement, however, came from the Siniora government. Information Minister Ghazi Aridi noted that "[t]here is a link between the attack which targeted the Spanish contingent of UNIFIL and the fighting between the Lebanese Army and the terrorists of Fatah al-Islam in Nahr al-Bared." He went on to say, "Lebanon is the victim of a terrorist wave striking from the North to the South in which the latest target was the Spanish contingent. This attack was preceded by confessions from arrested terrorists about preparations against UNIFIL."

Read the full opinion here.

John Brennan’s Hezbollah proposal is a "thoroughly idiotic scheme"...

Michael Young, who has no problem in seeing moderation in Samir Geagea' (a convicted mass murderer) and in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia .... denigrates John Brennan, the British .... for his "Hezbollah moderates" remark, and for their open channels with Hezbollah ...... at Young's favorite pulpit, MEOWLebanon/ here

"...... There is indeed a mulish formalism to the thinking of some Americans that makes you wonder if they are serious. For Brennan the world possibly really is divided into “extremists” and “moderates,” and if an organization or country appears uncompromising, then that must simply be because the moderates haven’t yet been discovered.

But what a self-centered way of looking at politics, since it assesses the actions of others entirely from the perspective of the interpreter. Brennan assumes that Hezbollah’s thinking, rhetoric, conceptual universe and so on, is perfectly comprehensible within American categories, his categories, which is just another way of saying that the party is not as serious about its own ideas as we assume.

A few years ago, the British government came out with an equally amusing sleight of hand, when it opened a dialogue with what it referred to as Hezbollah’s political wing, which it differentiated from the party’s military wing. This was rank hypocrisy, of course. The British knew enough about Hezbollah to realize that it is a highly centralized organization, in fact a Leninist organization in many ways, so that all the loose references to “wings” were just excuses to talk to party officials without being accused by the United States of chatting up what Washington officially labels a “terrorist organization.”

But Brennan’s proposal doesn’t even have the saving grace of cynicism. When asked how he proposed to reach the moderates, the presidential advisor offered no answer. That’s because his scheme is thoroughly idiotic. One thing about Hezbollah, its militants generally believe what they say, and when they say that Washington is their enemy, they mean that too. The party’s structure and worldview leave no room for “moderates” or “extremists.” What they allow are debates over tactics, but within well-defined strategic parameters, usually set by Iran, of which opposition to America and Israel is essential.

That lesson the St. Joseph University students understood instinctively. You might wonder, justifiably, how young people sent to an institution of higher learning where humanistic values are taught could so readily fall for Hezbollah’s catechism of violence and self-sacrifice. But at least they were not on an illusory quest for “moderates.” Their trip was about guns and war and death, and even if it was cool, they knew it was about guns and war and death.

"Bellmare ... you better watch out!"

Die libanesisch uber-neocon, Herr Michael Junge, waking up to the tune of Der Spiegel/Hezbollah/Hariri .... Read through we left of this tediously boring essay and see for yourself how Young's compass is one that aligns with exasperation & despair: Bring the 4 Generals back to jail, ... Long live Mehlis and torches-ablaze to the door of Braemmertz, maybe Bellmare will 'learn'.... in the Daily Star/ here

"... If Bellemare is optimistic, that’s good news, and his statement, though it told us relatively little, was perhaps the strongest sign yet that he believes his efforts will not end in a dead end. The prosecutor is responsible only for what he says, and he has said virtually nothing until now; however a more disturbing assessment is emerging from various sources, including foreign diplomatic sources, that the focus of Bellemare and his team may be on domestic Lebanese involvement in the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, and that only through this route might he follow the chain of decision-making in the crime outside the country.

What does this mean? Some will hear echoes of the Der Spiegel article: Hizbullah is blamed for Hariri’s killing, the investigation is contained inside Lebanon’s borders, Syria is effectively exonerated ...

This may all be true, but ................. a crime of that magnitude could not conceivably have taken place without Syrian authorization, given the tight control Syria exerted over Lebanon.

If it is true, therefore, that Bellemare will be unraveling the case through what we can call its domestic window, then what does that tell us about the UN investigation in general? Mehlis and Brammertz were well aware of the Syrian connection, as was, obviously, Bellemare when he took over his post. But there are also converging indications that Brammertz did not aggressively pursue his inquiry in Syria in the same way that Mehlis did, and the evidence for this is that no Syrian official, particularly no intelligence official, was ever arrested, even though Mehlis was on the verge of doing so when he left Beirut in December 2005. ......

Bellemare met with Eid the day before he was killed in a car-bomb attack, and while some sources believe that the killing was linked to important new information Eid had on the intercepts, Bellemare disagreed with this evaluation. We may never know, but if the UN prosecutor is pursuing a Lebanese path toward the truth, then, significantly, it may have been the Lebanese investigators, not those from the UN, who did the heavier lifting to make this possible.

Accusing Hizbullah alone, or individuals in the party, because that is where the available evidence lies, could bend out of shape our true understanding of the Hariri assassination. It would also raise doubts about Brammertz, who failed to take the wide road that Mehlis and the UN Security Council opened for him in 2005 to facilitate his probes in Syria. That does not mean that Bellemare would not find an alternative path to Syrian participation, perhaps through indictments he would bring against Lebanese intelligence officials (and his release of the four generals was not, legally, a declaration of their innocence). But an accusation against Hizbullah, even if justified, would only be partial if it did not include indictments against senior Syrian officials. (6th repetition) ...

Bellemare’s work is ongoing, so we should be careful (read: Bellmare should be careful, otherwise I, Michael Young will be back!) before reaching any hard conclusions on the basis of incomplete leaks. But we are entitled to wonder whether the Lebanon tribunal will identify those who gave the final order that Hariri be gotten rid of, or whether will we have to satisfy ourselves merely with identification of those who followed orders. (or neither/nor ?)"

Arab neocon: 'I was wrong on Syria: there is NO SOLUTION WITHOUT ASSAD, russia, Iran & allies!'

Nicholas Noe has this on the Arab uber-neocon.

"... Well not quite breaking news but…I just watched an incredible interview with Michael Young on France 24. Two and a half years after the Syria revolt broke out, he just now is admitting 1) He was WRONG in predicting that Assad would fall – an incredibly irresponsible”analysis” he has long promulgated and which very much helped to lead to this tunnel of extreme violence we are all now in and 2) that there is NO SOLUTION WITHOUT ASSAD, russia Iran etc.He also suggested that he really does not have a good idea anymore of what to do.
This is simply a breathtaking turnaround for all of us who have watched and argued with Michael about how wrong his analysis and suggestions were in dealing with the crisis in Syria.
Michael has always argued that he is a mere pundit – and not to blame him for US mistakes in the region or anyone elses mistakes. The problem is that he is read, he is taken, mainly by Neo LiberalCons, seriously and some of his best admirers in the Bush administration have used his columns as the ideological basis for some of their most disasterous moves in the region over the last 10 years..."

Patriarch Sfeir, the Maronites' "only leader" needs to lighten up...

The William Kristol of the Levant, Michael Young reflects on the Maronites, conventionalism and Sfeir, the "only Maronite leader... who is not an innovator." Only to compound his criticism of Michel Aoun who was an 'innovator' when he reached across the divide and for the first time in the modern history of this hapless country, led a majority of the Maronites to the clear choice of Lebanon's enmity with ISRAEL, something Young and his ilk abhors! Daily Star, here

"...........“Is it possible that there be a regular army and another army outside the legality [of the state] which one day points its weapons at the enemy, and the other points them toward the interior?” Sfeir asked.

The patriarch was only stating the obvious, which political Lebanon, in its inimitable capacity to sustain mirages, has been carefully ignoring as the government prepares a Cabinet statement legitimizing the existence of Hizbullah’s arms. So loud are the voices supporting counterfeit concord, that Sfeir is shouting in a desert. Faced with the impossibility of disarming Hizbullah, the politicians are justifying the party’s retaining its weapons, as if rationalizing an absurdity could make it more reasonable. The patriarch abruptly tore the veneer away.

One could argue that Sfeir enjoys the luxury of criticism because he doesn’t take the hard decisions. Yet there was much more to the patriarch during the latter two decades of the Syrian interregnum than talk. Under considerable threat during that time, isolated amid a craven political class at Syria’s beck and call, Sfeir was the Maronites’ only real leader, a debt that his critics, above all Michel Aoun, never acknowledged, so absorbed were they in their own authority........

But right after shattering the jar of complacency on Hizbullah, Sfeir was asked about the abolition of political confessionalism. And here the patriarch fell back into a disposition that showed why, for all his qualities, he is no innovator. He, quite correctly, stated, “What is the advantage of abolishing political confessionalism in [national] texts before doing so in [people’s] minds, if everyone says ‘I’m a Maronite, or a Druze?’” And when asked about Walid Jumblatt’s proposal for a communal rotation of the three presidencies, Sfeir responded that he did not understand it.

Jumblatt’s proposal was intentionally ambiguous. Did the Druze leader mean that all communities would benefit from being rotated into the three top posts in the state, or that the rotation would occur between the Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites, who already hold those posts? The Taif Accord outlines the abolition of confessionalism, but it does so in parallel with the establishment of a Senate which would retain a sectarian breakdown, and which Jumblatt would like to see led by a Druze.

Sfeir is not a politician, so his evasiveness was defensible. However, his uneasy response showed he was still thinking ....... Sfeir’s mistake, and that of many Christians, is to read too much into a Maronite presidency, whose powers have been depleted. In fact, the presidency has brought only woe to the community......

The symbolism of being head of state is important to Maronites, but it is also an illusion. The presidency has power, but on a day-to-day basis, in the formulation of long-term policy, its latitude is more limited. Instead of resisting this, the patriarch, like all Christians, should consider new ways his community can reinvent itself in a Lebanon that is changing rapidly, where Christian irrelevance is, alas, becoming ever more flagrant.

"Kiss March 14 goodbye ... "

... says Lebanon's Uber-neocon, Michael Young. Who are the culprits this time around? the French, the Syrians, the Saudis, the Turks, the Iranians, ... and the Lebanese. Note the only 'mixed bag' that Young can identify, as in the only flicker of hope is in the fact that the 2006' Israeli aggression, and consequently UNSC res. 1701 has "limited Hezbollah's margin of maneuver in the border area". In the Daily Star, here

"The death of the Independence Intifada of 2005 has been prematurely announced many times. However, today we have in front of us a genuine corpse, the end of the fleeting aspiration four years ago, at least in its more restricted form, of establishing a system emancipated from Syria. The Syrians, who left Lebanon through the window after Rafik Hariri’s assassination only to re-enter by the front door in recent months, have done so thanks to an understanding with Saudi Arabia. There are differences between what we have today and the Syrian-Saudi condominium after Taif, above all that the Syrian Army is no longer deployed in Lebanon. The latest contract is more equitable and is complicated by the fact that Iran has a powerful stake in the system through Hizbullah. However, it is familiar in leaving Lebanon with little discernible sovereignty, in large part courtesy of Lebanese divisions.

It’s no secret that the Saudis put considerable pressure on the prime minister-elect, Saad Hariri, to come to an arrangement over the new government with the opposition, one reason why he was forced to spend much time negotiating with Michel Aoun, to the irritation of his Christian partners. The Syrians, too, kept their end of the bargain, apparently with Turkish prodding, by bringing Aoun into line. After five months, the Hariri government was made in Lebanon only in the narrowest of ways.

This represents a fundamental shift from what Lebanon had between 2005 and 2009. From 2004 on, the country was placed under an effective, if highly imperfect, form of international trusteeship, ....began with Resolution 1559,.......

That international scaffolding has been substantially eroded in recent years, by action or omission. Resolution 1559 has been implemented only in the sense that Syrian soldiers have left Lebanon. However, Syrian meddling in Lebanese affairs has been unrelenting, and in late 2007 France significantly undermined the letter of the resolution, which it had co-sponsored, by actively bringing Damascus into the Lebanese presidential election. As for the disarmament of Hizbullah or pro-Syrian Palestinian groups, nothing has happened, and the Cabinet is preparing to find a consensual rhetorical formula in its statement to evade the question.

The initial optimism surrounding the Hariri investigation has, similarly, worn off. Although the prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Daniel Bellemare, remains confident that he will bring indictments,.......The regional and international political climate does not favor raising the heat on Syria – realistically the principal culprit in the crime. While it is too early to be definite, we should begin considering the possibility that no indictments will be brought, despite Bellemare’s assertions.

As for Resolution 1701, it has been a mixed bag. The reinforced UN force in the south has doubtless limited Hizbullah’s margin of maneuver in the border area, forcing the party to rebuild its main line of defense north of the Litani River. However, the resolution has failed utterly in preventing Israeli overflights but also Hizbullah’s massive rearmament, because the Security Council has been unwilling to punish Syria or Iran for violating its conditions. That the Lebanese government will soon put together a policy statement endorsing this situation helps little.

We should heed what the US assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, told Al-Nahar last week. He warned that arms exports from Iran put Lebanon at great risk, then added, pointedly, that he hoped the Lebanese government realized this. Lest we forget, the scope of Israeli destruction in 2006, though enormous, was contained by the Americans, mainly to avoid discrediting the Siniora government. Feltman’s remarks indicated that Washington would be less inclined next time around to do the same thing. In other words, the Lebanese must accept that their best protection against Israel is Resolution 1701.

So the Syrians are back.

'The first cataclysmic 'desertion' from M14 was that of Carlos Edde'

They don’t rule Lebanon from Anjar, but they are likely to retain a final say on most decisions of importance in the country. If one wants to see the glass as half full, Syria must now accept as a reality that many of its political foes are represented in the government and Parliament. Syria’s ability to tap into corruption and patronage networks has been blunted. But if the glass is half empty, Assad has significantly negated the emancipatory impulses of 2005, allowing him to once again use Lebanon to advance Syrian interests, to the Lebanese detriment. .... Syria has done well enough by chipping away at the order put in place after its withdrawal, and now has allies even within the majority camp ..."

Daily Star "laments": Lebanon should prepare for less attention in Paris

Michael Young in the Daily Star writes that "whoever replaces Chirac as president, those in Beirut who regard France as a vital ally in frustrating Syria's designs to regain power in Lebanon will have to brace themselves for less attention in Paris." And for once aptly notes that "... Chirac's closeness to the Hariri family will almost certainly ensure that a new French administration swings the pendulum in the opposite direction, to compensate for the perceived excesses of the current president." In conclusion, Young worries that the feud between Democrats (the American ones) and Republicans, could undermine President Bush's Mideast"strategy" (which one?) , ... and chipping at Syria's isolation.

Read the full article here.

'Civil War (Hold the Mustard ...)'

Our friend Michael Bronner (co-producer of among other films, 'the Green Zone') writes: ' As Seif al-Islam al-Gaddfi - son and erstwhile heir apparent of Col. Muʿammar al-Qaḏḏāfī - is now reportedly in custody and, perhaps, headed for the Hague, linked below (in the HuffPost World)is a piece I wrote a few months ago about a Libyan road trip our CBS team made with Seif al-Islam in his previous iteration: The public face of Gaddafi's grand deal with the US and UK to surrender his WMD programs in exchange for improved relations. ...'

"... "Mr. Michael! Your meeting with Mr. Saif al-Islam is tomorrow! In London!" said Mr. L., the young Gaddafi's squire (or something). I was still in Colorado, and it was snowing.

Several delayed flights later, finally in a London black cab en route to town with 45 minutes to make the meeting, the phone rang again. It was Mr. L.

--"Mr. Michael! The meeting! It is no longer in London!"

--"Um..."

--"Mr. Saif al-Islam has been called urgently to Geneva. The meeting will take place aboard his airplane. Mr. Ali is waiting for you at your hotel. You can take a shower."

Wayne Nelson, a longtime CBS producer and my partner on the piece, was also waiting at the hotel, having flown in from New York. We got into a silver sedan with a stranger who introduced himself as Mr. Ali, a spark plug of a fellow who shepherded us to London City Airport - out onto the tarmac and into a waiting biz jet.

As we climbed aboard, we saw them loading Seif's skis into the hold. The plane had sofas for seats. The pilots and flight attendant were spun-up, ready to go. After about 20 minutes, the young Gaddafi, supposedly bound for urgent business, popped up the jet stairs in a ski hat, ready to party and grinning ear to ear...

(continue, here)"

"Expert" on Lebanese Affairs Liz Cheney in the WaPo: Evokes litany of Lebanon's dead to attack Pelosi's "shuttle diplomacy."

The Administration is "calling all experts" to come to the rescue. Unfortunately, Cheney's expertise in the area does not go beyond a plagiarist's convocation of Lebanon's dead ...! Alas and behold, when you mention neocons or the OVP, Michael Young is not very far behind!

"The Saudis may decide that Geagea’s affiliation with Hariri is a serious snag in their rapprochement with Assad.."

Michael Young worries some more ... Daily Star/ here

".... In fact Jumblatt avoided a negative answer, forcing Bin Jiddu to clarify that he did not want to focus solely on the Lebanese Forces. But the message relayed by the Al-Jazeera correspondent was clear enough: In the future Walid Jumblatt might have to do better than that when mentioning Geagea, at least if he wants to enjoy Syria’s favors.

A longstanding pillar of Syrian policy in Lebanon has been the political containment of the Sunni community. A byproduct of this strategy has been the prevention of a solid Sunni-Christian alliance in Lebanon, with Christians traditionally those most hostile to the Syrian presence.....

Last year, Syria’s Lebanese allies began vowing that Geagea would be their next target. ...Unconfirmed reports suggested that Saudi Arabia was protecting Geagea from Syria, though this perhaps meant only that the Lebanese Forces leader would be spared assassination. In recent weeks, however, there have been new leaks indicating that Syria is annoyed with the Hariri-Geagea bond, and has complained to the Saudis about it.

Why is Damascus so wary of Geagea? There are several reasons, beyond Syrian discomfort with a Sunni-Christian axis. For starters, Geagea has been gaining ground in his community. His organizational skills are doubted by none, and he is the person most likely to inherit a Christian plurality, even a majority, after the demise of the 75-year-old Michel Aoun, who is unlikely to leave behind an effective movement. There are Christians who will never embrace Geagea, but there are also signs that many of those who once disliked him and his party are increasingly in agreement with Geagea for having remained politically consistent.

A second reason is that Geagea has managed to build up ties outside Lebanon that in some ways protect him against Syria. The Saudis will be forever uneasy with the Lebanese Forces leader, given his wartime record, but they may yet think twice before depriving Saad Hariri of a valuable Christian counterpart. Geagea can also depend to an extent on the backing of the United States. This may not have saved him from imprisonment, but now that the Syrians are gone militarily, Geagea can use such ties (bolstered by the close connection he has maintained with Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, someone much appreciated in Washington) to increase his leverage at key moments.....

Despite this, the Syrians see advantages in pressing ahead against the Lebanese Forces leader. For one thing, the Saudis have given Syria a wide berth in Lebanon, and may eventually decide that Geagea’s affiliation with Hariri is becoming too serious a snag in the Saudi-Syrian rapprochement. If so, this could undermine the Lebanese Forces patronage networks. The Syrians also know that Geagea’s partial reliance on Sfeir for his communal legitimacy will one day end. But most important, Syria has succeeded in keeping the Christians divided, and with Aoun and President Michel Sleiman also vying for Christian validation, Geagea is vulnerable.

It will be interesting to see whether Jumblatt, after his Syria trip, continues to avoid criticism of Geagea, or whether he will be start participating in the marginalization of the Lebanese Forces leader. ..... If Jumblatt turns against Geagea, that spells the end of the Christian-Druze-Sunni alliance that made March 14 possible. ..."

Michael Young is still smoking some really, though different, good stuff....

Whatever happened to Syria, Syria, Syria?

"...In that context, a new attack against western Beirut seems absurd. Nor can Hizbullah attack the mountains, because Walid Jumblatt is now more or less on the party’s side. Destabilizing the government would also be difficult, unless Syria sees an interest in doing so to gain greater leverage over Hariri. But for Hizbullah to bring down the government is much trickier. The Hariri government is, above all, the fruit of a Syrian-Saudi compromise. Hizbullah doesn’t have the latitude to damage relations between Riyadh and Damascus.

So there is not much Nasrallah can do, except rely on Syria ........... Bashar Assad seeks to return Lebanon entirely to the Syrian fold, and indictments would open doors allowing him to play on Lebanese divisions to Syria’s advantage.

Nasrallah is caught in another bind as well. His foremost task, as defined by his relationship with Iran, is to prepare Lebanon for the possibility of a conflict with Israel in the event of an attack against Iranian nuclear facilities. He has largely succeeded on that front. Hizbullah has rearmed, has managed to neutralize serious opposition to its weapons from within the government, and largely controls the activities of the Lebanese Army in southern Lebanon, not to say the major decisions taken by the army’s intelligence service....

Maybe Nasrallah is being too hasty in incriminating his own party."

...and all the while, March 14 'hopes' to see the Bush in Obama!

"expert" Michael Young" in NowLebanon, here

"...Obama's first test will be Gaza. Does he allow Hamas to be beaten, and then cash in on the results? Or does he step in and demand an immediate ceasefire? My money is on Obama's George W. Bush reflex"

WINEP wants the 'Haqq(iqah): "Hunting for Hizballah"

AIPAC does Pennsylvania Ave. while Schenker (and his soul-mate, Michael Young) do Moawad Street! From the looks of it, Schenker is delegating these reports to a 13 years old ... WINEP/ here

"........ Then, in May 2009 Der Spiegel published an article that reported in great detail on how Hizballah operatives participated in the murder, and how the IIIC had discovered the connection. Apparently, one of the militia's operatives "committed the unbelievable indiscretion" of calling his girlfriend from a mobile phone used in the operation, enabling the investigators to identify the man. The revelations contained in the Der Spiegel article sent shock waves through Beirut.....

For the pro-West March 14 coalition in Lebanon, the allegations of Hizballah involvement in the murder should come as little surprise. Not only would the militia have had the capacity to carry out the operation, its close allies in Damascus had the motive. Members of the coalition had also been at odds with Hizballah for years, and particularly so since the Hariri assassination and the subsequent Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. At the same time, a Hizballah connection to the crime would not in any sense absolve Syria -- which then occupied and controlled Lebanon -- of culpability.

Yet the IIIC's targeting of Hizballah comes at an awkward time for the March 14 leadership. Although the coalition won national elections this past summer -- and with this victory, the opportunity to form a government -- the opposition compelled the majority, led by Rafiq Hariri's son Saad, to establish a national unity government to include members of the Shiite militia and provide the organization with preponderant influence. Strange bedfellows indeed.

Worse, in the months following the election, the March 14 coalition, which had remained fairly stable since its establishment in 2005, started to fray as its leading international backers in Washington and Riyadh sought rapprochement with Damascus. Consequently, in recent months both Saad Hariri and the March 14 coalition's influential Druze leader Walid Jumblat have looked to mend fences with Hizballah and Syria. In the case of Jumblat, the price for this accommodation has been to apologize publicly for his anti-Syrian disposition of recent years, request forgiveness from Syria's Bashar al-Asad regime, and embrace -- at least rhetorically -- Hizballah's "resistance" agenda.

For Jumblat, who cut his teeth as a warlord during the Lebanese civil war, rapprochement with Syria was a simple choice between justice and chaos. Given the IIIC's change of focus to Hizballah, Jumblat sensed that implicating the militia in the crime could present a threat to the fragile state's stability. While the Druze leader has not repudiated the tribunal publicly, he appears to be hoping that indictments will not be forthcoming.

For Rafiq's son Saad (is WINEP on first name basis?), the calculations are different. As the current leader of Lebanon's Sunni community, Saad cannot afford politically to forgive and forget the reported transgressions of Hizballah. Indeed, Saad Hariri's motto since 2005 has been al-haqq (a 'qiqa' is missing)-- "the truth" -- an allusion to the necessity above all else to find out who killed his father. While Saad demonstrated a sense of pragmatism by visiting Syria this past December, the prospect of forgiving his father's killers would be less palatable.

In addition to domestic considerations, Hariri and his government's support (or lack thereof) for the tribunal could have an impact on Lebanon's foreign relations. Because the tribunal was established by the UN, if the government fails to meet its
obligations, then Beirut could encounter bilateral difficulties with Washington and Europe. Clearly, the government of Lebanon is not in a position -- and likely would not be expected -- to render subpoenaed Hizballah suspects to the IIIC. But how would the UN respond if Hizballah were able to engineer the defunding of Lebanon's $23 million annual financial obligation to the tribunal from the state's Ministry of Justice?

With two years remaining in its current mandate, the IIIC will probably issue indictments by the end of this year. The threshold for charges in the international criminal court is so high that convictions almost always result. Given the attendant risks, should the tribunal indict even low-level operatives, it is doubtful that Hizballah will allow the accused to live, much less stand trial.

At the end of the day, if hearings do occur, they will likely be held in absentia. .......It will be more difficult -- both from an evidentiary and a political standpoint -- for the IIIC to establish connections between the Hariri murder, Damascus, and Tehran that would sustain further indictments. For Washington and the credibility of the tribunal institution, however, it is important that the investigation be given time to unfold.....'

U.S.-Syria: Who’s converting whom?

Former Asst. Secretary of Defense, Peter Rodman in MESH, here

(NOTICE the comments section: Michael Young + Eyal Zisser gang on CSIS's Jon Alterman in siding with the never learning hawks!)

"...........splitting Syria from Iran ...... The obstacle to actually accomplishing this strategic coup is that no one has figured out a way to do it consistently with other important strategic interests or without risk to other strategic interests of the United States.....

.........In other words, while our tough talking points were meant to ratchet up pressures, the Syrians spun the visits into relief from pressures........

.........Arab anger at Syria is a recurring phenomenon—usually short-lived. In recent years, however, given the growing threat from Iran, the unholy alliance between Syria and Iran is likely to remain a big issue in Syrian-Arab relations. We should not forget which side we have the bigger stake in.............

............The incident ('strike') probably has more immediate relevance to our present diplomacy with North Korea, but it is also a reminder of the potential dangers of a Syrian-Israeli conflict. Syria already possesses other forms of WMD if not nuclear weapons..........

Syrian policies have made it harder to visualize any kind of rapprochement.........Ultimately there will have to be a Syrian-Israeli peace settlement—everyone knows that—but it should be in a strategic context that strengthens the forces of moderation in the region rather than weakening them. Syria will be thinking strategically if it pursues a dialogue with Israel; so should we."

Syria regains strength in Lebanon, without troop presence .... Saudi, Western rapprochement with Syria sealed new reality

Reuters/ here

"Slowly but surely, Syria has regained influence in Lebanon, but wields it more diplomatically than in the era before the slaying of Lebanese statesman Rafik al-Hariri ..... with a green light from Hariri's regional ally Saudi Arabia, it has recovered its standing abroad, shrugging off Western efforts to isolate it and developing strong new ties with Turkey, a former enemy.

"There was not even the pretence of diplomacy and dignity," recalled Karim Makdisi, "It's not so much that Lebanon is now a sovereign country," he said, but a more normal relationship had been restored.....

The younger Hariri became prime minister after his Western- and Saudi-backed coalition narrowly won a June election against Hezbollah and other Syrian allies. But he heads a national unity government in which the minority enjoys significant power.

Lebanese politicians who had hoped the United States, France and Saudi Arabia would block any Syrian interference after the last Syrian troops left in April 2005 have trimmed their sails.

Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, once one of Syria's fieriest critics, left the Hariri-led coalition last year to take a more centrist stance -- and is expected to visit Damascus soon.

For Marwan Hamadeh, a Jumblatt aide who survived an attempt on his life in October 2004, the new relationship with Syria stops short of genuine reconciliation and cannot obstruct an international tribunal formed to prosecute Hariri's killers.

"I wouldn't say the Syrians are back," he told Reuters. "In political and intelligence terms they never left.....

Most Lebanese politicians now clear their lines with Syria.

President Michel Suleiman, a former army commander, holds a weekly call with Assad. Hariri has spoken by telephone to the Syrian leader several times since his trip to Damascus.

"Once the Syrians and Saudis got together, local politicians would always have to dance to their music," said Makdisi.

Anti-Syrian politicians had to compromise because they had realised that Lebanon was "not the centre of the universe" and Western leaders would not come to their rescue, he added.

Syria sees its influence in Lebanon as a trump card in any negotiations with the West and Israel, Hamadeh said. The West still wanted to keep Lebanon from coming under Syria's thumb again. "But everything in this world is now relative, especially independence and sovereignty," he shrugged....

But progress could be slow on measures that Hariri sees as vital to reinforce a normal state-to-state relationship.....

Hariri no longer publicly accuses Syria of orchestrating the huge seafront bomb blast that killed his father and 22 others, saying he will await the outcome of the U.N.-backed tribunal.

Investigators initially implicated Syrian and Lebanese security officials, but the tribunal has yet to indict any suspects and critics say it appears to have lost momentum.

Lebanese commentator Michael Young said the United States and France, both hostile to Syria at the time, had spearheaded efforts to set up the tribunal, but now had other priorities.

"Today there is no critical mass to see the tribunal accuse Syria or anybody else. For many in the international community, the tribunal is more a headache than anything else," he argued.

Makdisi, the academic, said the tribunal had a life of its own, but might never uncover the truth behind Hariri's killing.

"Behind Druze kisses for Quntar"

I hate to say it, but I do slightly agree with Lebanon's uber-neocon, Michael Young, in MESH's, here

"...Jumblatt’s and Arslan’s rally for Quntar was motivated by the need to avoid Druze ill feeling by ignoring their coreligionist; but more importantly by a desire to defend their leadership over the Druze by containing Quntar, which they did by embracing him to better defuse him. Although Quntar presents no threat to their power base, he could emerge as a small headache. For example, he could conceivably be brought into parliament in next year’s elections in the Baabda constituency, where Hezbollah and the Aounists, if they decide to bother Jumblatt, have considerable electoral sway..."

Hariri's Bellmare to issue an indictment between and September and December

Interesting though to hear Cassese say that the Hariri carnival has not been politicized "since 2007.." Post-Mehlis era!

From the ever watchful eye of Michael Young at the The DailyStar ...

"... Cassese added that he did not have any information about the potential culprits or the details of Bellemare’s probe. “I have no idea, because we are very strict (huh?) … The prosecutor does not tell anything [about the investigation] to anybody within the tribunal,” Cassese said. Bellemare’s office did not respond to a request for comment....

At the same time, Cassese believes the tribunal will struggle to find enough donations for its budget next year, because the added costs of a trial would run into state budgets shrunken by the economic crisis afflicting the Western nations bankrolling the court. Lebanon pays 49 percent of the tribunal’s annual budget, which for 2010 amounts to $55.35 million. ..... “The problem will be next year, because if next year – as I very much hope – we have a trial, then we will have to recruit staff.”

Critics have assailed the tribunal as a political tool for the US and its allies to pressure Damascus and Hizbullah. ..... Since the UN voted in May 2007 to form the court, “the whole process has never been political or politicized,” said Cassese, .... The tribunal has also battled negative perceptions over the exodus of key personnel...."

Washington beware: Bashar Assad is scheming!

Seriously, I believe that Michael Young shows signs of dementia ... Old scribblings like "controlling the Sunnis, ... stifle Geagea' ... Hezbollah card" have been throttled to death ...Daily Star/ here

"... Syrian weapons to Hizbullah appear to be there to serve a more complex purpose. I continue to believe that the primary Syrian objective is to create the proper conditions for a Syrian military return to Lebanon. This is not an easy venture, or one guaranteed of success.... That loss was a bitter one for Bashar, striking at the very heart of his political self-esteem.

But there are more pragmatic reasons as well. Only a military presence allows the Syrian regime to control Lebanon’s Sunni community,.... also allows Syria to stifle its old bugbear, the Maronite community, where Samir Geagea has made headway ..... But perhaps most important, only if Syria is physically present in Lebanon can it turn the “Hizbullah card” to its advantage by projecting itself as the sole actor able to contain the party – which it would nevertheless allow to pursue a “resistance’ agenda, since Syria could use this as leverage whenever it needs to bargain with the Arab states, the US, Israel, even Iran.

If Syria can guarantee that the next war between Hizbullah and Israel is particularly vicious and that Hizbullah can hold its own (Syria’s passing of game-changing weaponry, for example more effective anti-aircraft missiles, would help do so), this could open up numerous possibilities. Israeli retaliation would be ferocious, the Lebanese state and government would emerge from the maelstrom discredited and weak, United Nations resolutions on Lebanon would effectively collapse, and Hizbullah would be perceived by Arab states and Israel as a major regional menace, which Assad could then use as a wedge to facilitate acceptance of a Syrian military comeback.

The absence of a credible UN-sponsored post-conflict framework would be Syria’s opening. No one, least of all the Israelis, would take seriously a new international force in southern Lebanon. That conviction could swing the Americans. Subcontract Lebanon to Syria once again and everyone is happy, the rationale might go.

That’s where the hard questioning should come in Washington. If Syria’s energies are primarily geared toward reestablishing a military presence in Lebanon, then American engagement of Damascus will not change much in Bashar Assad’s plans. Washington needs to move beyond Robert Ford to address the real issue: Syria’s intention to again use Lebanon as the platform from which to become a dominant Arab state."