Vice President Joseph Biden invited U.S. Jewish group leaders to the White House yesteday to get input for his upcoming trip to Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and possibly Egypt ...
Among those who attended the powwow yesterday, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations's Alan Solow and Malcolm Hoenlein, the Orthodox Union's Nathan Diament, the Jewish Federation of North America's Kathy Manning, AIPAC's Lee Rosenberg, the Reform Jewish Movement's Rabbi David Saperstein, former Congressman Robert Wexler, as well as long-time Biden friends Jack Rosen, formerly with the American Jewish Committee, and philanthropist and Democratic donor Haim Saban. Among those who attended from the White House: Dennis Ross, the NSC's senior Iran and wider regional strategist, NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Daniel Shapiro, Biden and his longtime advisor Tony Blinken.
........ Diament writes at the OU blog. "In the wake of the meeting, it can be said that Israelis and supporters of Israel in the U.S. should pay close attention to what Vice President Biden says and where he goes next week - it will be important."
Biden gives a speech next week to Israelis at Tel Aviv University,...... a speech that is important and significant for Israeli-American relations,'" the paper reported. "The political portion of his visit will likely concentrate on the Iranian nuclear question, with Biden stressing before Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the U.S. expects Israel to assist in the effort to foil, using diplomatic means, Iran's nuclear ambitions through the imposition of effective sanctions at the UN Security Council, thus avoiding unilateral steps that may include an attack on Iran's nuclear installations."
Other sources said they saw Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Michael Oren at the White House as well yesterday - thought to be for a separate meeting with Biden."
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
"Seeking input" on the Middle East, VP Biden talks to .....US Jewish groups leaders!
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
"UAE authorities are so ticked off because they were quietly cooperating with Israel on Iran intelligence ... Israeli minister was in Dubai 'that' day
".... But in fact, am told that one reason UAE authorities are so ticked off about the assassination is because they were quietly cooperating with Israel on Iran intelligence. Indeed, an Israeli minister (Uzi Landau) was in Abu Dhabi & Dubai the day the day the assassination took place."
Jumblatt & the at-long-last 'apology' ...
أن كلمة جنبلاط، التي يعكف على وضع عناوينها حسم منها إلى الآن نقطتان:
1- الخطاب الذي سيتوجه به إلى القيادة والشعب في سوريا والذي يتضمن اعتذاراً صريحاً عما بدر منه، أو أسيء فهمه خلال السنوات الخمس الماضية، على أن يقفل الكلام في هذا الموضوع·
2- تسمية نجله تيمور وليد جنبلاط خليفة له في قيادة الحزب والطائفة، في مناسبة أراد أن تكون امتداداً للسياسة الجنبلاطية واستمراراً للزعامة الجنبلاطية لطائفة الموحدين الدروز ببعديها اللبناني والعربي·
Dahi Khalfan Tamim plans to seek the arrest of Netanyahu & Dagan ...
"Dubai's police chief plans to seek the arrest of Benjamin Netanyahu and the head of Israel's spy agency over the killing of a Hamas leader in the emirate, Al Jazeera television reported. Dahi Khalfan Tamim "said he would ask the Dubai prosecutor to issue arrest warrants for ... Netanyahu and the head of Mossad," the television said. It did not give details..."
"... pledging to go toe to toe with Israel in the next campaign ..."
"..... Two years after Hizballah military commander Imad Mughniyah was assassinated in Damascus -- prompting Nasrallah to declare an "open war" on Israel, the presumed perpetrator -- the group has yet to successfully retaliate....During his February 16, 2010 speech marking the martyrdom of Mughniyah and other Hizballah heroes, Nasrallah rationalized the conspicuous lack of significant retaliation: "Our options are open and we have all the time in the world....[W]e are the ones to choose the time and place and target." He also suggested that Hizballah had not yet found a target that "rises to the level" of Mughniyah.Meanwhile, the group has been preparing for a conventional fight against Israel by stockpiling weapons in the south in violation of UN Security Council resolutions......These discoveries represent only a fraction of the weapons Hizballah has procured during its most recent massive military buildup. Since the 2006 war with Israel, the group has acquired an estimated 40,000 rockets and -- with Syria's help -- reportedly improved the quality of its arsenal. In addition to boosting the range of this stockpile, Syria may have provided the organization with the Russian-made shoulder-fired Igla-S antiaircraft system, which is capable of downing Israeli F-16s. ..... U.S. officials have already confirmed in the Arab press that Hizballah is training with Syria on the antiquated SA-2 antiaircraft system.To complement its upgraded arsenal, Hizballah recently spelled out a new, more aggressive military posture toward Israel. Since the 2006 war, rumors (Schenker & Lewitt read DEBKA!) have persisted that the group would cross the border and "take the fighting to Israel" in the next conflict. During his February 16, speech, Nasrallah offered a new vision of strategic parity with Israel, if not an advanced conception of the organization's longstanding "balance of terror" strategy.Deriding Israel's "Iron Dome" missile defense system as a "science fiction movie," Nasrallah upped the ante by pledging to go toe to toe with Israel in the next campaign....If Hizballah succeeds in avenging Mughniyah by striking an Israeli target -- whether on the border or abroad -- it could set off another round of fighting similar to that of 2006. This time, however, other actors could well enter the fray. If one takes Damascus at its word, Syria may decide to participate in the next Israeli-Hizballah war, a development that could spark a region-wide conflagration. At the moment, Hizballah may be keeping its powder dry on orders from Tehran, in anticipation of an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Still, avenging Mughniyah is a key priority for the group, and its success or failure in meeting this goal could be the difference between the current status quo and a regional war."
SYRIA’S STRATEGIC TIES TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC: DIPLOMACY IN THE POST-IRAQ/POST-PEACE PROCESS MIDDLE EAST
"...... Last week, just after we had completed our regional tour to Beirut, Damascus, and Tehran, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made his own journey to Damascus, for highly publicized meetings with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, HAMAS Political Bureau chief Khalid Mishal, and a “resistance” summit with Assad and Hizballah Secretary General Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah.......A week before Ahmadinejad’s arrival in Damascus, we had our own conversation with President Assad—a conversation that came one day after U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns met with the Syrian leader. In our session with him, Assad expressed satisfaction over his meeting with Undersecretary Burns. However, Assad also made clear that Syria’s relations with Iran, as well as its ties to Hizballah and HAMAS, are not on the table.Syria’s relationship with the Islamic Republic seems increasingly strategic in character. Over the past year, key advisers to President Assad have told us as much; one of them went so far as to describe Syrian-Iranian relations with the French adjective, “intime”. If the Obama Administration is unable or unwilling to acknowledge this reality and the regional dynamics that have given rise to it, the already limited effectiveness of American diplomacy in the Middle East will be further undermined.To understand Syria’s increasingly strategic partnership with Iran, a bit of history is in order. The late Hafiz al-Assad inaugurated Syria’s relationship with the Islamic Republic during the Iran-Iraq war. ........ interest flowed naturally from Assad’s chronic concern about his country’s potential strategic marginalization by the United States and Israel.“The Assad regime’s inclination to challenge U.S. Middle East policy has not stemmed primarily from the personal obstreperousness of Syrian leaders, but from a particular assessment of what defending Syrian interests required in the face of the U.S. posture toward the region. The United States is, of course, the chief external backer of the state of Israel—from a Syrian perspective, an expansive power seeking regional hegemony. U.S. military and political support has been critical to allowing Israel to expand its territorial holdings and occupy these lands in defiance of what Syrian leaders frequently describe as “international legitimacy”.“From a Syrian vantage point, U.S. policy in the Middle East for much of the last thirty-five years has aimed principally at ensuring Israel’s ability to consolidate and maintain its hegemonic position in the region. Given this interpretation of the underlying rationale for America’s Middle East policy, the Assad regime has long been concerned to forestall a worst-case scenario in which Syria would be encircled by regimes hostile to its interests, allied to the United States, and docile toward Israel (that is, a Lebanon that has made a separate peace with Israel, a pro-Western Turkey cooperating strategically with the Jewish state, an Iraq with a regime supported by and supportive of the United States, a Jordan ruled by pro-American Hashemites who have sold out the Palestinian cause and forged security ties to Israel, and a rump Palestinian entity). Under these conditions, Syria would be marginalized in regional affairs, with other states free to ignore or undermine its interests.”
Seen through this prism, cooperation with Iran proved enormously valuable to Syrian interests during the balance of Hafiz al-Assad’s tenure, on multiple fronts—resisting U.S. and Israeli military incursions in Lebanon; cultivating Hizballah as a military and political asset; using Palestinian Islamist resistance groups like Islamic Jihad and HAMAS to press the United States, Israel, and the PLO not to neglect Syrian interests in the Arab-Israeli peace process; and, in general, underscoring the potential costs to the United States, Israel, and other regional actors of ignoring or threatening Syria’s regional interests. Nevertheless, at the end of Hafiz al-Assad’s life, the Syrian-Iranian relationship still seemed as much tactical as strategic in character..........
Bashar al-Assad’s accession to the Syrian presidency in 2000 took place near the beginning of what has proven to be a still ongoing period of dramatic shifts in the Middle East’s strategic environment. These shifts include the effective collapse of the traditional Arab-Israeli peace process, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, the rise of Hizballah and HAMAS as important political actors in their national and regional contexts, the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri in Lebanon, and the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as well as subsequent Israeli military campaigns in Lebanon and Gaza.
Following Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, the Islamic Republic was able to take advantage of these developments to effect a significant boost in its own regional standing. And ....Turkey has intensified its diplomatic engagement in the Middle East, in ways not always congruent with U.S. strategic preferences, thereby boosting its own regional standing.
For Bashar al-Assad, these developments have created both enormous challenges and, over time, new strategic opportunities. In this context of daunting challenges and emerging opportunities, Syria’s diplomatic calculations have shifted in at least three important ways during Bashar’s presidency; one consequence of these shifting diplomatic calculations has been an ever greater inclination in Damascus to see Syria’s relationship with the Islamic Republic as a unalloyed strategic partnership.
First, Syria’s ties to regional “resistance” forces—including groups like Hizballah and HAMAS that are also closely linked to Iran—have taken on an increasingly strategic character during Bashar’s tenure. As we have discussed previously, with the removal of Syrian military forces from Lebanon following the Hariri assassination, Hizballah has become an even more valuable asset for Syria. Similarly, on the Palestinian front, it is hard to imagine that, at this point, Bashar would agree to expel Khalid Mishal from Syria as part of a purely bilateral peace settlement with Israel—as, it would seem, his father had been prepared to do.
On this point, it is noteworthy that, since late 2008, Bashar has adopted a rhetorical position on Arab-Israeli issues emphasizing the need for a “comprehensive” Arab-Israeli settlement, along the lines indicated in the 2002 Arab League peace initiative, and with HAMAS playing a central role on the Palestinian side. When we asked him about this evolution in his rhetoric, President Assad said that, if Israel were prepared to conclude a peace treaty with Syria meeting his longstanding requirements (full return of the occupied Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 line, etc.), he “could not say ‘no’.” He noted, though, that, while Israel could get a “peace treaty” with Syria, such a settlement would give Israel little more than a “ceasefire” and, perhaps, a heavily guarded embassy in Damascus. For real “peace”, according to President Assad, Israel will need to negotiate a comprehensive settlement, including on the Palestinian track.Second, the Islamic Republic has proven its steadfastness to Syria in recent years. Syria and Iran were the two regional states which argued most vociferously that the United States would face serious difficulties in its occupation of post-Saddam Iraq, and their stance was widely viewed in the region as having been vindicated by events. More practically, Syria’s ties to Iran were critical in fending off the heavy pressure applied on the Assad regime by the United States, most of Europe, and moderate Arab states in the wake of the Hariri assassination. As another of Bashar’s advisers said to me recently, it would be hard for Syria to forsake Iran, as Iran, in the period following Hariri’s assassination, had “stood by us when no one else did”. This should not be interpreted as a sentimental statement. Rather, it is a statement that, in an uncertain strategic environment, Syria will continue to need the “hedge” provided by its close relationship with the Islamic Republic.
Third, the perceived value in Damascus of strategic realignment with the United States through a carefully conditioned peace deal with Israel is slowly declining as America’s hegemonic standing and influence erode. Certainly, the Syrian leadership was relieved by President George W. Bush’s departure from office and his replacement by President Obama. But, with a right-leaning coalition headed by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in power in Israel, expectations in Damascus for what Syria would see as major improvements in America’s Middle East policy are not high. And, as President Assad noted to us, poor policy choices in the Middle East by the United States over the last decade have created “vacuums” which “others [Iran and Turkey] filled”. (In this context, Assad argued that Iran’s evolving regional role does not represent “new ambitions” on Tehran’s part.) This has expanded Syria’s strategic optionality. In this context, Assad underscored that the rise of Iran and Turkey to new levels of regional influence has not come at Syria’s expense; rather, all three states have been able to improve their own relations and bolster their regional influence.
This is not to say that Hafiz al-Assad’s preferred strategic option of realignment toward the West through a “principled” peace with Israel does not remain deeply attractive to his son and successor. But, the longer that Damascus must wait for the United States to deliver on its end of the peace process, the more time that Bashar and his advisers have to internalize what they see as the reality of America’s slow decline. And that has a palpable effect on the price they are willing to pay for realizing Hafiz al-Assad’s preferred strategic option. ......
We came away from that visit convinced—contra the conventional wisdom in Washington—that the Lebanon withdrawal had been well internalized in Syria, that President Assad was more in control of the Syrian government than he had been before Hariri’s assassination, and that U.S.-French efforts to isolate Syria from regional affairs would ultimately fail. That assessment has been powerfully validated with the passage of time. Bashar al-Assad has weathered the storm unleashed in the aftermath of the Hariri assassination and has emerged as a masterful player of the regional game. It is striking that many of the people who argued in 2005 that the Syrian leadership was internally conflicted and uniquely vulnerable to external pressure are now making the same arguments about the Islamic Republic of Iran. They were wrong then; they are wrong now."
"... The bottom line, is that assassination is justified if it keeps us out of a war. But short of that, it's not ..."
"...... In America's war on terror, there has been a conspicuous absence of classical assassination. The closest thing to it was when the CIA kidnapped an Egyptian cleric in Milan and rendered him to Egypt in 2003. Most of the CIA agents behind the rendition were identified because, like the assassins in Dubai, the agents apparently did not understand that you can't put a large team on the ground in a modern country and not leave a digital footprint. It took a matter of days for the Italian prosecutors to trace their supposedly sterile phone to their hotels, and from there to their true-name email accounts and telephone calls to family. We might as well have let Delta Force do it with helicopters with American insignia on the side.Israel has yet to feel the real cost of the hit in Dubai. But the longer it is covered in the press, the higher the cost.And was Mr. Mabhouh worth it? Other than taking revenge for killing the two Israeli soldiers, he will be quickly replaced. Arms dealing is not a professional skill, and as long as Hamas's militants are at war with Israel they will find people to buy arms and smuggle them into Gaza. In short, it's looking more and more like Mr. Mabhouh's assassination was a serious policy failure.In cold prose, it sounds inhuman, but there should be a cost-benefit calculation in deciding whether to assassinate an enemy. With all of the new technology available to any government who can afford it, that cost has gone up astronomically. Plausible deniability is out the window. Obviously, if we had known with any specificity 9/11 was coming, we would have ignored the high cost and tried to assassinate Osama bin Laden. And there's certainly an argument to be made that we should have assassinated Saddam Hussein rather than invade Iraq. The bottom line, it seems to me, is that assassination is justified if it keeps us out of a war. But short of that, it's not. The Mabhouhs of the world are best pursued by relentless diplomatic pressure and the rule of law."
"I will not ... what is that word? ... Yes, I will not accept Israel's obnoxiousness..."
"... The Palestinian president noted that PA representatives will participate in the Arab League's internal regulations committee in order to be acquainted with the Arab stance. ...Abbas said that the Palestinians continue to discuss the resuming negotiations' elements with the Americans including a timetable for talks.He acknowledged the complexity of matters. "The situation in Israel and the territories is complex. Construction in settlements continues and the last Israeli move regarding heritage sites only adds problems with each passing day. We cannot remain silent, especially in light of the violation of holy sites....
"The Arabs must take Jerusalem under their wing and give enough support in order to allow us to continue to live there, build there and sustain the Palestinian residents because Israel is expelling the Palestinians in Jerusalem. If the Arab nation doesn't act quickly, then I fear it'll be too late."
“The Iranians are to Jundullah as termites are to wood,”
"....... The big question, of course, is whether Rigi was actually “confessing” or merely reciting what his Iranian captors wanted him to say. (The New York Times reported that the interview may have been intended to stir up anti-American sentiments within Iran.) Either way, Obama administration officials, like their Bush administration predecessors, have emphatically denied that U.S. agencies have ever been involved in any operations with Jundullah. They say that years ago the group was deemed too violent and untrustworthy by American intelligence. Current and former officials also say they suspect the group has been thoroughly infiltrated by Iranian intelligence.“The Iranians are to Jundullah as termites are to wood,” a U.S. counterterrorism official told Declassified. “The group is hopelessly penetrated, and its methods don’t accord with those of the United States.”In 2007, ABC News reported that Jundullah, which at the time was allegedly conducting bombing and other guerrilla operations inside Iran, had been secretly encouraged and advised by U.S. officials over a two-year period. U.S. officials denied the ABC report before congressional committees.In his purported confession, Rigi suggested that when his plane was intercepted, he was on his way to a meeting at a U.S. airbase in Kyrgyzstan with a senior U.S. official, identified in some Iranian news reports as Richard Holbrooke, the Obama administration's special diplomatic representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan............P. J. Crowley told Declassified that such reports were "complete nonsense."
China, Iran Creating 'No-Go' Zones to Thwart U.S. Military Power
"......... But now the party's over. The United States, Pentagon strategists say, is quickly losing its ability to barge in without permission. Potential target countries and even some lukewarm allies are figuring out ingenious ways to blunt American power without trying to meet it head-on, using a combination of high-tech and low-tech jujitsu.At the same time, U.S. naval and air forces have been shrinking under the weight of ever more expensive hardware. It's no longer the case that the United States can overwhelm clever defenses with sheer numbers.As Defense Secretary Robert Gates summed up the problem this month, countries in places where the United States has strategic interests -- including the Persian Gulf and the Pacific -- are building "sophisticated, new technologies to deny our forces access to the global commons of sea, air, space and cyberspace.''Those innocuous words spell trouble. While the U.S. military and strategy community is focused on Afghanistan and the fight in Marja, others – Iran and China, to name two – are chipping away at America's access to the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Persian Gulf and the increasingly critical extraterrestrial realms."This era of U.S. military dominance is waning at an increasing and alarming rate,'' Andrew Krepinevich, a West Point-educated officer and former senior Pentagon strategist, writes in a new report. "With the spread of advanced military technologies and their exploitation by other militaries, especially China's People's Liberation Army and to a far lesser extent Iran's military and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the U.S. military's ability to preserve military access to two key areas of vital interest, the western Pacific and the Persian Gulf, is being increasingly challenged.''
Monday, March 1, 2010
Syria willing to consider gradual approach to peace?
"Syria is willing to consider peace and gradual normalization with Israel, according to Gabrielle Rifkind of the Oxford Research Group, who met with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem in December. Speaking with Haaretz over e-mail, the conflict resolution specialist said that following an Israeli withdrawal from half the territory it holds on the Golan Heights, the two states would declare an end to the state of enmity between them as a first step.According to Rifkind, who met the minister along with a group of conflict resolution experts, Muallem suggested that Syria was prepared to consider a phased approach to the return of the Golan Heights."There could be stages of withdrawal, the timing of which could involve a form of normalization," he reportedly said."Half of the Golan could lead to an end to enmity; three quarters of the Golan, to a special interest section in the U.S. embassy in Damascus: a full withdrawal would allow a Syrian embassy in Israel."Rifkind, who is the director of the Middle East Program at Oxford Research Group and who traveled to Damascus with a delegation who had conversations with the Syrian foreign minister over a period of time, recently published an article in the Guardian on her last visit there. She says that Muallem stressed that Syria was serious about peace over the Golan Heights.But he also said that "for peace-making, Israel needs to be ready to recognize that Syria is entitled to every inch of the Golan, but we wish to engage in talks". "For us," he added, "the land is sacred and a matter of honor."The Syrian foreign minister also emphasized the role of Turkey as third party mediators, as they have already begun working on the issue of defining the 1967 border. This line has never been agreed and the unresolved issue is the demarcation of the line on the water between Syria and Israel, in particular who would control the Lake Kinneret shore.In talks during the tenure of Ehud Barak as prime minister, the idea was floated of establishing of an expert committee that would draw the border along the eastern shoreline of the lake.Muallem said Turkey dealt fairly when mediating talks while Ehud Olmert was prime minister and Damascus does not wish to see their neighbor replaced. He said that despite internal dissent, Industry, Trade and Labor Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer had been sent to Turkey to try and repair the relationship.He told Rifkind that "Syria does not see direct talks taking place through Turkey, but Ankara could play a part in devising a formula for the demarcation line".He added that the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had felt cheated because they had been close to completing the delineation of the border when Israel launched its attack on Gaza.The next stage, Muallem said, "would entail direct talks with America to address the security concerns. The key issue here is U.S. flights over the Golan in order to provide security".When asked about a change of relationship with Hamas and Hezbollah, he said that it will not negotiate any change in its relationship with Hezbollah and Hamas until after the Golan is returned. "Key questions, such as Syria's support for Hamas, Hezbollah and its policy to Iran - would only be answered after withdrawal," he said.Rifkind told Haaretz that in the assessment of the group that met with Muallem "this is particularly hard for Israel to swallow. This is because Israel believes that Syria plays an active role in providing passage for Iranian weapons to these groups. Syria has also recently been involved in the secret transfer of mobile surface to surface Syrian-made 250 kilometer missiles to Hezbollah. It seems that one of the tragedies of the region is that an outstretched hand for peace-making coincides with increased military pressure, and this is seen to be the route to the peace table."She added that making peace with Syria would not be easy but could pay off in the long run."From a conflict resolution perspective, reaching out to Syria will involve bold steps, and experience would suggest that if Syria and Israel managed to establish an agreement on the Golan, the view from the leadership may be significantly different," she said. "There could be a potential role for Syria as a mediator between Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah which could drastically improve the chances of a long-term truce - or even a permanent resolution - between these parties."
"Israeli companies establish overseas presence due to 'fears of missiles' & other calamities ..."
The goal of companies is to back up their financial information and ensure business continuity in case the country is 'harmed' or a disaster occurs at their facilities... ● Halperin (HMS) recently signed an agreement with the meter - Naotolis, totaling tens of millions of shekels, to lease thousands of feet of "secure backup facility in Italy", ...Iranian threat, warnings of Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah, and earthquakes prompted hundreds of Israeli companies to look for ways to establish facilities outside the country........ a senior adviser with Halperin, said that "this is a new trend"... Until the second Lebanon war, Israeli companies and organizations prefered to build up information sites within Israel due to a relatively easy access and operation, resulting from geographical proximity....However, Threats missiles, Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as fear of earthquakes, brought a radical change in the perception of security and storage of information. Israeli companies began to realize that one should preferably have backup sites and data locations abroad....."
STRATFOR's Friedman: "pushing Iran to give up a key instrument of leverage (its nuclear program) without any concessions on our part is not happening"
".... The diplomatic approach consists of creating a broad coalition prepared to impose what have been called crippling sanctions on Iran. Effective sanctions must be so painful that they compel the target to change its behavior. In Tehran’s case, this could only consist of blocking Iran’s imports of gasoline. Iran imports 35 percent of the gasoline it consumes. It is not clear that a gasoline embargo would be crippling, but it is the only embargo that might work. All other forms of sanctions against Iran would be mere gestures designed to give the impression that something is being done. The Chinese will not participate in any gasoline embargo…Since all other sanctions are gestures, the diplomatic approach is therefore unlikely to work.
The military option has its own risks. First, its success depends on the quality of intelligence on Iran’s nuclear facilities and on the degree of hardening of those targets. Second, it requires successful air attacks. Third, it requires battle damage assessments that tell the attacker whether the strike succeeded. Fourth, it requires follow-on raids to destroy facilities that remain functional. And fifth, attacks must do more than simply set back Iran’s program a few months or even years: If the risk of a nuclear Iran is great enough to justify the risks of war, the outcome must be decisive….
As long as the problem of Iran is defined in terms of its nuclear program, the United States is in an impossible place. Therefore, the Iranian problem must be redefined. One attempt at redefinition involves hope for an uprising against the current regime. We will not repeat our views on this in depth, but in short, we do not regard these demonstrations to be a serious threat to the regime. Tehran has handily crushed them, and even if they did succeed, we do not believe they would produce a regime any more accommodating toward the United States. The idea of waiting for a revolution is more useful as a justification for inaction — and accepting a nuclear Iran — than it is as a strategic alternative....
Israel would also be enraged. It sees ongoing American-Iranian hostility as a given. And it wants the United States to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. But eliminating this threat is not an option given the risks, so the choice is a nuclear Iran outside some structured relationship with the United States or within it. The choice that Israel might want, a U.S.-Iranian conflict, is unlikely. Israel can no more drive American strategy than can Saudi Arabia...."
Is the Pentagon turning down Israeli "special acquisition requests'?
"..... Obviously, the U.S. is not the only actor that matters on the Iran strikes issue. I noted over the weekend that Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, in a talk last week at the Washington Institute, projected frustration with the U.S. on Iran. Worth noting that Barak's expression of different perspectives between the U.S. and Israel on Iran came a day after Barak held meetings at the Pentagon with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm.Mike Mullen.Are certain Israeli military acquistion requests getting turned down by the Pentagon?
Possibly.
"Israel has been interested for some time in items that could hit varied targets," the Washington Institute's Patrick Clawson told POLITICO. "Hezbollah is burying a lot of stocks, and digging more tunnels. Israel needs things that will hit varied targets that are [also] useful for Iran. Israel is also interested in [items that enable] long-distance strikes" such as those Israel reportedly used to strike Hamas weapons convoys in Sudan last year. "They can quite credibly say the last time we used this was not against Iran" but for other operations, Clawson said. "It's not very surprising they would be continuing to press" for such items. Nor that the Pentagon might turn them down."
'Israelis no longer allowed in Dubai ... even with 'alternative' passports
"...The Emirates will now deny entry to anyone suspected of having Israeli citizenship, Tamim said at a security conference in Abu Dhabi Monday.It was unclear if the measure would apply to Israeli athletes competing in international sports events being held there, such as tennis player Shahar Peer, a recent semifinalist in the local WTA tennis tournament....."Mossad shouldn't come to us. We haven't done anything to Israel. This is an insult to us, to Britain, to Australia, to Germany and to New Zealand and it's shameful," Tamim told reporters in Dubai, a member of the United Arab Emirates..."
Amano's (IAEA) first report on Iran (and Syria)
".... The Agency continues, under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but we cannot confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities because Iran has not provided the Agency with the necessary cooperation....
..... Syria has not cooperated with the Agency since June 2008 in connection with the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and other locations. As a consequence, the Agency has not been able to make progress towards resolving the outstanding issues related to those sites since the previous report to the Board of Governors. It would be helpful if Israel shared with the Agency any relevant information which it may possess. Full cooperation is also needed from Syria to facilitate the resolution of issues "
[Full report/ here]
"Do not even think about bombing Iran"
...... As an option, however, it should not become a self-fulfilling prophecy. We need instead to develop a long-term strategy for dealing with a nuclear Iran and not box ourselves into war.
The threat of a military strike is seen as increasing American leverage. In this view, not only does it supposedly intimidate Iran, but it also helps Washington and like-minded western nations persuade other countries to tighten and enforce official sanctions. The US can argue that sanctions are preferred to military force, but that they will only work if all co-operate.
The strike option, however, lacks credibility. America is engaged in two massive and unpopular military campaigns in the region. Given Iran’s ability to retaliate against the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is simply not credible that we would use force in the foreseeable future. Tehran, Moscow and Beijing know this.
There is also a technical reality: ...... Even if we did strike most or all existing facilities, Iran can rebuild fairly fast and would surely expel inspectors and burrow further underground when building its next facilities. It would be even harder to find, and strike, those assets.
If there were any real chance of major political reform in Iran within a couple of years, buying that much time might be worth the cost. But the unrest in Iran since last year’s stolen election is not likely to bring about regime change, given the regime’s control of the military. Nor is a strike by an outside power likely to help the cause of Iranian reformists.
Generally, those who argue against a military strike stop 10 yards short of the finish line. After concluding that a strike would not make sense, they still tend to tolerate leaving it as a last resort. There are dangers to such an approach. Mr Obama may some day come under pressure to employ it when all else has failed – and we think this would be a mistake, not only for the specific matter of Iran policy but more broadly for his effort to recast the US as a country playing by international legal norms.
In addition, keeping the option of force requires US diplomats and military officials to take preparatory steps that may distract from our current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and complicate a number of regional bilateral alliances. Some states in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are generally worried about Iran. But few are anxious to support moves towards war. We will be better positioned for a sustained tightening of regional alliances if we remain resolute yet fundamentally defensive in our orientation and strategy.
There is a better way: sanctions, deterrence and containment. To be sure, another nuclear-armed state in the Middle East, especially one touting the extremist views of the current Iranian regime, would be bad for regional security. But Iran would be suicidal to attack a US ally in the region – especially one such as Israel, which has a formidable nuclear arsenal by all accounts. Iran has already proved its willingness to wage proxy and terror wars against the US and Israel. It is doubtful that a small nuclear arsenal would offer it many more options than it has already.
We should structure a sanctions regime so that it could evolve into containment of a nuclear-armed Iran, focusing on high-technology goods and weapons transfers. We should also pledge to provide a nuclear umbrella over Israel and other threatened states. In other words, we would use the techniques of containing the Soviet Union and communist China from the cold war to handle this newer, serious yet smaller, threat. It is not a great option. But it is much better than war."
Clinton to Berri: "We cannot stop an Israeli aggression in Lebanon..."
"... London-based al-Hayat newspaper reported on Monday that the message was conveyed via US Ambassador to Lebanon Michele Sison to Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.
According to the report, Berri asked Sison to tell Clinton that finding a solution to the arms smuggling issue is "not a problem", but that the US must also stop arming Israel with weapons and equipment..."