"... Overthrowing Assad would provide a setback to Iran, but not a fatal one, particularly with regard to its interests against the United States. It would in fact open new opportunities for Iran to drain the resources of its Western and Sunni Arab foes – and as in Iraq and Lebanon, efforts to combat Iranian influence in Syria would again likely demand more effort from the intervening forces than from Iran itself. Giving Iran the opportunity to wage yet another proxy war is hardly good strategic sense for Washington – even if it does relieve pressure on Tel Aviv.....
All that said, there is no denying that without foreign intervention, Syria is headed for further violence ...
Gaining an accurate picture of the motivations of FSA and opposition members, the composition of the sundry armed militias and unarmed political groups under the broader banners of the FSA and opposition, are all of serious concern to the United States. This task would, as in Libya, be primarily accomplished through the CIA. Particularly due to the ongoing civil war and the nature of the mission, would likely involve the Special Activity Division. Identifying rebel leaders, potential threats, and making initial contact with Syrian opposition and rebel forces would fall primarily under this aegis......
Another important question in the event of a drawn civil war in Syria, and indeed, one still vital should Assad fall, would be counter-proliferation operations to secure or destroy Syrian chemical, biological, or nuclear assets....
But what if Syria’s conflict persists? Prolonged civil war would likely generate stronger calls for intervention, either because of mounting humanitarian costs or growing anger over the inability or unwillingness of Syria’s remaining friends to pressure the Assad regime into an adequate solution for the problem. Even if major regime figures departed or defected, sectarian fears would, at the very least, likely still leave significant portions of the security services intact. One potential scenario would be a potential Syrian “Salò.” While the degree of support from and dependency on Syria’s foreign patrons is likely to be much lower, so too is the threat the regime is likely to face from foreign intervention (or local opposition). That said, arguments that protracted civil war or a failure to overthrow Assad will only make him more subservient to and dependent on Iran have significant merit. Where many assessments err, though, is in identifying this as a reason to bring about Assad’s speedy demise. No, not quite.
For a decade, Iran has bled the resources of America its allies by taking advantage of their invasions of or interventions in foreign states. When America invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran’s Qods Force came to support militants against its soldiers. When Israel attacked Lebanon in 2006, Iran’s preferred client in Lebanon, Hezbollah, inflicted serious pain on Israeli forces. Should the West or Arab states intervene in Syria, policymakers should automatically assume a similar modus operandi..... Iran would not have much trouble flooding Syria with weapons and personnel capable of inflicting significant harm on Iran’s enemies.
But what if, in the course of a protracted fight against rebel Syrians, Iran decided it needed to begin more directly propping up Assad? Syria would become a festering sore in the Iranian strategic map, and the stabilization or recovery of a pro-Iranian regime there could potentially divert significant resources from Iranian campaigns elsewhere. Given Hezbollah’s benefits from a Syrian logistical supply line, they too might contribute resources and volunteers (but probably not major combat formations) to supporting Damascus. The Assad regime could rapidly become an expensive commitment for an increasingly isolated Iranian regime. Toppling that regime quickly, however, while a significant blow, would bring about a reversion to the standard IRGC/QF model of operating with a light, inexpensive footprint to extract maximum costs from Iran’s enemies. On the other hand, an embattled but still salvageable pro-Tehran regime could force an increasing commitment of Iranian treasure – and probably even Iranian personnel – to preserve Iran’s regional power projection.
Protracted civil war would present the opportunity for Iran’s enemies to bleed the country as Iran bled them in previous conflicts. This could be facilitated without direct U.S. involvement in the conflict......
In the very long run, if civil war in Syria persists as long as, say, Kurdistan’s (and if the Provide Comfort analogy is accurate, it would be years), the U.S. ultimately might consider the deployment of Special Forces (as it did in Kurdistan) as a way to supplement preferred proxy forces for dealing with jihadist groups that form or take up residence on Syrian soil. Operation Viking Hammer is instructive in this regard, in which the 10th Special Forces Group, aided by U.S. air support, along with large groups of Kurdish peshmerga, were able to attack and destroy an Ansar al-Islam camp in northern Iraq with minimal expenditure of U.S. resources......
The United States does not have a compelling strategic interest in rapidly hastening the downfall of Assad commensurate with the risks and resources that would entail. ......The much more unpleasant strategic reality is that, whether foreign forces intervene or not, the U.S. receives little reward from hastening Assad’s downfall. An embattled Assad imposes just the same limitations on Syrian and Iranian threats to U.S. interests. Resources will have to be diverted from the proxies Iran supports through Syria to Syria itself as Iran tries to maintain its host’s viability. The loss of Assad’s regime would mean a rapid retrenchment in Iranian support, for sure, but this would likely be replaced by a proxy campaign against Syria’s new government and its foreign backers, or a redeployment of IRGC/QF assets to other theaters, probably against the U.S (if not both). Given that rapidly overthrowing Assad without major overt military action from a broad coalition of forces is a pipe dream anyway, the United States should consider contingency plans in which it works through, rather than against, the specter of protracted civil war. To be able to bleed Iran in Syria would, relative to the risks involved, be a far more significant strategic opportunity against Iranian power relative to the investment and risk than would be a major overt campaign to overthrow Assad outright. The more blood and treasure Iran loses in Syria – even if Assad stays in power longer – the weaker Iran will be........"
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