WINEP/ AIPAC: 'Significant' number of foreign Jihadi fighters in Syria

"Ever since the Syrian uprising began to show signs of becoming an armed rebellion, President Bashar al-Assad and other regime officials have painted the opposition as terrorists or other foreign actors who have penetrated the country in order to create anarchy. Although that general characterization is inaccurate, a small but steady stream of foreign Islamists is entering the fight against Assad's forces. More worrisome is that some mainstream clerical voices as well as violent Islamists are now calling for jihad in Syria.
One of the reasons why the ground is fertile for greater jihadist penetration in Syria is because the regime turned a blind eye to foreign fighters passing through the country to join al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004-2007, the height of the post-Saddam insurgency. Although the facilitation networks established during those years became less active in 2009-2010, they appear to have reignited of late. Therefore, the jihadist elements currently entering or already active in Syria are not starting from scratch -- they probably still have contacts to help them bring in more fighters from Iraq, North Africa, and Europe.
In Libya, many worried that NATO's involvement would spur jihadist penetration, but that did not occur on any appreciable scale. In Syria, however, the past six months have seen the arrival of significant numbers of foreign fighters. One difference is that al-Qaeda and key global jihadist ideologues have actively incited individuals to join the fight in Syria. For example, Sheikh Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, a Mauritanian considered the most important such ideologue still at large, has endorsed the new Syrian jihadist organization Jabhat al-Nusra.
Although no reliable data is available regarding the number of foreign fighters in Syria, many sources have discussed their presence....the collective evidence suggests that between 700 and 1,400 foreign fighters have entered or attempted to enter the country this year alone. If estimates of the size of the Syrian insurgency are accurate -- the latest figure is around 18,000 fighters -- then foreign fighters make up about 4-7 percent of that total...
The foreign fighters in Syria reportedly include Arabs (Lebanese, Iraqis, Jordanians, Palestinians, Kuwaitis, Tunisians, Libyans, Algerians, Egyptians, Saudis, Sudanese, and Yemenis) as well as other Muslims, including South and Central Asians (Afghans, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis) and Westerners (Belgian, British, French, and American). The largest contingents -- totaling approximately 500-900 fighters -- seem to hail from Syria's neighbors: namely Lebanese, Iraqis, Palestinians, and Jordanians, many of whom previously fought U.S. forces in Iraq. The second-largest contingent hails from North Africa: around 75-300 fighters from Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria.
According to media reports, the majority of these individuals arrived in Syria via Lebanon or Turkey. Smaller numbers have trekked through Iraq and Jordan.
Although some of the fighters lack prior training or battlefield experience, others have either participated in previous jihads or attended recent training camps. Some reports state that such camps have been set up in Lebanon and Libya. In Lebanon, jihadists appear to be using camps established in the northern Beqa Valley in 2008, following Hizballah's takeover of Beirut (acknowledging that Jihadis fought for the Hariris in 2008!)...
No full picture is available yet regarding these fighters' affiliations. Many are reportedly linking up with the main rebel force, the Free Syrian Army, while others (especially the Lebanese) are establishing their own independent battalions or militias. Elements of the Lebanese group Fatah al-Islam and the multinational Abdullah Azzam Brigades have also crossed into Syria; they are not fighting under those banners, however, but simply as "mujahedin." In addition, French media reported in December that a Libyan detachment led by Abd al-Mehdi al-Harati -- a close associate of Abdul Hakim Belhaj, former leader of the defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group -- had joined the conflict. There is no hard evidence that the homegrown jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra has recruited foreign fighters, but at least some of them have likely connected with the movement....
the issue bears watching -- foreign fighters in Syria have yet to have a known force-multiplying effect on the level seen in Iraq, but the longer the conflict persists and the more jihadists attempt to join in, the more likely it is that they might punch above their weight in influence. Therefore, Washington should work with its allies in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq to help better secure the border from infiltration.
In addition, Washington must contend with extremist rhetoric emanating from Saudi Arabia. Some Saudi clerics are exhorting individuals to wage violent jihad against the Assad regime and have used deliberate anti-Shiite language. The kingdom's religious establishment has denounced such declarations -- a development that Washington should applaud. Saudi state support for Syrians fighting in their own country is to be welcomed, but Saudi clerics urging young non-Syrians to wage jihad on their own should be discouraged.
Another issue is what the foreign fighters will do after the struggle is over. Following the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, some fighters returned home and attempted to overthrow their own governments using the new skills they had gained. Others got caught up in al-Qaeda's worldview, directing their efforts against the West. Washington must therefore begin thinking about how to curb such scenarios in the aftermath of the Syrian conflict.'