Wikileaks: Hariri's 'mentor': 'The problem with the Saudis is that they treat Hariri like a child; they don't take him seriously!'

C O N F I D E N T I A L 

SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001307

SUBJECT: JOHNNY ABDO: DISTRUSTFUL OF SAUDI DIPLOMATIC

ACTIVITY

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons

¶1. (C) Summary: In a March 30 meeting, Former Lebanese Intelligence Chief Johnny Abdo said he distrusts the recent flurry of Saudi diplomatic activity on Lebanon, and faulted the Saudis for not taking Saad Hariri seriously. A March 14
supporter, Abdo nevertheless criticized the March 14 leadership for "lacking a strategic vision" and said the majority was "gradually surrendering" to the March 8 opposition.....
¶2. (C) Former Lebanese Intelligence Chief Johnny Abdo shared his insights into Lebanon's political crisis during a meeting at his Parisian home on March 30 with Poloff. Abdo began by dismissing the recent Arab League summit in Riyadh for having produced "nothing of note." "The Saudis are more interested in form than in substance," Abdo said disdainfully, adding that the Summit's communique had merely papered over the deep cleavages between AL members, including on the subject of Lebanon..... 

¶3. (C) Turning to the recent spate of Saudi diplomatic activity on Lebanon, Abdo (a self-proclaimed supporter of the March 14 Coalition) expressed general distrust of the Saudis. He assessed that Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan and Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal are at odds over Lebanon/Syria policy, with Bandar urging support for March 14 and the Siniora government, Saud al-Faisal urging reconciliation with Syria, and King Adballah somewhere in between but readily influenced by whomever managed to grab his ear last. "Whether the Saudis decide they hate Bashar one hundred percent, or love him one hundred percent, it's still bad for Lebanon," he said. The biggest problem with the Saudis, he continued, is that they don't take Saad Hariri seriously. Whereas the late Rafik Hariri was an active participant in Saudi decision-making, advising the Saudi leadership on how to promote Lebanon's interests as well as on how best to pursue the Kingdom's interests in Lebanon, the Saudis treat Saad "like a child." The resultant imbalance in the relationship has made it difficult for Saad to shake the perception that he is a Saudi puppet who will do whatever Riyadh tells him to do, a perception that, in turn, undermines his ability to attack Hassan Nasrallah and others for being foreign agents.

¶5. (C) Abdo assessed that March 14 was in a weaker position today than twelve months ago, and was getting weaker all the time. This, he said, was due to a lack of strategic vision on the part of March 14's leadership, as well as to the sundry personal liabilities of Saad Hariri, Samir Geagea, and Walid Jumblatt. Hariri, he reiterated, is seen as too beholden to the Saudis; Geagea says the right things and probably believes them, but needs to improve his public image  (Abdo cited Geagea's inability to pull in the Christian voters who have deserted Michel Aoun, and predicted that if Aoun runs for president, most of his former supporters will
return to his fold); and Jumblatt is seen by many as untrustworthy (even though Abdo is convinced that Jumblatt has "passed the point of no return" and there is no danger of his defecting to the opposition (well?). Expounding on Geagea's problems, Abdo said that Lebanon's Christian community did not want to face the fact that, after 25 years, it hasn't managed to move beyond Michel Aoun, Samir Geagea, and Amin Gemayel......... Compounding March 14's troubles is Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, whom Abdo accused of "not doing his job" for failing to shape the outcome of the presidential election. "Sfeir has no knees," Abdo said sadly ....
¶8. (C) Turning to Lebanon's turbulent relations with Syria, Abdo said he saw only three ways out of the current crisis: First, topple the Syrian regime ("not an option for us," Abdo said ruefully); second, reach a compromise ("unfortunately, the Syrians are not interested in compromise right now because they have the upper hand"); third, surrender (which is what he believes March 14 is gradually doing).
¶9. (C) Pausing to extol at some length the wily mind of the late Hafez al-Asad, Abdo said that al-Asad's genius lay in never conclusively answering the question of whether, from an American point of view, Syria was "retrievable" or "beyond rehabilitation." Abdo argued that Bashar has attempted, albeit clumsily, to follow the same line........

¶12. (C) Comment: Abdo, notwithstanding the many years he has spent in Paris, remains an intense observer of the Lebanese scene, and a gregarious if somewhat disconcerting interlocutor. (At one point in the conversation, Abdo evoked -- with candid admiration -- Yasser Arafat's skill at dissembling, calling the late Palestinian leader the "greatest liar I ever met.") Although we have attempted to accurately convey his views, we naturally defer to our colleagues at Embassies Beirut and Damascus as to the value of his analysis...