Prospects for Arab politics ...

OXFAN; Excerpts;

What next :

New parliaments in Egypt and Tunisia will test the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the newly emerging secular and liberal political groups. Libya is heading for regime change and Yemen possibly for civil war. Tensions between Iran and the Gulf states will rise, as US and EU policies back regimes that respond favourably to the Spring. 

Analysis 

Egyptian parliamentary elections in September will be followed by presidential elections by the end of the year. The MB, as the Freedom and Justice Party, will contest half the parliamentary seats, selecting the constituencies it is likely to win. Its leadership wants to show that it can be trusted by the people: The former opposition parties and new groups being formed by the Tahrir Square activists have little time to build effective organisations or form alliances with other new groups (and the powerful but apolitical elites that dominate rural constituencies).The MB could thus face a weak and fragmented opposition... ...

Revolutions in progress in Egypt and Tunisia:

1.        Tunisia 

The interim government wants to postpone elections (scheduled for July) until October, but the people, eager for rapid reform, may not allow this despite concerns by the new groupings that they will not be ready for an early poll. The Tunisian MB (al-Nahda) is building its organisation. It is the most pragmatic of the Arab MBs and does not want to provoke a strong reaction in a relatively secular country. Disturbances continue, driven by the 30% rate of youth unemployment. Domestic unrest and the regional turbulence will deter tourists and investors, making Tunisia's economic problems worse.

2.        Egypt 

Demonstrations continue and helped force a reluctant military to put the Mubarak family on trial -- but the focus of protest is more on economic issues than political. The military dealt with an outbreak of violence against the Coptic minority, stirred by the emerging Salafi movement. The revolution caused major economic dislocation which was exacerbated by a rash of strikes and assertion of workers' rights. The euphoria of revolution will carry Egypt through the next three months, but there is a risk of unrest as the government fails to meet the unrealistic expectations that have been generated. 

Repressing revolution 

Instability persists in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain: 

1.        Syria 

Through brutal repression, the regime has contained protests and kept them out of Damascus and Aleppo. However, it cannot end the demonstrations, and the protesters cannot topple the regime . The core of the regime has narrowed to a few clans from the Alawi minority, and its alliance with leading Sunni families has weakened. President Bashar al-Assad has emerged as no better than the security chiefs that keep him in power: He will now use concessions to win greater acquiescence, but his regime is incapable of pushing through much-needed economic and political reforms. His government will survive the next few months, but the protests will continue to build and eventually force it to change or fall, at considerable cost.

2.        Libya 

Pressure on the regime will intensity as NATO reinterprets its UN mandate. The Transitional National Council (TNC) will build up its organisation in Benghazi. The ending of the siege of Misrata has given the rebels a major presence -- and a psychological boost -- in Tripolitania: Muammar al-Qadhafi will not be able to restore control to the parts of the country he has lost, including major oilfields. Over the next quarter, the military balance is likely to shift at an accelerating rate towards the TNC, leading to further regime defections and the beginning of an uprising in Tripoli itself. His downfall is now inevitable, but considerable damage could be done to Libya's infrastructure before that happens.

3.        Yemen 

President Ali Abdallah Saleh had resisted local, GCC and international demands to leave under an agreed transition plan, but his hand may now be forced as he receives medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. In the absence of a deal, there will be a showdown, possibly a civil war, between Saleh's son and nephews (who command his Praetorian Guards) and a coalition of opposition groups that includes part of the armed forces . There would then be growing chaos as local groups seize control of their area -- the Shia al-Huthi in the extreme north, and Salafis and secessionists in the south. The only beneficiary will be Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. Any successor regime may not be able to bring order to Yemen without substantial support from the GCC and the international community. 

4.        Bahrain 

The regime put down the Shia protests harshly, with clear support from Saudi Arabia . It accused Iran of subverting the main Shia groups, which could become a self-fulfilling prophecy as Iran's rivalry with Saudi Arabia intensifies: The ruling family is split into a hard-line group associated with the prime minister, and others led by the crown prince, who want to meet the Shia demands at least half-way. Repression has driven the more moderate Shia -- who had been participating in the flawed democratic process -- to unite with the more extreme groups. ...

Adjusting to revolution 

Political reforms are moving forward in Morocco, Jordan and Oman: 

1.        Morocco 

Morocco's King Mohammed VI has set up a committee to make recommendations on new constitutional arrangements, which will be put to a referendum in September . Moroccan youth suffer from the same problems as their counterparts elsewhere in the Arab world, and there will be continuing protests over food prices, jobs and housing. Morocco is too distant from the GCC for membership to become a reality, but it can expect substantial inflows into its economy. 

2.        Jordan  

King Abdallah set up a national dialogue to come up with an improved system for parliamentary elections and laws governing political parties . This could lead to the dissolution of the current parliament, elected only last year. The king has successfully diverted criticism from himself into the work of this committee, but the process has been marred by infighting among the clans that want to limit reform. Difficult decisions on these issues are looming, and urban opposition groups may return to the streets. The government 'bought off' the initial protests through wage and subsidy increases. However, it is being forced to import energy at much higher prices, and the regional unrest is deterring investors and tourists. 

3.        Oman 

Oman's Sultan Qaboos bin Said has dealt with a surprisingly strong protest movement by engaging in dialogue, implementing changes and promising a fresh look at the parliamentary process. He has done enough to prevent the protest movement from intensifying, and his GCC colleagues are providing substantial economic support . 

Forestalling revolution 

Saudi Arabia has forestalled protest by investing over 110 billion dollars to tackle key issues for the young, and strengthened its traditional base by giving more money to the Religious Police and for taking the Wahhabi message abroad. .. ... ... While the immediate succession is clear, related issues can foment tensions such as the precise order of succession and which princes take over the defence and interior ministries. 

...  the majority of Shia believe that they can get more by working with and not against the regime. Riyadh will be preoccupied with problems in Bahrain and Yemen and the growing threat from Iran. 

The less affected 

Elsewhere in the region, the uprisings have had less of an impact: 

1.        Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar 

Kuwaiti politics are dominated by the long-running issues of the difficult relationship between the prime minister, a member of the ruling family, and some parliamentarians... (The UAE &) Qatar, enjoying the highest GDP per capita in the world, is unaffected. 

2.        Algeria 

... The regime has set up a committee to consult on political reform, but this top-down approach will lead to a rebalancing of power within the Algerian political elite, not greater democracy. The level of dissatisfaction will rise, leading to larger and potentially more violent demonstrations. 

3.        Iraq 

I the country is drifting dangerously as the main politicians fail to agree on policies and appointments to key ministries. Iranian influence may be growing, and the Mahdi army is making an unwelcome return to the streets. 

4.        Palestine, Israel and Lebanon 

The Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement was a response to the changing politics of the region, .... ... more attempts by Palestinians to 'march' across borders with Israel in a show of people power....  The Spring has passed by Lebanon, but it will be deeply affected by events in Syria..."