S E C R E T BEIRUT 000490
3. (C) Charge Sison, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt at his home in Clemenceau on April 8. Jumblatt was pleased to hear from the Charge that March 14 leader Saad Hariri would return to Lebanon before the April 17-18 visit of NEA A/S Welch. He agreed that Saad's prolonged absence was "not good," especially if it was for purely business reasons, and that the jokes circulating about Saad abiding by the Saudi warning to its citizens to leave Lebanon were a "bad sign.".................. he noted, the Saudis had yet to follow through with their promised $1 billion deposit for Lebanon's Central Bank, he noted, which indicated they were "not serious.".....
8. (S) The second issue Jumblatt raised was Saad's reported training of Sunni militias in Lebanon (allegedly 15,000 members in Beirut and more in Tripoli). In establishing his own "security agencies" in Beirut and Tripoli, Saad was being badly advised by "some people," Jumblatt said, such as ISF General Ashraf Rifi. In his meeting with Jumblatt, Hassan admitted having knowledge that members of Saad's Future Movement were being trained. Hassan reportedly opposed such training, but "people around Saad" (i.e., Rifi) were telling him to go ahead. (Note: The Jordanians have refused to train Internal Security Forces (ISF) members hand-picked and vetted by the Embassy to participate in a DA/ATA-funded Terrorism Crime Scene Investigation program, reportedly because they don't want to be involved in training "Saad's militia." (His concerns about Sunni militias areunderstandable, given that in the past such militias were used against his own Druze forces. End note.) Jumblatt said Saad's militia would cause significant damage to March 14, especially because Geagea's Lebanese Forces and Suleiman Franjieh's Marada were in line to train their own forces..... 13. (C) Never one to mince words, Jumblatt called Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman's recent announcement that he planned to retire August 21, three months before the end of his commission, "stupid." Jumblatt interpreted the announcement as a warning to both the majority and opposition to hurry up with the election. It's as if he's asking us to beg him to stay, Jumblatt said, adding, "He's a nice guy, but not too bright." ... Jumblatt said Saad had received money from the Saudis for cultivating both Sunnis and Shia, which he was distributing through Future MPs Okab Saqr and Bassem Saba'. He agreed with the Charge, however, that it was not possible to "buy" Shia support and that more effort was needed. He encouraged the Charge to talk directly to Saad about it or to Saudi Ambassador Khoja, and said he would do the same. Some Shia might prefer to deal directly with the Saudis, he explained. But they also need to have their own independent identity, he added. 18. (C) As for his own Shia contacts, Jumblatt, noting that he was having lunch with Ibrahim Shamsaddine later that day, said he also dealt with the Mufti of Tyre, Sayyed Ali al-Amin, whom he labeled "acceptable." He also cited Riad Assad and Youssef Khalil as other good Shia interlocutors, though he dismissed former Ambassador Khalil al-Khalil, recalling his "special militias with the Israelis" during Lebanon's civil war.... 19. (C) Note: Shemsaddine, son of Higher Shia Council leader Mohammad Mehdi Shemsaddine, is frequently mentioned as a possible Shia minister in an expanded Siniora cabinet. Ambassador al-Khalil was one of the few Shia who attended the recent March 14 convention, as well as a March 13 dinner hosted by the Charge for independent Shia (Refs C and B). Al-Khalil's distant cousin Youssef, who also attended the Charge's dinner, is a close Embassy contact who has a reputation as an impressive and well-respected Central Bank official. Riad Assad also is a well-known and respected contact and a rival of Ahmad Assad, who earned a scant 700 votes compared to Riad's 55,000 in the 2005 parliamentary elections. End note...."
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