US Officials: "Saudi King gave order to invade Bahrain first, & THEN it was agreed to by Al Khalifas!"
(MEPGS/ Excerpts): While public interests centers on the continuing conflict in Libya, US officials appear even more concerned over the course of events in Bahrain and Syria. While the uprisings against various regimes in the region are linked by a strong desire to change the status quo, US policy makers are finding it increasingly difficult to chart a consistent course. Perhaps the most notable case in point is Bahrain. There, a genuine effort by the sunni royal family to find an accommodation with its mostly shia population foundered on distrust engendered at both extremes. US officials acknowledge that the Crown Prince was genuinely seeking a "middle ground" as were elements of the Shia opposition. However, shortly before the mostly Saudi military intervention [In an order given by Saudi King Abdallah and then agreed to by Bahrain's ruling Khalifa family, according to US officials], extreme shia elements of the opposition had moved from peaceful protest to violent demonstrations. "There was a breakdown in order and a move to get rid of the Khalifas," is the way one US analyst put it. "This was not Tahrir Square anymore," said one US expert.
But the dilemma for US officials is that once Saudi and a token group of other Gulf countries' forces restored order, reprisals began against many shia throughout the country... "They may have needed to restore law and order," says one State Department official, "But the way they did it insured that they are now sitting on a powder keg." Even more troubling to US officials is that unlike in any of the other conflicts or confrontations in the region, in Bahrain, the Administration may for the first time find itself being asked by both sides to choose between them, with one being Shia, the other Sunni. "The shia in Bahrain are being oppressed. The sunni royal family is our ally," notes one veteran US analyst. We have never had that clear cut a problem before." [Another unpleasant aspect to this dilemma has been the outspoken support for the shias in Bahrain by Iraqi leaders. While Prime Minister Maliki's comments have drawn the most public attention -- and in so doing possibly have helped derail plans for Baghdad to host an Arab summit next month -- it is the concern expressed by Grand Ayotollah Sistani, that most worries US officials. For it is Sistani to whom the US has often looked to for crucial support in Iraq.
In Syria, the problem for the US is not any allegiance to the Assad-led government, which one State Department official characterized as a "rotten crumbling system," but a fear of the consequences of disorder should the regime be toppled. According to veteran US analysts, Syrian dissidents, unlike, say, their Egyptian counterparts, lack cohesive leadership or even agreed upon principles. Opposition is some cities and towns is sectarian based, while others are simply fed up with 40 years of corrupt mismanagement. Should the Syrian regime attempt a major crackdown, few expect it to be on the scale of the one that crushed an uprising in Hama in 1982. "Information, pictures, first hand accounts will inhibit the government," says one State Department expert. "It probably already has." But what it has not done, according to US officials, is make Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, unlike his father Hafez, any more capable in dealing with an explosive situation than he was in 2004-2005, when his "arrogance-laced incompetence" [One state Department official's characterization] led to the so-called "Cedar Revolution" in Lebanon....
As the New York Times reported this morning, US officials are debating what, if anything, President Obama should say about the current deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. With Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu due to address a joint session of Congress next month, Israeli officials expect him to outline a modest proposal that could short circuit an attempt by the President to present a full-fledged peace plan...... looking ahead to September, the Administration is facing a full-fledged effort by the Palestinians and their allies to have the UN General Assembly vote in favor of Palestinian statehood....
While all this diplomacy is taking shape, US officials are still trying to cope in the two Middle East countries where American force is in play. In Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki is under considerable domestic pressure not to extend the December 31 deadline for the complete withdrawal of US troops. Some, especially in the Pentagon, fear such a precipitate withdrawal could quickly undo much of the improved security. As one official put it bluntly, "We don't want our boys to have died so that Iraq can go to hell in a hand basket." However, there is criticism that political considerations dominate the thinking in the White House; that election year politics will trump a sensible policy of temporarily extending the stay of some US combat troops. Still, as one State Department official said recently, "The decision is more about them [the Iraqis] than us. So, they will have to decide -- and soon."
Decisions on Libya continue to be made almost on a daily, ad hoc basis, say some critics within the Administration. With decision making squarely in the White House, US and foreign diplomats have often found it exceedingly difficult to get quick, clear-cut answers. "They have meetings upon meetings," says one well-placed official. "Deputies meetings. Meetings of Principals" But often nothing comes of them but more meetings." This has led to public criticism by France and Britain of "NATO decision-making," a euphemism few in the Administration miss as a knock on the US. But for some outside the White House, the trend is clear and to them ominous --"mission creep." As one State Department official said this week, "It may not be Vietnam but barring someone close to Qaddafy `taking him out', it's not going to go our way quickly or easily either."
No comments:
Post a Comment