Wikileaks: US & France: "Election of Michel Suleiman 'would seal the fate of Aoun ..who will become irrelevant"

C O N F I D E N T I A L  PARIS 988 
SUBJECT: FRANCE/LEBANON: FRENCH PRESIDENCY POSITIVE BUT  NOT NAIVE ABOUT DOHA ACCORD, WANTS ONGOING U.S./FRENCH CONSULTATION ON IMPLEMENTATION 
¶1. (C) French Presidency NEA adviser Boris Boillon told us  May 22 that the GOF regarded the recently Doha accord on  Lebanon as mostly favorable to the March 8 opposition but not  entirely so. Most important, he stressed, the agreement  stopped the fighting and got the political process for  addressing Lebanese political differences back on track.  Hizballah and Syria may have "won" overall, but they fell  short of achieving their maximal goals. Boillon agreed with  those analysts who inter alia believe that recent events have  largely sealed the fate of Michel Aoun, who will rapidly  become irrelevant in the Christian community once Sleiman is  elected.... 
¶2. (C) With respect to the preserving U.S./French unity,  Boillon referred to a phone call the previous evening between  French Presidency diplomatic adviser Levitte and NSA Hadley.  He observed that Levitte sought to emphasize the positive  points in the accord and project "enthusiasm" in its  implementation, contrasted with what he claimed were concerns  on Hadley's part that the opposition had obtained too much  and that the agreement constituted a "loss" or setback for  March 14 and western interests in Lebanon. Despite its  outward public enthusiasm, Boillon confided that the GOF has  no illusions about the situation. The factions may have  ceased fire but the danger remains because of the  irresponsibility of Lebanon's political leaders. This was  most evident with respect to the March 8 side, taking its  orders from Damascus and Tehran, but also applied to March 14..... 
¶3. (C) French FM Kouchner will fly to Beirut to be there  for the presidential election May 25. Boillon explained that  French President Sarkozy had considered going but changed his  mind in part because the date would coincide with "Liberation  Day" (i.e., the anniversary of Israel's withdrawal from  southern Lebanon in 2000). Sarkozy had absolutely no  intention of being in Beirut the same day Hizballah SecGen  Nasrallah gave a triumphal speech. (NB: This was before  word filtered out that Hizballah had decided to postpone its  "festivities" until May 26.) With a sneer, Boillon accused  Lebanese parliament of having chosen this date  "intentionally." He confirmed, however, that Sarkozy intends  to visit Beirut to congratulate Sleiman after his election.  (Comment: Boillon was ambiguous as to timing, but Sarkozy's  schedule and things Boillon said later suggested it would not  occur before late next week. End comment) Sarkozy would not  have a detailed message for Sleiman, but, when pressed,  Boillon said Sarkozy would do more than shake hands and smile  for the camera. He imagined Sarkozy would point out that the  world had high expectations in terms of Sleiman's commitment  to implementing the Doha accord and safeguarding the  integrity of the Lebanese state. 
¶4. (C) In terms of next diplomatic steps, Boillon affirmed  French skepticism about the utility of seeking significant  UNSC action on Lebanon at the moment. He agreed with our  view that the formation of a new Lebanese government will  take some time. Given the fragile state of things, he  contended it would be inadvisable to push measures through  the UNSC that would allow March 8 to ratchet up tension anew  with the risk of renewed violence. Boillon also reasserted  the now-standard French line about the UNSC suffering from  "Lebanon fatigue." He thus added his voice to the French  chorus of those who doubt we could get the nine votes needed  to pass a UNSCR calling for significant action, and he  dismissed out of hand passing anything beyond a general  statement of support for the Doha accord at this time. Any explicit link between implementing the Doha accord and  previously adopted UNSCRs dealing with Hizballah's weapons  would be tricky in New York and potentially dangerous in  Beirut....  
¶5. (C) We flagged for Boillon the possibility that  Washington may once again ask EU member states to designate  Hizballah a terrorist organization in light of the events of  recent weeks. He reiterated what we have consistently heard  from MFA DAS-equivalent for the Levant Ludovic Pouille,  namely that designating Hizballah was completely out of the  question for France. Boillon rehashed a number of familiar  French arguments for not designating Hizballah, most notably  to allow the GOF to maintain contact with a political  movement that, despite its terrorist aspect, represents at least 20 percent of the  Lebanese population and is the principal Shi'a  representative...... Boillon offered the view that U.S.  encouragement to designate Hizballah now would be poorly  received within the EU as well as in Lebanon. (Comment: We  did not have time to argue with many of the historical and  logical fallacies in Boillon's argument, some of which may  stem from his ignorance of Hizballah's and Hamas' histories.  In any case, his bottom line on French opposition to any  attempt to secure an EU designation of Hizballah as a  terrorist organization is pretty clear cut. End comment)..."