Wikileaks: Jumblatt & Hamadeh: "Bemoaned the irony that Hizballah's military infrastructure had not been touched ..Israel will have to invade southern Lebanon...

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002403
SUBJECT: TFLE01: LARSEN TO PROPOSE HANDOVER OF ISRAELI
SOLDIERS TO GOL; JUMBLATT AND HAMADEH CONCUR
2. (C/NF) On July 16, the Ambassador and econoff met UN
envoy Terje Roed-Larsen and UNSYG Personal Representative to
Lebanon Geir Pederson at Larsen's suite at the Phoenicia
Hotel. Pederson excused himself early to return to the other
part of the UN delegation (Ambassadors Nambiar and Ambassador
De Sota) so as to not arouse suspicion about Larsen-U.S.
collusion.....
3, (C/NF) Larsen explained that he and Pederson had met
with Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri and Prime Minister
Fouad Siniora on July 16 and received a positive response
from Siniora and a non-negative response from Berri for the
basic concepts. He interpreted Berri's lack of negativity as
quiet interest restrained by the need to keep his
constituency happy....
4. (C/NF) Larsen continued that he was working to derail
Javier Solona's efforts. "Solona is an embarrassment."
Larsen explained that Berri had told him that Solona had
brought a German Ambassador with him with the intention of
hostage negotiations like those that freed Elhian Tannebaum
and the bodies of three Israeli soldiers in 2004 in exchange
for hundreds of Arab prisoners. Siniora was equally
skeptical. The Ambassador called Adviser to the Prime
Minister Mohammad Chattah, who confirmed that Siniora had
told Solona that his initiative was dead in the water....
5. (C/NF) Larsen agreed that Hizballah would most likely
reject his plan. This would be not be a problem because then
the Arab countries, possibly including Qatar, would be
pressured to come on board. Hizballah would look like the
party that is denying an opportunity for a cease-fire.
6. (C/NF) Mid-way through the meeting three visitors
arrived at Larsen's room unannounced. Druze leader Walid
Jumblatt, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, and
Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi entered the room in good
humor and indulged in generous orders to room service with
the others present. ... Over a glass of red wine, a large bottle of vodka
(the quality of which sparked a long exchange between
Jumblatt and the startled room service waiter), and three
bottles of Corona beer, Jumblatt gave a briefing on the
thinking of the March 14 coalition which had met that
evening. Jumblatt noted the heavy destruction of Lebanese
infrastructure but bemoaned the irony that Hizballah's
military infrastructure had not been seriously touched.
Jumblatt explained that although March 14 must call for a
cease-fire in public, it is hoping that Israel continues its
military operations until it destroys Hizballah's military
capabilities. "If there is a cease-fire now, Hizballah
wins," said Jumblatt. "We don't want it to stop," Hamadeh
chimed in. Hizballah has been stockpiling arms for years and
its arsenal is well-hidden and protected somewhere in the
Biqa Valley. Jumblatt marveled at the cleverness of the
Iranians in supplying Hizballah with the anti-ship missile
that hit an Israeli gunboat.
8. (C/NF) Responding to Jumblatt's complain that Israel is
hitting targets that hurt the GOL while leaving Hizballah
strategically strong, the Ambassador asked Jumblatt what
Israel should do to cause serious damage to Hizballah.
Jumblatt replied that Israel is still in the mindset of
fighting classic battles with Arab armies. "You can't win
this kind of war with zero dead," he said. Jumblatt finally
said what he meant; Israel will have to invade southern
Lebanon.... it should clear Hizballah out of southern Lebanon. Then the LAF
can replace the IDF once a cease-fire is reached. A defeat
of Hizballah by Israel would be a defeat of Syrian and
Iranian influence in Lebanon, Hamadeh added. For emphasis,
Jumblatt said that the only two outcomes are total defeat or
total success for Hizballah.
9. (C/NF) Hamadeh said that an Israeli invasion would give
Siniora more ammunition to deal with Hizballah's arms.
Jumblatt thought the crisis could end in an armistice
agreement like after the 1973 war. A buffer zone in the
south could then be created.....
10. (C/NF) After finishing their room service, Jumblatt and
company departed. Pederson, now back at the meeting said he
thought Israel might launch a ground incursion into southern
Lebanon. Larsen agreed, noting that much could be achieved
if Israel invades southern Lebanon. "No one wants the status
quo ante," said Larsen. Pederson sensed Hizballah was
getting nervous. "They called me several times today; they
seem desperate," Pederson said.
11. (C/NF) Jumblatt's comments echoed those of other March
14 contacts. Like the Israelis, they see the status quo ante
as not an appealing destination. Thus, they also privately
share their belief that a cease-fire now would leave
Hizballah's capabilities largely intact, with Nasrallah
stronger and March 14 even weaker. But they fret that
Israel's stated aims of weakening Hizballah, while
theoretically attractive, is not in fact happening. Marwan
Hamadeh commented bitterly that al-Manar television is still
broadcasting, while infrastructure under "March 14" control,
like the fixed telephone network, has been seriously damaged.