C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 002706
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI WANTS ....
.... 3. (C/NF) Seated in粑his funereal basement study, surrounded by images of his late father and fidgeting nervously with his prayer beads, Saad said that there needs to be "a different ball game" in the South. Responding to the Ambassador's complaints about LAF chief Michel Sleiman's recent 8/17 'Amr ul-'Amaliyyat' (Operations' Order) saying that the LAF would deploy "beside the resistance," implying tacit approval of an armed Hizballah, Saad said that Sleiman is hardly in a position to say anything else right now. So long as the army remains militarily weaker than Hizballah, he said, the LAF will have to maintain such a less-threatening posture. But once the army has "some teeth and some morale," Saad urged, then he promises to "smack Hizballah down."Growing morestrident (and clearly hoping to be recorded verbatim), Saad assured the Ambassador, "Give me a chance, and I will f*** Hizballah."
4. (C/NF) Bothered that the USG has not come through yet on items he has asked for previously -- Saad mentioned specifically machine guns and helicopters -- for the military and security forces, Saad urged that the U.S. do more to help strengthen these institutions. The Ambassador said that, indeed, we were increasing our assistance to both the LAF and ISF. But, he noted, it is difficult to find sympathetic ears in Washington when senior Lebanese officials like General Sleiman (not to mention President Lahoud) are still crowing about the merits of the resistance. It also makes it harder for us to convince the Israelis of the LAF's seriousness in containing Hizballah. Ticking off numerous speeches since Sleiman's that strike a different tone (his own, PM Siniora's, Walid Jumblatt's, Defense Minister Murr's), Saad implied the Ambassador is blowing Sleiman's statement out of proportion. He said that all that is needed is for the USG to lean on some of the Gulf Arab states -- Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia -- to cough up military equipment for the ISF and LAF.... 5. (C/NF) Referring to lukewarm statements from Lebanese ministers, the Ambassador asked why the GOL is treating UNSCR 1701 as a burden rather than a blessing to help Lebanon secure its sovereignty. Why, for instance, is the GOL not willing to quietly ask for UNIFIL assistance at the ports, airports, and Lebanese-Syrian border to stop Iran and Syria from supplying arms to Hizballah and others? This is a key point. Saad replied that this is a sovereignty issue, adding shockingly (surely in reference to violations of sovereignty, not intent) that "there is no difference between UNIFIL and Syria." The Ambassador told Saad that this answer would not suffice in getting the Israeli blockade lifted, and if the GOL wants to achieve that objective, then they need to ensure effective monitoring at points of entry. 6. (C/NF) Saying that "we are the ones who control the port and the airport," Saad complained emotively that the U.S. policy has led to an "embargo that has suffocated the Cedar Revolution for one month." The embargo does not hurt Hizballah but cripples March 14. Saad assured the Ambassador that "99 per cent" of arms smuggled into Lebanon come across the Syrian frontier. Only very few come through the port and airport, and the GOL has made recent significant changes in security at BIA. When the Ambassador told Saad that ISF chief Ashraf Rifi had informed us that the BIA cargo terminal remains under the influence of LAF officers sympathetic to Hizballah (reftel), Saad picked up the phone and called Nabih Berri directly. Speaking in Arabic, Saad cle粑rly lied to Berri on the phone, saying that "the United Nations had told him to just change the Shi'a officers at the cargo terminal," and also that "that will be the end of the issue. (Comment. Striking throughout this meeting wasSaad's absolute disregard for Siniora's prime ministerial prerogative. End Comment.)
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11. (C/NF) Locked away in his palace, 'Sheikh Saad' was in an erratic mood. His claim that the USG's failure to get supplies to the LAF leaves Michel Sleiman with no choice but to say the LAF would deploy "beside the resistance" is simply preposterous, and the Ambassador pointed out to Saad that it would have been better had Sleiman simply not mentioned "the resistance" at all. (Sleiman himself seems to have gotten the message about the outrageousness of comments, for he is busily spinning his comments -- delivered last Thursday -- as meaning that the army would stand with the "heroic people of the south," a dubious interpretation.) In addition, we were shocked by Saad's total dismissiveness of Siniora, particularly in phoning Speaker Berri, lying to him and asking him outright to "change the Shi'a officers" without consulting Siniora on this action. Saad tried to get through to Acting Interior Minister Ahmad Fatfat following his call with Berri, presumably to inform Fatfat of his decision. Throughout the meeting, Saad referred to GOL actions over the past week (since his return from Paris) as if he himself had carried them out, not Siniora. One wonders whether Siniora might have preferred Saad to remain outside of Lebanon conducting his so-called "diplomatic resistance.".......... (Am I the only one who sees Feltman's contempt of 'Sheikh Saad'?)
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