Wikileaks: Iran: "..The West underestimated Ahmadinejad's rural & working class support .."

S E C R E T  
SUBJECT: IRAN ELECTIONS; DISARRAY IN BOTH CONSERVATIVE AND REFORMIST CAMPS; 
....Reformists seemed divided and adrift, with no clear focus for aspirations, an uncertain message beyond criticism of Ahmedinejad, and poor prospects for electoral victory.  Moussavi, despite his recent call for greater civil liberties and for a more tempered rhetoric on Israel and the Holocaust, is unknown to many younger Iranians, though remembered by older voters for a good performance as Prime Minister during economic hard times, and appeared less likely than Khatami was to inspire anti-Ahmedinejad voters.  Iranian analyst contacts including XXXXXXXXXXXX and other contacts in separate conversations, held similar views of Moussavi's early history of friction as Prime Minister with now-Supreme Leader (then-President) Khamenei, agreeing that the personal divide between the ex-Prime Minister and Khamenei is the defining feature of Moussavi's candidacy, and puts Moussavi sentimentally if not ideologically, into the reformist camp. 
¶3. (U) Summary con't. By contrast, a XXXXXXXXXXXX, attaches little strategic significance to the elections.  He argues that U.S. direct engagement transcends the June elections and will, if pursued, have a leavening and moderating effect on Iranian politics.  XXXXXXXXXXXX believes U.S. engagement with Iran's polity will, irrespective of specific negotiating results, moderate the regime's domestic and international behavior. On the June election, he believes the West is, as before Ahmedinejad's 2005 election, underestimating the incumbent's rural and working class campaigning skills and political support.... 

¶5. Contacts named in paragraph 3 above characterize Moussavi's economic ideas and campaign themes as being, like Ahmedinejad's, populist and redistributive.  Moussavi's announcing his candidacy in South Tehran, a heartland constituency for both him and Ahmedinejad, was a continuing indication of Moussavi's own reflexive populism, and reflected themes he is likely to pursue throughout the campaign.  While Moussavi may try to challenge Ahmedinejad for some of Ahmedinejad's working class base, most Iranian contacts here believe Moussavi's critique of Ahmedinejad's economic record and of regime corruption is not enough to counter the patronage tools and campaign skills of Ahmedinejad.  At the non-populist end of the spectrum, Moussavi is thought to offer few natural attractions to those many Khatami supporters now at loose ends, who are likely according to contacts either not to vote (most likely) or to split their vote between Karroubi and Moussavi...
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