The momentous events in Bahrain are placing the Saudi government in a difficult position. On the one hand, the Saudis fear the potential “fall” of Bahrain to Iran, on the other, they know that a muscled intervention and interference could actually create it. Indeed, as the United States knows from experience, intervention and occupation do not win hearts and minds. The most salient fact of Saudi policy at this time is that there is none. The country suffers from a major power vacuum. Any decision to invade and occupy Bahrain to put down a “Shi’ite” rebellion would have to come from the King himself after he has obtained consensus from the rest of the leadership of the country. The King is 87 years old... and has not had the time and the energy to build a national consensus on a response to Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain or Libya. Prince Sultan, is often reported to be unable to build any kind of response or policy....
From five thousand miles away, the solution to the Bahrain crisis appears simple. The al-Khalifas should accept to become a British-style monarch.... Unfortunately, this rosy scenario is under severe attack by an important side of the al-Khalifas who do not want to give up their right to control and plunder the island. They know that their time is coming to a close and have their back to the wall. They seek to create havoc and polarize the situation—i.e., make the uprising into a Sunni-Shi’i issue. Their game is to ensure that the United States and the Saudis maintain their support of the corrupt regime as a bastion against “evil Iran”. Undoubtedly the orders to shoot at the demonstrators came from this camp, to provoke and emphasize the sectarian split in the Island. It is this which has also given nationality to the foreign mercenaries in order to change the sectarian balance of the island, arrested and tortured Shi’a leaders, manipulated elections, seized the best pieces of land, demanded percentages in successful businesses, etc. This faction of the family is headed by the Prime Minister.... and his group have substantial support among many Salafi Sunni groups, which view him as perhaps corrupt but strong enough to defend the true faith against the Shi’a. (reminds you of some place in the Levant?) The more liberal side of the family, headed by the Crown Prince, has shown that it is more willing to accommodate a new system of competition for power.... The King may be the arbiter between the feudal and the modern factions within his family, but over the years he has increasingly appeared to be a very weak figure unable to stand up to the faction headed by his uncle, the Prime Minister, which seeks to preserve its feudal control over society....
If we try to put the Saudi equation and the Bahraini one together, it would appear that a Saudi direct intervention is not likely at this time.... Physical Saudi presence in Bahrain would open the Kingdom to major criticism from all its neighbors and from most Muslim countries..... On the other side of the Saudi causeway, even the most feudal among the al-Khalifas would be wary of a physical Saudi intervention,... From their point of view, it would be better to have the al-Saud in charge rather than the Iranians, but not much better. Perhaps, some of the more feudal al-Khalifas do not see the danger of a foreign camel putting its nose into their tent. After all, they did provide nationality to many Baluchi, Yemeni and Syrian military types, thereby creating a new class of Mamluks. However, one can assume that the ultimate interest of the al-Khalifas is to remain in charge, and not sell out their inheritance to the al-Saud for a plate of lentil–like security...."
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