Thursday, February 10, 2011

"Protests in Jordan not part of a cohesive movement & show few signs of morphing into a well-structured longer-term campaign..."

Oxford Analytica; Excerpts;
"... Though government changes are frequent, this was the first such replacement in response to popular unrest, and it reflects the king's concerns about the domestic impact of uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. ... Under pressure, the king decided on February 1 to dismiss Rafai's government and appoint Marouf Bakhit, a former prime minister and ex-army general, in his stead.  The regime has managed through the years to build a safe distance between the king as the symbol of the nation, and the government which he appoints (and whose policy he orchestrates), allowing citizens to criticise the government while insulating the king. Governments in Jordan are easily replaceable: in his twelve years in power, the king has changed the government eight times (before the latest one), to pre-empt discontent and give a semblance of change. However, this time, government dismissal was in direct response to mounting public pressure, and sets a precedent. 
Moreover, the safe distance the king has maintained from blame has been challenged. In an unprecedented move, 36 tribal figures sent the king an open letter on February 6 warning him to rein in corruption and instigate political reform or else face events similar to Tunisia and Egypt. The letter also directly criticised Queen Rania's alleged interference in power, and claimed that she is "stealing from the country and the people." ......... the boldness of the letter is highly significant. Nonetheless, it did not reflect a change in the approach of the opposition as a whole -- at least not yet. Despite rising complaints against the king, the protestors have not targeted the monarchy or demanded regime change, only political and economic reform.  Given that their main demand was the departure of Rafai's government, once it was met, the opposition was divided as to whether protests should continue or await the shape of promised reform. The Islamic Action Front (IAF) -- the political arm of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood -- was quick to attack the king's choice of Bakhit as prime minister, citing the record of his previous government in overseeing the 2007 elections, widely seen as fraudulent. It calls instead for an elected prime minister. ......
Changing the government has only bought the king time:  numerous challenges continue to confront him:
  • Jordan's tribes, making up 40% of the population and the backbone of the king's support, are showing signs of waning loyalty. Quiet complaints, preceding this week's letter from tribesmen, are mounting against the royal family's perceived lavish lifestyle and silence over corruption.
  • Incidents of violence preceded the protests, highlighting social cleavages and the questionable sustainability of the king's system of patronage.
  • King Abdallah's tribal power base is resistant to any forms of political reform that will empower Jordanians of Palestinian origin.
Adding to this, the new government comes to office shackled by a record deficit of 15 billion dollars and an aid-dependent economy, making it difficult to effect economic and political reforms. The credibility of parliament, elected under a widely criticised electoral law, is already in question; some protestors have called for its dissolution, two months into its term. Furthermore, parliament is not expected to be as cooperative with the new government; members will try more forcefully to assert themselves to regain credibility with their constituents. 
Outlook. Energised by regional events and the change of government, low-level protests will continue. However, the regime broadly remains stable:
  • Though energised by the region's events, protests have not been part of a cohesive movement and show few signs of morphing into a well-structured longer-term campaign, especially since indigenous Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin have different interests.
  • The regime continues to distribute patronage among a significant slice of the population that has come to be invested in its stability.
  • The silence among protestors over the king's own culpability is attributable to a combination of a fear of a competent security apparatus & civic illiteracy.....
The king is operating on a crisis-management basis, and his reform strategy is likely to remain reactionary until the outcome of the Egyptian unrest is clear. Yet even then, real reform will be difficult given the deep mutual suspicion and different interests of the indigenous and Palestinian Jordanians. For this reason, the opposition is likely to give the king a chance; few want a Tunisia or Egypt scenario because they are aware of this schism. How far he will ultimately go will depend on regional events, and the ability of the currently weak opposition to muster greater and more sustained support.

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