"The Hariri episode represented an attempt by the Saudis to use the CIA to influence Middle East policy by means of “contaminated information from a hostile source".."

As I said, Sale's memory is deceiving him in some instances but the general picture is there.

Judging from the frequency & nature of the phone calls that were received this afternoon by the 'original' poster of this story, I can say someone is not happy with this story. You need to read the comment by Sam Will (a Lebanese) who was an associate of Zahi Bustany.

"... The crisis between the U.S. intelligence services and Hariri began with the 9/11 attacks.  As one serving U.S. analysts said at the time, with the discovery of the hijackers’ Saudi identity, The Kingdom ordered Hariri and the rest of their agents into a “protective stance” in an effort to repair “Its shattered image” in Washington. The agency was shocked to find that their key asset was no longer talking to his American controllers and even when he did, he never gave anything of value regarding secret Arab conversations, sources said. The case was made worse when the agency thought of the huge monies they had spent on furthering their man’s political career in Lebanon.  Former CIA official Larry Johnson said at the time, ‘”It’s another example of the incompetence of the agency in managing a source.” (Johnson, a good friend, was not a source for this piece by the way.) 

A former senior U.S. intelligence official agreed with Johnson: “It doesn’t take much to fool the CIA if you are averse to risk and you give your superiors the idea that you have this great source who makes you look good in your fitness reports.”

Another source cited examples of the British MI-5 agency and the difficulties of MI-5 handlers admitting that an agent of their had been blown. 

Asked about counterintelligence analysis – why Hariri’s reports were not correlated and measured against other area reports, a former senior CIA official said, “At the agency we slip it into some compartment somewhere, give it a number, and ship it to the director himself and then whisper what it is and how the thing is so secret that asking any questions would pose risk to the source’s life.” 

This person said that there were instances where agents arranged meetings with Hariri and their superiors only to be told afterwards by their superiors not to talk to Hariri anymore yet nothing had an effect. 

After the Trade Center attacks, the Saudis began to agitate for Washington to receive Hariri and listen to his explanations of his pervious lack of cooperation.  “The Saudis expected that Hariri would come to Washington (in 2002) and say, ‘Get the Syrians off my back and I will deal with Hisbullah and support the resettlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon.” 

It came too late. (at this juncture) When Hariri visited Washington, he saw no one of any importance, making clear he had lost his American employer. ......

Perhaps the most telling judgment was made by a former senior analyst who concluded that the Hariri episode represented an attempt by the Saudis to use the CIA to direct and influence Middle East policy by means of “contaminated information from a hostile source.” .......