".... Moreover, the most sensational witness testimonies recorded in the first IIIC report were largely discredited by the time of the STL's establishment in mid-2007.... This unimpressive scorecard did little to exonerate Damascus, but it steadily reduced expectations that the hammer was going to fall anytime soon... Although the IIIC later made progress in linking Hizballah to the killing (which implies Syrian involvement), by that time the battle for Lebanon was effectively over.
Asad's most formidable defense against pressure from Washington, Paris, and Riyadh was his ability to paralyze the Siniora government. Syria controlled large minority blocs in parliament and the cabinet; held the offices of president and parliament speaker; dominated both the military and the General Security Directorate, and commanded the preponderance of non-state paramilitary forces in Lebanon. This weapon was particularly decisive because Syria's three international adversaries had markedly different preferences regarding the breakdown of political cohabitation between Hariri and Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Washington favored a breakdown over any political accommodation that limited the parliamentary majority's ability to govern unilaterally, a stance that found strong support from Druze and Christian members of March 14.... In order to ensure that no holds were barred, Washington and some members of the Saudi royal family encouraged the parliamentary majority to antagonize Hizballah, escalate its anti-Syrian rhetoric, and forge ties with the Syrian opposition. .....The Bush administration began tacitly (and, according to some reports, actively) supporting Saudi funding of militant anti-Shi’i (and anti-Alawi) Salafi groups in Lebanon as a means of making the breakdown of law and order in Lebanon more dicey for Asad. .... Rather than spooking the Syrians, turmoil in Lebanon mainly served to undermine Saudi and French resolve... Although the Bush administration largely abstained, it did little to discourage either the Saudis or the French from undertaking direct talks and frequently communicated its preferences through their diplomats.... Riyadh hoped to secure a "normalization" of Lebanese-Syrian relations that would allow Lebanon to sit out the storm as Syria's (and Iran's) confrontation with the West reached its climax. For this, it was reportedly willing to accept a settlement that recognized Hizballah's right to bear arms and even floated a proposal requiring the parliamentary majority to desist from anti-Syrian media activity .... The Bush administration, however, was determined to thwart any agreement that limited the majority's ability to govern unilaterally without major reciprocal Syrian concessions....
Although Riyadh officially rebuked "voices in Lebanon" advocating violence against the Asad regime, many Saudis privately encouraged such strident rhetoric as a foil to impress upon him the dangers of being unreasonable. However, this may only have reinforced his reluctance to accept a Saudi-brokered "normalization" in Lebanon .... The international entente belatedly rallied against Asad in the wake of Hizballah's deadly July 2006 raid against Israel, but this burst of resolve was premised on erroneous expectations that Israel's retaliatory campaign against Lebanon would critically weaken Hizballah politically. It did not....
Obstructing an undesirable settlement proved easy enough for the Bush administration. Washington vastly increased economic and security aid to the Siniora government (particularly institutions firmly under the March 14 control, like the Internal Security Forces).... authorized covert CIA assistance to March 14 politicians, feted them with warm official receptions in Washington, and turned a blind eye to their embryonic militia forces. .... (but) American leverage was further undermined by the May 2007 departure of Chirac,... French talks with Damascus went nowhere. Facing no credible threat of punishment for non-cooperation and quite content to let the Lebanese crisis drag on, Asad had little reason to intervene ...
The failure of engagement efforts left the field open for the Bush administration (and the Saudis) to advance a bold plan to break the stalemate before it left office. In May 2008, the Siniora government proclaimed Hizballah's private fiber optic telecommunications network to be illegal.... Nasrallah responded by abandoning altogether his militia's longstanding "purity of arms" in domestic conflicts (much to the surprise of its most vocal Lebanese detractors, ironically) and quickly routing rival Sunni and Druze militiamen with one overwhelming eruption of force.... Hizballah's power play more than compensated by dispelling the illusion of competence on the part of Saudi-financed "security companies" and putting to rest the widespread assumption that Syria and/or Iran were too fearful of sectarian conflict in Lebanon to risk such a major armed confrontation.... Washington's failure to mitigate the consequences of a confrontation it helped instigate dealt an enormous blow to American influence in Lebanon and re-opened the floodgates of international and regional diplomatic engagement with Syria.... The American-led campaign to force Syria's hand in Lebanon was effectively over by the time the Bush administration left office. ... Saudi and American reconciliation with Asad removed the last major external incentives for any Lebanese group to continue antagonizing Asad. .....(his) success in nevertheless expanding Syria’s dominion over Lebanon amid the final countdown to the indictments--without making major concessions or incurring diplomatic penalties--is a striking manifestation of his adversaries' conflicting interests and lack of resolve...... The return to office of Najib Miqati, the last prime minister of Syrian-occupied Lebanon, may not have been Asad's preferred outcome, but it left him squarely in command of the political process.... Although many of Hariri's supporters at home and abroad are portraying his defiance as a second wind of the Cedar Revolution, it is significant that his ire has been directed squarely at Hizballah, not Damascus. Last month, his aides interrupted a member of his parliamentary bloc who began criticizing Asad in a live speech. Thus far, Hariri is not opposing Syria, but trying to win its favor vis-à-vis his political adversaries (indeed his threat to stay in the opposition may yet prove to be a ploy to extract better terms for joining the government). While it is not clear how the current impasse will be resolved, it is quite evident that Syria is once again the supreme arbiter in Lebanon." (Read the Full story here)
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