".. March 14 has limited options for dealing with the new situation.."

Oxford Analytica: Excerpts

"... March 8's domination in the new political arrangement poses questions for the future of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon and sectarian stability....The development followed a deterioration in the Syrian-Saudi rapprochement, and official acknowledgment that they had failed to find a deal to calm Lebanese tensions .... Regional attempts led by Qatar and Turkey to find a last-minute compromise solution also failed.

The March 8 coalition subsequently declared its unwillingness to accept a return of Hariri to power, and a media campaign began against him, including the publication of leaked recordings of Hariri's testimony to the STL. The situation was exacerbated with the submission of the draft indictments to the pre-trial judge in the STL on January 17..... The development was a major victory for Hizbollah: given the support Mikati relies on, and his ties to Syria, the first item on the new government's agenda is likely to be discussion of the ending of cooperation with the STL. March 14 coalition announced that they would not participate in the government, calling it a coup d'etat and dubbing Mikati as the candidate of Hizbollah.

March 14 has limited options for dealing with the new situation:

Recourse to violent protests is not sustainable in the long run, with the current military balance of power in favour of Hizbollah. The situation on the ground is therefore likely to calm down, at least for the time being.

Participation in the government is also not an option, as inclusion would legitimise the Mikati government, and his probable decision to withdraw the cooperation protocol.

It is therefore most likely that March 14 will stay outside of the government, in peaceful opposition, until Mikati's government starts debating the cooperation protocol between Lebanon and the STL. A decision to withdraw the protocol would probably require March 14 to formulate a different political strategy, and renewed social unrest would be highly likely.

Mikati's options. Mikati announced his willingness to form a national unity government, but March 14 rejected this proposal. Yet his strategy is to present himself as a compromise candidate, close to all contending parties. His most likely option is therefore to form a 'National Salvation' government of 'independent' figures, since the alternative -- forming a March 8 government, or including prominent March 8 members -- would be too provocative.

Yet despite his desire to appear as a compromise candidate, Mikati is still under March 8 control -- since it provides him with the majority required for a vote of confidence in parliament. His statement that his government will respect commitments made by previous governments, unless there is a national consensus to alter them, suggests an attempt to appear to be nationally representative while also setting the stage for the rejection of the tribunal. The issue is especially urgent since the STL has announced that the warrants will be made public in six to ten weeks.

On other issues, Mikati's government is unlikely to diverge significantly from the approach of previous governments. His need to act as a compromise candidate will limit the use of the government by March 8 to retaliate against March 14. As long as there is no further serious instability, there should be no major repercussions on the economy or tourism, as Mikati is widely seen as a moderate pro-business politician, with no desire to overthrow the existing economic system........

International response. Mikati's successful bid for power is seen as a victory for Syria in Lebanon, with one of its allies back in power, Hariri ousted and Riyadh's influence in Lebanon challenged .... Since Hariri could not capitalise on the international support for his candidacy, it appears that Syria has returned to its position as the main powerbroker in Lebanon.

This is supported by the various responses from abroad:

The strongest reaction came from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who warned that a Hizbollah-controlled government in Lebanon would affect its ties with Washington. The United States has warned against government change in Lebanon, arguing that such a development could threaten aid supplies.

However, an acknowledgment of Mikati's appointment came from France. The French Foreign Ministry 'took note' of the designation of Mikati, calling on him to form a government without outside interference. Similarly, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton called on Mikati to form a consensus government and respect Lebanon's international obligations.

Moreover, despite strong statements by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal prior to the nomination, Saudi officials have been silent on the recent developments, and their position is as yet uncertain...... There are rumours that France and Qatar were behind his candidacy, ..... in the absence of a strong reaction from the regional backers of March 14, Syria could be said to have imposed a new situation on the ground....., the victory of Hizbollah will not necessarily increase the likelihood of war, (with israel) as both sides have no immediate interest in starting a conflict..."