"Jumblatt (the 'collaborationist' as per Elliott Abrams) may find it harder to resist Syrian pressures to side with the opposition"

Oxford Analytica: Excerpts: (Hariri 'Buying time' is, our analysis, NOT an option!)

"... A key question is whether Hariri will be re-appointed as prime minister: The 'March 8' coalition has not yet declared its candidate, but is unlikely to nominate Hariri. ..... few Sunnis would accept the replacement of Hariri in what is developing into a sensitive sectarian situation. Suleiman is facing considerable pressure to take sides. Yet his regional power base includes both the Saudis and the Syrians, making it hard for him to do this.  The decisive voter is Druze leader Walid Jumblatt: collaboration of his bloc would alter March 8's prospects, securing a parliamentary majority. Nonetheless, despite his rapprochement with Syria, Jumblatt may not feel able or willing to challenge Hariri and Saudi Arabia in such an explicit manner. He is likely to condition his votes on a prior agreement, ....... in the event of prolonged deadlock, he may find it harder to resist Syrian pressures to side with the opposition..... Therefore, a long period of negotiations is likely. Such an outcome need not be detrimental to Hariri. No major government decisions are pending, allowing him to continue his strategy of buying time (Not an option!), at the head of a caretaker government. However, it will likely entail paralysis of official institutions......  Israel will watch the unfolding of events closely. It is unlikely to intervene unless a significant victory is delivered to Hizbollah or a worsening of the domestic situation leads to rising tensions on the southern border. The outlook could depend much on the approach of Syria and Iran: Syria. With rejection of the STL off the negotiating table, Syria has been forced either to concede to an agreement that will maintain the STL or reject the negotiations and allow political escalation and a possible deterioration in the security situation. Current developments indicate that it will choose the second route. There will be considerable regional pressure on Damascus to make concessions and exert a moderating influence on the situation. However, while it may act to delay escalation, succumbing to international pressure and allowing the STL to press ahead with its work would represent a significant defeat. Syria is unlikely to accept this at present. Iran. Tehran's approach hinges on the direction of US-Iranian relations. An imminent round of nuclear negotiations is unlikely to make progress, and Washington has been hinting at the possibility of tightening international sanctions further. The fact that a possible Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities looks further off as the nuclear programme shows signs of struggling reduces the risk of retaliatory escalation via Hizbollah, but the failure of nuclear talks and the introduction of other punitive measures nonetheless could provide incentives for Iran to seek further escalation in Lebanon. Clashes? In the context of institutional paralysis, the danger of violent clashes has increased. (OA fails to name the 'protagonists')  Efforts to prevent this are underway....  However, in the absence of a possible political solution and in view of the regional deadlock, it seems probable that tensions will rise, and might be instrumentally related to the political bargaining taking place. Faced with major hurdles to forming a new government, and unable to influence the existing one, Hizbollah might resort to localised disturbances as a way of pressuring Hariri and his regional allies..."