".. Democracy movements are attractive to Washington when they target a regime such as Iran's, but in allied autocracies, they're a problem.."

"...Democracy movements are attractive to Washington when they target a regime such as Iran's, but in allied autocracies, they're a problem. There's no way for Egypt to be democratic and exclude the Islamists from political participation. The same is true for most other parts of the Arab world — a lesson the U.S. ought to have learned in Iraq, where Islamists have dominated all the democratically elected governments that followed Saddam Hussein's ouster. But when the Islamists of Hamas won the last Palestinian elections in 2006, held under pressure from Washington, the Bush Administration literally did a 180-degree turn on the question of Palestinian democracy. Meanwhile, much of the commentary on Ben Ali's ouster in Tunisia has hailed the apparent absence of Islamists from the protest movement, but that may be premature. After the repression they suffered under the dictatorship, Tunisia's Islamists have yet to emerge, as does the character of a new regime. Islamists may not dominate or even seek to, but don't bet against them becoming an integral part of Tunisian democracy.

There are many different models of Islamist politics competing with U.S. allies and with each other for support in the Middle East, ranging from the violent extremism of al-Qaeda to the modernizing, business-friendly democrats of Turkey's ruling AK Party. But they tend to share a hostility toward U.S. intervention in the region, and toward Israel.

Explaining why the U.S. continues to support Mubarak, the State Department's Crowley on Thursday told al-Jazeera that "Egypt is an anchor of stability in the Middle East ... It's made its own peace with Israel and is pursuing normal relations with Israel. We think that's important; we think that's a model that the region should adopt."

The problem for Washington is that Arab electorates are unlikely to agree. The democratically elected Iraqi government, for example, despite its dependence on U.S. support, has stated its refusal to normalize relations with Israel. A democratic Egypt, whether led by the Muslim Brotherhood or any other opposition party, is unlikely to go to war with Israel given the vast imbalance in military capability, but they're even less likely to accept normal ties given the present condition of the Palestinians. And the most secular liberal activists in Egypt reject with contempt the argument that regional stability can come at the expense of their right to choose their government.

Turkey, once its electorate was given a voice in matters of state, denied the U.S. the right to use its territory to invade Iraq. It has become more assertive in challenging both Israel and the U.S. strategy on Iran. Arab electorates are unlikely to give Washington the sort of support against Iran it gets from the region's pro-U.S. autocrats.

The problem the Administration now confronts is that backing autocrats who support U.S. regional policy is no longer simply uncomfortable given the values Washington professes to uphold: it's increasingly untenable as the forces of demographics, economics and technology gnaw at the bonds imposed by those autocrats. The Egyptians, young and old, that risk life and limb by taking to the streets on Friday may not have the patience for the pace and nature of change envisaged by Secretary Clinton."