Wikileaks[28]: "Sending US officials to focus on Hizballah could distract significantly from our efforts to build a cooperative foothold.."

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000804

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, S/CT

NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT

SUBJECT: IS NOW THE TIME TO RAISE HIZBALLAH WITH SYRIA?

Is the Strategic Balance Changing?...

. Hizballah SecGen Nasrallah's recent claims of possessing a capability to "destroy" the IDF may overstate the case for domestic and regional propaganda purposes, but reporting in other channels confirms Nasrallah's bragging on November 11 that Hizballah can sustain fire on Tel Aviv and reach "all of Israel." This 

capability, if fully used, would represent a quantum leap 

over the damage and psychological terror Hizballah rockets 

caused in northern Israel during the 2006 war.

¶3. (S/NF) There is overwhelming evidence that shows Syria provided not just logistical and other support in moving the weapons, but was the main source of the weapons. Syria's integration of Hizballah into its military doctrine, moreover, means that Hizballah operatives and facilities enjoy a growing footprint in Syria. ¶4. (S/NF) At least two potential consequences flow from Hizballah's increased capabilities and Syria's role in creating them: (1) If there is another war between Hizballah and Israel, it will be far deadlier than the 2006 conflict; (2) as in 2006, there would be compelling reasons for Israel to want to keep Syria out of any future war if possible, but there might be a countervailing need to hit 

Hizballah and perhaps targets in Syria, some of which are 

located in populated areas.

¶5. (S/NF) U.S.-Syrian discussions on Hizballah have tended to "agree to disagree" after hitting the wall of conflicting views on the legitimacy of armed resistance and Israeli occupation...

¶6. (S/NF) The Syrian government's strategic view of relations with Hizballah is difficult to assess with high confidence. According to various contacts, President Asad appears to be focused on the possibility of a new conflict

between Israel and Syria, but many suggest he believes that 

the red lines of the 2006 war would be preserved. According 

to this model, Syria could avoid direct involvement as long 

as Israel refrained from striking targets on Syrian soil. 

Syria also seems to be hedging its bets through improved relations with Turkey, France, and Saudi Arabia, which, Syrian officials probably hope, would object to Israeli attacks against Lebanon and/or Syria. Asad nonetheless appears more convinced than ever that arming Hizballah is necessary for Syrian security and perhaps as a stick to bring the current Israeli government back to negotiations on the return of the Golan..... Israel, they insist, remains the problem, and only a more active U.S. role can bring and sustain a resolution. According to the prevailing Syrian view, however, U.S.-Syrian relations must normalize before the U.S. can play the role of a credible honest broker.

¶8. (S/NF) As the interagency continues to plot future plans to engage Syrian officials and thinks about how to recruit other countries to support our efforts, we face a choice not only about the level of our engagement, but about the approach itself. Up to now, U.S. efforts have largely focused on developing a cooperative relationship on issues of mutual interest, such as Iraq and U.S. sanctions. Our four 

month pursuit of military-to-military cooperation on Iraqi 

border security represented, in effect, a first step toward 

establishing a broader and higher-level dialogue on Iraqi 

security issues, including Syrian support of foreign fighters. After the August 19 bombings Baghdad rendered implementation of this initiative impracticable, discussions in late-September shifted toward a possible CT dialogue. This new focus provides an alternative mechanism to continue discussions on Iraqi security issues such as foreign fighters. Syrian officials appear willing to go along with this approach, as long as the emphasis is on building bilateral relations first. After months of investment, our 

engagement efforts are close to enabling both sides to 

exchange positive gestures. This cooperation should help to 

the stage for more focused discussions on a broad range of issues and strategic choices about the future direction of the relationship. During this process, U.S. officials have carefully placed markers on key issues, including human rights, IAEA compliance, Bank Aman, Lebanon (e.g., border demarcation), and Palestinians (pushing Hamas to accept the Quartet principles), and the new embassy compound. We have addressed these issues mainly in discussions with Vice Foreign Minister Miqdad and the Syrian Embassy in Washington (with less dialogue between Embassy Damascus and the Syrian MFA). Our view is that the cooperative approach will have 

more chance of success if we continue to use these channels 

to deal with such issues, until the relationship can sustain discussion at higher levels that will yield a higher probability of favorable progress.

¶10. (S/NF) Against this backdrop, sending U.S. officials to 

focus on Syrian relations with Hizballah could distract 

significantly from our efforts to build a cooperative 

foothold..... Sharing ourconcerns about the dangers of Syria's arming of Hizballah, 

probably best done privately in a one-on-one session with President Asad,...