Will Three Months Make Any Difference?

"... The idea of starting with borders may reflect a desire to begin with what might seem the easiest of the vexed final-status issues between Israel and the Palestinians. But the reality is that even a discussion on borders can't avoid the issue of Jerusalem — perhaps the most difficult and emotionally charged of the core disputes. As far as the Palestinians are concerned, there's no deal unless the border between the two states runs through Jerusalem, but the Israelis insist that their own claim to all of Jerusalem is nonnegotiable.
Hardly surprising, then, that among Middle East analysts it's an exceedingly rare breed that is willing to predict agreement on borders within three months. So, the real question becomes what cards President Obama will put on the table if his bet is called by the failure of three months of talks to produce a deal. Will he simply walk away, declaring Middle East peace a bridge too far, or will he try to get the two sides to keep talking by convincing them that they have no alternative to keep up the appearance of a process even if it offers no hope of resolution? The Palestinians and their Arab backers are unlikely to accept either option, and they would likely respond by taking matters out of Washington's hands and seeking remedies in international law, which Israel and the U.S. want to avoid.
The other alternative, in the event of a stalemate after three months of talks, would be for President Obama to put on the table a U.S. plan on where to draw borders, ... That's a scenario the Israelis desperately want to avoid because it removes the overwhelming advantage in leverage they enjoy in direct talks with the Palestinians. For the same reason, the Palestinians would welcome an international solution, which could only give them more, rather than less, than what the Israelis would willingly offer.
Failing to force the issue in the event of a stalemate in direct talks between Netanyahu and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas will deal a devastating blow to U.S. credibility among its allies in the Muslim world. But making demands that Israel's leaders are inclined to resist will carry a growing domestic political cost as the President faces a Republican congressional leadership who is more inclined to take Netanyahu's view than Obama's. And Netanyahu has always shown a willingness to appeal directly to his allies on Capitol Hill when he doesn't like what he's hearing from the White House.
Peace between Israel and the Palestinians is routinely described these days as a national-security priority for the U.S., particularly in light of the negative impact the conflict has on the Muslim world's perceptions of America. Until now, Washington's operating assumption has been that such a peace would result from negotiations between the parties themselves. By demanding that Israel and the Palestinians put their cards on the table over the next three months, President Obama is subjecting that assumption to a stress test. If it fails, he'll be called on to play some new cards of his own."