Oxford Analytica: "both Shia's & Sunnis look back to Saddam's rule with ...nostalgia..."

Oxford Analytica: Excerpts: "Iraq's insurgents are demonstrating greater ability to coordinate attacks, a reflection of rising political tension and government mishandling of the security portfolio....  Security in 2010. In general terms, the effort to stabilise Iraq stagnated in the first nine months of 2010: In January, there were 618 reported security incidents and in September there were 527.... There have been important variations between different regions: violence has largely been sustained by steady increases in attacks in Baghdad and the old Ba'athist heartland between Ramadi, Tikrit and Baquba; with some exceptions outlined below, other areas continue to stabilise.  Political drivers. Three interlinked sets of political drivers have allowed insurgent groups to recover some capability in Baghdad and the areas around the capital: Discontent with governance. A June International Republican Institute poll of Iraqis found that 61% felt that Iraq was headed in the wrong direction...., leading many secular Iraqis and technocrats, both Sunni and Shia, to look nostalgically back on the early decades of Ba'athist rule, before wars, tribal influence and corruption took their toll. Stalled reconciliation. The demobilisation of Sons of Iraq militiamen and their subsequent inability to defend themselves from retribution is just one of many issues (including failed amnesties, ongoing de-Ba'athification initiatives and stalled constitutional reform) that have convinced the Sunni Arab community and former Ba'athists of all denominations that the Shia-led government is hostile to them. Careless policing of Sunni Arab areas in Baghdad by predominately Shia Iraqi Army units has contributed to unrest..... Renewed campaign. Insurgent groups in northern and central Iraq have been developing a narrative, organisational structure and operational plans configured to support a prolonged anti-government insurgency after US military withdrawal. The objective according to the Jaish Rajal al-Tariqah al-Naqshbandia (JRTN), the most significant Ba'athist-controlled insurgent movement, is to oppose the Shia-led government until it is replaced by a government drawing on Iraqis of all sects and backgrounds, including the technocratic and military class who ran the country during the Ba'athist era.  JRTN has emerged as a powerful coordinating force: It uses Ba'ath-era networks and significant financial holdings to encourage cooperation between insurgent cells, to commission paid-for attacks, and to incorporate al-Qaida-type cells as a subordinate element of the broader insurgent effort. The campaign launched by JRTN-aligned groups in 2010 has targeted Awakening Council leaders and Sons of Iraq militiamen from the Sunni community, plus Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Kurdish security forces and government workers.... Iranian-backed militancy. Reported violent incidents remain few in the nine predominately Shia southern provinces, with Basra witnessing an average of 15 reported incidents per month in 2010 and all other provinces suffering fewer than five attacks in most months. Nevertheless, Iranian-backed militant groups in these provinces are capable of some of the most advanced operations of any groups and could present a more significant threat under certain conditions. At present their attacks comprise roadside bomb attacks on US convoys and a steady sequence of rocket attacks on the International (Green) Zone, Basra Air Station and other bases with a US presence.  These groups are capable of surging attacks if they were ordered to do so by Iraqi political factions (such as Moqtada al-Sadr's movement) or by Iran. Warnings throughout the summer of 2010 have suggested that Iranian-backed groups may be seeking to gather new Western hostages to trade for arrested militants or to hold as bargaining chips to deter a US or Israeli attack on Iran...."