Saturday, November 6, 2010

'Neoconish' March14er: "Saudi teeterings..."

In the Weekly Standard:
"... Last week, the Saudi Abdullah extended a public invitation to Iraq’s president and all its parliamentary coalitions to come to Saudi Arabia in order to hold talks and reach an agreement over the formation of Iraq’s government. The timing of this surprising move suggests that Riyadh may have finally realized—perhaps with U.S. prodding—that its disastrous Iraq policy has hit a dead end.  The king’s offer comes as a response to perceived Iranian primacy in Baghdad, especially after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s recent visit there. The Saudis’ assessment of Iranian power in Baghdad is correct that the Obama administration has projected an unmistakable sense of indifference to Iraq that has allowed others to fill the vacuum. Blame this ugly state of affairs on the Iraq Study Group......
Under this new American dispensation, where Iraq’s neighbors are invited to have a say in Baghdad’s political wrangling, some regional states are doing well while others are flailing. Iran has plotted a realistic Iraq strategy that has taken full advantage of Washington’s flagging attention, while Saudi Arabia has failed to come to terms with the new Iraqi order and its balance of power. The Saudis are consumed by fear of Iranian expansion, and view the Iraqi Shiite political class as nothing but Iranian assets and facilitators of Iran’s influence over post-American Iraq. In particular, they have been unwilling to work with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki...... they sought to undermine him while backing former interim prime minister Ayad Allawi..., made common cause with the Syrians, whose ostensible support of Allawi gave Riyadh the belief that Damascus could be enlisted to help counterbalance Iranian influence in Iraq. This hope was misguided. Syria had no political leverage in Iraq aside from the terrorism it sponsored there, and which it used to try to extract concessions from both Washington and the Iraqi government. With the Obama administration focused on withdrawal, rather than protecting the American investment in Iraq, Syria embarked on a campaign of terror in late August 2009 that was aimed explicitly at destroying Maliki’s political fortunes. 
Riyadh’s decisions showed how badly they misread the political situation. Maliki, as the incumbent, was always the favorite to return to office, having had years to build up his power base through patronage and administrative appointments. The Syrians understood as much, which is why Damascus shifted its position in September and pulled the rug out from under Riyadh. Allawi, the Syrians concluded, could not be Iraq’s next premier, and the only real option was Maliki. The Saudis had always believed that Maliki was Iran’s primary choice for prime minister, but this was yet another inaccurate Saudi assessment. In fact, Maliki had irked the Iranians by refusing to join the broad Shiite umbrella coalition that included Iran’s closest allies. He had sought, moreover, to marginalize his opponents—and Iran’s friends—and had even moved militarily against Moktada al-Sadr, Iran’s most formidable asset in Iraq. By trying to undermine Maliki, the Saudis were doing Iran a favor. A weakened Maliki, the Iranians calculated, could not risk it on his own and would be forced to come back under their tent. 
In stark contrast to the Saudis, the Iranians have played their hand in Iraq pragmatically. They knew that none of their Shiite friends had a serious shot at challenging Maliki, so they figured that it was better to stick with him and find a way to plant Sadr in his cabinet. Iran sees Sadr as its long-term investment—head of a political and military movement similar to its Lebanese asset, Hezbollah—and with him in Maliki’s coalition, Tehran would have a seat in the cabinet. From that perch, the Iranians believe that they would be able to pressure the government on their key issues of concern, like security appointments and U.S. basing rights in Iraq.  Either the Obama administration did not appreciate the damage the Saudis were doing, or, even worse, were not able to lean on Riyadh to fall in line....."

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