Mubarak: 'Stability as a byproduct of supporting Netanyahu ...'

Oxford Analytica: Excerpts: 

"Anxiety is increasing: Hosni Mubarak will probably run again in the 2011 presidential elections, unless ... Egypt will find its mediating role at risk if the Middle East peace process collapses, in which case its relationship with Hamas-controlled Gaza could worsen, with domestic repercussions. Sudan's potential partition will be a major foreign policy concern for Cairo ...few regime figures have advocated for his son Gamal, most, especially in the old guard, remain vocally committed to Mubarak's candidacy. This serves the purpose of both reaffirming to Mubarak that he is indispensable, and postponing any succession struggle... Egypt's strongly presidential political system has become increasingly fragmented as Mubarak's health has worsened ... Security and foreign policy remains largely in the hands of Chief of Intelligence Omar Suleiman.... The armed forces remain officially aloof from such debates, but have a fundamental interest in political stability and good relations with the United States, Egypt's main arms provider. All of these factions tend to favour consensus and the status quo,....  In terms of competition over the presidency, the main publicly discussed candidates remain Gamal and Suleiman, who were the subject of competing poster campaigns this summer.  Parliamentary elections on November 28 should return a considerably different parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) hold is expected to fall from 88 seats to possibly as low as 20-30....   The newer groups calling for democratic change, including El Baradei's movement, remain highly visible in the media but lack organisation and clear leadership....  

Foreign policy. The basic foreign policy orientation of Egypt is unlikely to be affected by domestic politics, including, at least initially, a new president: 

1.        Israel and the Palestinians. With the Middle East peace process foundering, Egypt will be concerned to keep the status quo on its border with Gaza, which has been mostly closed since 2006. The relief of the Israeli blockade of Gaza following international pressure after the Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla in May eased pressure on Egypt to open its own border. A collapse in the peace process could threaten the status quo, which Egypt -- though dissatisfied with the Netanyahu government's settlement policy -- has little choice but to back.  Egypt's relationship with Hamas will remain highly influenced by regional developments, and a potential source of both domestic mobilisation among the MB and other pro-Palestinian groups and condemnation in the pro-Hamas Arab media. However, any risk of major demonstrations will likely be controlled. 

2.        Sudan. A more urgent issue in early 2011 will be Southern Sudan's referendum on self-determination. Egypt has given confused statements over its desires for Sudan, although its interests lie in both preventing a renewal of civil war which would send thousands of refugees to its borders, and ensuring continuation of its current agreement with Sudan on its Nile quotas.  Cairo has appeared to favour a solution within unity; nonetheless, it is preparing for the possibility of a new state along the Nile and working to ensure, in that event, both a continuation of its quotas and support for its position in negotiations among riverine states to renegotiate these quotas. It has expanded its activities in Juba, Southern Sudan's capital, opened a direct flight from Cairo and invested millions of dollars in aid to secure the potential new state's goodwill..."