Saturday, November 20, 2010

Iran & the US work together to stabilize Iraq

"....It is almost impossible to be certain about who won and who lost in a pantomime. The Americans, prima facie, “lost” and yet, as the witches in Macbeth would say, they may have “won” as well. So has Iran....
What has emerged is that there is probably some degree of U.S.-Iranian convergence. The deal in Iraq leaves one guessing all over again about the backchannel contact between the two implacable adversaries that never quite stops working. We know for sure that the backchannel has been working steadily on Afghanistan in the recent period. All the same, it is hard to tell whether it was a mere coincidence that, in a dramatic turnaround on November 3, the U.S. State Department designated the Jundullah as a terrorist organisation.... You change, and we shall change as well.” Is the Obama administration finally changing course and addressing the mother of all “injustices” that Tehran alleges successive U.S. administrations have perpetrated on Iran through the past three decades — the covert policy to seek a “regime change?”
Of course, Tehran will wield influence over the new government in Baghdad so as to ensure that Iranian interests are not jeopardised. But it knows well enough that Mr. Maliki is first and foremost an Iraqi nationalist — so is Mr. Sadr — who is a master-tactician in balancing competing interest groups and superb practitioner of the politics of expediency. Mr. Maliki all along kept lines open to Tehran and Washington, besides having his own regional connections, as is apparent from his success in winning over Syria (which, along with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, has been supportive of Mr. Allawi) to his side. In sum, Tehran is accepting a power structure in Baghdad that is dominated by Shi'ite groups but accommodates Sunni groups and possibly at some stage Baathist elements as well. Iran's main consideration is that Iraq should remain stable and friendly....
To be sure, Mr. Obama's pragmatism in hailing a political dispensation in Iraq comprising stakeholders ranging from Arab nationalists, pro-Iranian Shi'ites and radical anti-American Islamists to U.S.-backed moderates (and possibly erstwhile Baathists) is noteworthy. How long can Mr. Obama shy away from showing statesmanship to the Hamas in Palestine and the Hezbollah in Lebanon — groups that have, like the Sadrists in Iraq, demonstrated their support via the ballot box? More important, is there scope for extending similar “pragmatism” to the Afghan conflict?
Although no two conflicts can be analogous, the contours of an Afghan settlement can be discerned from what has been happening in Iraq...., Afghanistan faces nothing like Kurdish separatism or Shi'ite-Sunni schism or the legacy of brutal authoritarianism. Yet, the big difference is that the Pakistani military leadership is yet to show the wisdom and cosmopolitanism of the Persian mind. It remains rooted in the tribal instincts of a zero-sum game. It continues to waffle on the core issue of Afghanistan's stability and takes recourse to detours — ‘The road to Kabul runs through Kashmir,' etc...."

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