THIS is BIG: "Wissam Hassan & Hezbollah in cahoots? '"...

... dissecting a circus of a  'tribunal.......The CBC report shows nothing new EXCEPT that wissam al hassan was/is a suspect (that's huge) and sheds some light over Hariri-Inc. Infighting ..
"...Hariri is due to head a large delegation in his two-day visit to Iran. Iran, along with Syria, provides Hezbollah with finances, weaponry and training...."' 

"... The big break came when the blue network was closed down and the phones were collected by a minor electronics specialist who worked for Hezbollah, Abd al Majid al Ghamloush.

Ghamloush was, in the words of one former UN investigator, "an idiot."

Given the job of collecting and disposing of the blue phones, he noticed some still had time remaining on them and used one to call his girlfriend, Sawan, in the process basically identifying himself to Capt. Eid. He might as well have written his name on a whiteboard and held it up outside ISF headquarters.

Ghamloush's stupidity eventually led Eid to a pair of brothers named Hussein and Mouin Khreis, both Hezbollah operatives. One of them had actually been at the site of the blast.

Capt. Eid kept going, identifying more and more phones directly or indirectly associated with the hit team. He found the core of a third network, a longer-term surveillance team that would eventually be dubbed the "yellows."

Eid's work would also lead to another discovery: Everything connected, however elliptically, to land lines inside Hezbollah's Great Prophet Hospital in South Beirut, a sector of the city entirely controlled by the Party of God.

Lebanese officials inspect the aftermath of an attempt on the life of Lt.-Col. Samer Shedaheh, Eid's boss at the ISF. Shedaheh survived the car bomb attack, near Sidon, in September 2006 and was sent to Canada for treatment and resettlement. (Kamel Jabe/Reuters) It has long been said that the fundamentalist fighters operate a command centre in the hospital...

CBC has obtained a copy of this record provided to the commission. On it, someone has highlighted four entries in a long column of six-digit numbers. Beside the highlighted numbers, in Arabic, was the word "Hezbollah."

Hezbollah has several seats in the Lebanese legislature and at the time had been part of a governing coalition, hence the government-issued phones.

Finally, Eid was handed a clue from the best source possible: He was contacted by Hezbollah itself and told that some of the phones he was chasing were being used by Hezbollah agents conducting a counter-espionage operation against Israel's Mossad spy agency and that he needed to back off.

The warning could not have been more clear.

As though to underscore it, Eid's boss, Lt.-Col. Shehadeh, was targeted by bombers in September 2006. The blast killed four of his bodyguards and nearly killed Shehadeh, who was sent to Quebec for medical treatment and resettlement. By that time, Capt. Eid had sent his report to the UN inquiry and moved on to another operation. The Eid report was entered into the UN's database by someone who either didn't understand it or didn't care enough to bring it forward. It disappeared...

But Hassan's phone records told another story entirely.

In fact, it was Col. Hassan who called the professor, not the other way around. And Hassan placed the call half an hour after he had met Hariri earlier in the evening.

UN investigators prepared a report on Col. Hassan in late 2008 that challenged his alibi and recommended that he be brought in for detailed questioning. (Report on Wissam Hassan opens here.)

The cell towers around Hassan's home also showed that the next day Col. Hassan spent the hours before Hariri's assassination, the time he was supposedly studying, on the phone. He made 24 calls, an average of one every nine minutes. What was also disturbing the UN investigators was that high security officials in Lebanon don't normally sit for exams.

"His alibi is weak and inconsistent," says a confidential UN report that labels Hassan a "possible suspect in the Hariri murder."

That report, obtained by CBC News, was prepared in late 2008 for Garry Loeppky, a former senior RCMP official who had taken over as the UN's chief investigator that summer. Hassan's alibi, said the document, "does not appear to have been independently verified." That hadn't been for lack of desire on the part of UN investigators. They'd wanted to check out Hassan's alibi, to "get in his face," in the words of one former detective, and pick apart his story.

At the very least, they wanted to contact Rabih, the professor.

But Brammertz, the second UN commissioner, flatly ruled that out. He considered Hassan too valuable a contact and any such investigation as too disruptive.

The confidential report concedes that investigating Hassan could have its drawbacks: "It may damage the commission's relations with the ISF, and if he was somehow involved in the Hariri murder, the network might resolve to eliminate him."... former U.S. officials, some of whom were in the Oval Office when then president George W. Bush vented his frustration with the commission's apparent incompetence, maintain that Hassan is in fact a bitter enemy of Hezbollah, and casting suspicion on him merely plays into the group's hands.

That this particular UN memo about Hassan was ever written, says one former American security official, is evidence that the commission hadn't the slightest idea what it was doing.

Several former UN investigators, though, are unanimous. They believe Hezbollah infiltrated the commission and used Hassan in the process. "He lied to us on the alibi," says one. "He should have died in the convoy. That's the question mark."..."