Israeli 'concessions'?

Oxford Analytica, excerpts:

"... The most important lesson that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu took from his 1996-99 term in office is that the greatest threat to his rule comes not from the left, but from the ultra-nationalist, ideological purists in his own camp. Their defection led to the fall of his last government.

Hence almost all his domestic political efforts have been directed at keeping his government stable, and maintaining the support of ultra-nationalists amid US pressure to give concessions to the Palestinians....

However, while his government currently is very stable, a series of events taking place within the various political parties is threatening to undermine the coalition's foundations.

Yisrael Beiteinu. With 15 seats in the House, this party is the third largest in the Knesset. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, its undisputed leader, is awaiting a decision on whether he should be indicted for corruption and graft. Meanwhile, he is trying to position himself as political leader of the ultra-nationalists:

Lieberman primarily targets immigrants from the former Soviet Union who came to Israel after 1990, and people born close to the start of the first Intifada in 1987. Neither group experienced the direct, personal contact with the Palestinians common to most Israelis before 1987, but they experienced the violence accompanying both Intifadas.

Lieberman is willing to voice feelings that many Israelis have, but fear to articulate to avoid international repercussions. His populism was demonstrated in his declaration on October 10 that the Europeans should resolve Europe's problems before interfering in Middle Eastern issues.

According to his aides, he believes that he will be able to attract as many as ten Likud Knesset members to his side if Netanyahu makes what ultra-nationalists believe are profligate concessions to the Palestinians.

Lieberman's speech to the UN last month, during which he laid out his party's platform rather than the Israeli government's official position, was in effect the first shot in the next general election campaign. The party's platform, including proposals that any peace agreement should include both a population and land exchange, is diametrically opposed to the official government position.

Under any other circumstances, Lieberman would have been fired, not only for the speech itself, but for not informing the prime minister of its contents beforehand. However, Netanyahu was reluctant to deliver even a small verbal hand-slap for fear of subsequent dependence on the Labour Party.

Labour. The party is bankrupt and in disarray. Its membership rolls have plummeted and it needs its government presence, and ministerial budgets, to pay many of the party's public relations expenses -- especially since its Knesset representation (and thus public funding) has fallen. When Ehud Barak took over as party leader for the second time in 2007, it held 19 Knesset seats. In 2009 elections, it fell to fourth place with 13 seats. Polls predict a collapse in support to 6-9 seats if elections were held now.

Following the 2009 elections, the Knesset caucus split into two factions: those seeking Barak's ouster and those wanting to enter the government. Barak's camp managed to win that battle, but his position has recently been weakened:

The party ostensibly joined the government to promote the peace process. Thus, Netanyahu's recent attempts to counter Lieberman's play to the ultra-nationalists, especially the hard line on not renewing the settlement freeze, has left Barak without political cover.

The party, under his leadership, has also failed to come up with a popular or even coherent policy platform. Barak's internal critics charge that he does not care about the party and treats it merely as a platform to enable him to continue as defence minister....

Kadima. The largest party in the Knesset is in a quandary:

Its leadership mostly consists of right-of-centre former Likud members.

However, most supporters are former, disgruntled Labourites and liberal independents.

Therefore it too has been unable to come up with a common and coherent policy platform.

However, if it is able to find a popular cause, Kadima could become a direct threat to Netanyahu.

Party leader Tzipi Livni has been able to fend off consistent leadership challenges from former Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz. She has also managed to derail a concerted effort by Netanyahu to woo back former Likud Knesset members. However, to date, she has proven colourless and ineffective as an opposition leader.

Although consistently courted to join the government, Livni has resisted these pressures, primarily because she fears that Netanyahu would simply use Kadima's involvement as evidence of a peace agenda, even if his actual policies do not promote this. She also knows that no Israeli leader has ever defeated a sitting prime minister after serving in that prime minister's cabinet. While Mofaz and others support joining the government, Livni is adamantly against this.

Shas. An ultra-Orthodox party with eleven Knesset seats, Shas is the most stalwart member of the coalition because it has been bought off by Netanyahu. Among other things, it has received considerable public funding for its religious institutions.

However, its problems are twofold:

There is no accepted successor to its founding religious leader, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, who is over 90. The party is in danger of breaking into as many as ten competing factions when Yosef dies....

Likud. Netanyahu's own party is also becoming more divided. This is not only between extreme ultra-nationalists and moderates, but increasingly, between old-time adherents to the liberal philosophy of the movement's founding father, Zeev Jabotinsky, and a growing bloc of younger, right-wing, populist opportunists.

CONCLUSION: In the context of both intra-government and intra-party divisions across the political spectrum, most of the positions Netanyahu will adopt in the near future will be directed less at responding to foreign pressures and more at manoeuvring among changing domestic political currents. Unless he can secure Palestinian concessions that he can sell to the Israeli public as a major softening in the Palestinians' position, the concessions he will offer, even if talks are renewed, will be tactical and technical, rather than substantive...."