Monday, October 4, 2010

"..I can’t imagine any use for these kids except in an internal street clash .."

Elias Muhanna interviews the author of 'A privilege to die', Thanassis Cambanis.
"... QN: What do you believe the party will do in the event that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon indicts some of its members for the assassination of ex-PM Rafiq al-Hariri?
TC: They’re already preparing a maximalist response. One scenario (which you’ve discussed) is that Hezbollah could choose to distance itself from indicted party members, calling them loose canons. But Hezbollah appears uninterested in such an outcome. Instead, it seems, it will deny the Tribunal’s legitimacy and jurisdiction. The entire Hezbollah presentation about Israel was largely intended for its own supporters, to build the case for later refusing to hand over any indicted party members.
On my most recent visit to Lebanon in September, I saw that Hezbollah had recruited a lot of rough shabab in Haret Hreik. My Hezbollah-supporting sources there (including some party members) found these new members disquieting and even alarming; they lack Hezbollah’s potential discipline. As one Hezbollah member told me, “I can’t imagine any use for these kids except in an internal street clash.”

QN: Who listents to Hebollah outside Lebanon?

TC: In Gaza, the deputy foreign minister Ahmed Yousef spoke to me at length about the lessons he’s learned from Hezbollah as an organization and Nasrallah as a leader. He’d like to build a Hamas television and radio network modeled after Al Manar and An Nour. He’d also like to build a diplomatic corps modeled on Hezbollah’s office of international relations.
Further afield, Hezbollah is trying to sell the idea that war is the answer, that Islam can guide all elements in one’s life from politics and parenting to war and education. The party is trying to bridge a lot of divides — between Muslim and non-Muslim Arabs; between Arabs and Persians; between Sunni and Shia. They’re trying to deepen Islam among their constituents while simultaneously appealing to non-believers who like Hezbollah’s anti-Israeli resistance. It’s not a balance that can survive forever.
Game-changers might include a Syrian peace deal with Israel; a change in Iranian regime; changes in Israeli strategy; and possibly, but less likely, a wholesale loss in credibility if Hezbollah clashes too much with its Lebanese rivals or falls prey to run-of-the-mill nepotism, za`im-ism (is that a word?), or corruption...."

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