Iran's growing reach in Central Asia

"...In the past 15 years, however, Tehran has been particularly active in trying to create a deep net of institutional and economic links in the region, in part to counter the increasing reach of Turkey, perceived as an American proxy, and of Pakistan, historically an enemy of Iran. Such an approach has been characterized by the "pragmatism" typical of Iran's post-revolutionary leadership. Eschewing the idea of exporting revolution, Iran has instead tried to improve ties with all the countries of the region, focusing on those with which it shares cultural and historical links. This explains the strong attention paid by Tehran to Tajikistan and

Afghanistan, which represent cornerstones of the Iranian strategy in the region. At the same time, a clear example of Iran's pragmatism is the close relationship it has forged with Armenia, cemented by the common interest of containing Azerbaijan.

Iran's ultimate goal is to become a technological and economic power in the region, and to this end, Tehran is supplementing its cultural and historical links with a more resolute economic presence, including investments in massive infrastructure projects. These include the Anzab tunnel in Tajikistan, built by an Iranian company and financed in part by Tehran, as well as railroad and highway construciton in western Afghanistan. Central Asia and Afghanistan have also become prime targets for Iran's increasingly refined use of soft power. Scholarships for students from the Muslim world, economic aid -- Iran is a leading donor to Afghanistan -- and support for economic and cultural projects are all elements of a renewed public diplomacy that now plays an important role in Iran's foreign policy.

One of the main geopolitical paradoxes of the past decade has been the outcomes of the American-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where in spite of the longstanding hostility between Washington and Tehran, Iran has emerged as the main beneficiary. With regard to Afghanistan, Iran has historically been the main supporter of the country's Shiite groups, perceiving the Taliban as an existential threat. So avoiding a Taliban return to power represents one of Tehran's key interests in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, Tehran faces a strategic dilemma. On one hand, Iran is clearly interested in a stable Afghanistan: Iran and Afghanistan are linked by a "strategic geography," and problems due to instability in one country can easily affect its neighbor. For example, Iran is already deeply concerned about drug trafficking, refugee flows and crime along its borders with Afghanistan. Only a stable government in Kabul can reduce such threats.

On the other hand, Tehran perceives the longstanding presence of American troops at its borders as a strategic threat. Moreover, the ability to undermine American interests in Afghanistan can provide Tehran with leverage over Washington on other issues, such as the confrontation over its nuclear program. As a result, Tehran could potentially see an interest in destabilizing Afghanistan in order to affect the American military effort there.

This same unresolved ambiguity in Tehran's approach can also be seen, if to a lesser extent, in Iran's relationships with Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing have been Tehran's main supporters at the U.N. Security Council in countering U.S. efforts to impose stiffened sanctions over its nuclear program. However, both still view Iran with suspicion....

In short, rivalries and diverging interests on other issues are preventing Iran from working with the three main global players involved in the region -- the U.S., China and Russia -- toward the stabilization of Afghanistan, one of the few global geopolitical goals they all share..."