"... * The IDF would be occupying some, perhaps substantial, parts of Lebanon and potentially all of Gaza.
* Wherever the course and outcome of the war went badly—defeats, significant civilian casualties, widespread destruction—there would be political crises.
* Several immediate requirements would emerge: dealing with dislocated civilians, rebuilding and resupplying military forces, and repairing damaged infrastructure.
This situation would require a great deal of time and serious political and economic investments before it could stabilize.
In the long term, the sort of war outlined here could reshape the region’s political and military environment. It would certainly be Israel’s most serious war since 1973, and one that the IDF would have to win. Given the likely political, military, and economic costs, Israel would face serious consequences if it failed to demonstrably achieve its core objectives.
In contrast, if Israel acted decisively, were willing to pay the costs in casualties and damage, and enjoyed military success, then a new war could substantially weaken its opponents in the following ways:
* Hizballah would be broken as a military factor in Lebanon and weakened politically.
* The Syrian regime would be weakened by military defeat and the loss of important military and security assets.
* Iran’s activities in the region would be circumscribed by the defeat of its allies; and if Tehran failed to aid them during the conflict, it would lose influence as well.
* Hamas would lose its military power in Gaza and at least some of its political power.
Washington should be taking its own preparatory steps for potential war by developing concrete plans for action, both in advance of such a conflict and if hostilities occur. If war comes, the United States should not necessarily take immediate steps toward ending it quickly. Several important objectives would be at stake in such a scenario: breaking Hizballah’s military capabilities and reducing its political power; disabusing Syria of the notion that it can act in Lebanon to further its own interests without significant cost; and removing the potent Hizballah proxy from Iran’s foreign policy arsenal. Only successful IDF operations can achieve those goals. Accordingly, the United States should consider giving the IDF both the time and the political space it needs to carry out those objectives. Washington should also be prepared for associated Iranian troublemaking in the Persian Gulf. The United States must demonstrate that it will use force if necessary, thwarting any attempt by Tehran to take advantage of the situation created by a Lebanon war..."
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