Hariri's ambiguity ... & the cost of Sunni & 'Western' support

OxfAn: Excerpts: ".... Hizbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah confirmed rumours that the STL is expected to indict his party, accusing the STL of working at the behest of Israel. This unprecedented attack on the STL prompted renewed commitment by Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri to the tribunal. Although Nasrallah last month claimed that Hariri had assured him that any Hizbollah members accused would be regarded as undisciplined elements of the party, officials close to Hariri have denied this. It may have been one of a number of deals Hariri was considering to persuade Hizbollah to accept the court's decision, but which Hizbollah declined.... Hizbollah's position. Nasrallah's media appearances set the stage for a new political controversy regarding the STL. Following his lead, the March 8 coalition is waging a campaign against the international tribunal, demanding its abrogation. Hizbollah's strategy is designed to send a signal to the STL and its Western backers either to delay any announcement or dismantle the tribunal altogether. Nasrallah accused the STL of basing its conclusions on fabricated evidence and false witnesses, linking the Israeli spies with the evidence gathered. He accused Israel of Hariri's assassination, claiming to have evidence which he will soon make public.... Hariri's position. Hariri has taken an ambiguous stance, reasserting his commitment to the STL while claiming that the tribunal will not be a cause for a renewed civil strife. He is aware that his government depends on the underlying political consensus, and that Hizbollah has the means to bring it down. More widely, he knows that an indictment of Hizbollah could destroy the precarious social stability between Sunnis and Shia that has endured since 2008. Nevertheless, rejecting the tribunal would be a politically costly move that would weaken Hariri vis-a-vis his domestic opponents and with respect to his Sunni constituency. It would also lead to isolation from his Western backers. He has so far adopted a strategy of buying time, trying to juggle two seemingly opposite positions. He is most likely waiting for the STL's announcement before attempting to renegotiate with Hizbollah from a stronger position, while hoping for a regional agreement on the tribunal which might moderate Hizbollah's response. Regional context. The July 30 meeting was a sign of deepening Saudi-Syrian rapprochement regarding Lebanon, and of the two countries' role in providing a 'regional cover' for the domestic situation. Essentially, Assad and Abdallah adopted a 'wait and see' position. The issue of the STL was not included in the public statement following their meeting, indicating that no common position had yet been reached on how to deal with the impact of a Hizbollah indictment. Syria-Hizbollah relations. Media reports have highlighted a possible cooling between Syria and Hizbollah, based on diverging interests. .......However, there are no concrete signs of such a distancing yet. It is possible that Syria and Hizbollah are intentionally pursuing different strategies, in part since the former is subject to significant international pressure. Outlook. The STL may issue its indictment in September. Once this happens, ...Hizbollah will probably demand an official stance from the Lebanese government regarding the indictment, which has the potential to trigger a crisis leading to the breakdown of the government........ On the other hand, a possible Syrian-Saudi deal on the STL, which would indicate a much broader agreement on regional issues, could provide a regional response to deal with the impact of the STL. This might force Hizbollah to accept some of the STL's conclusions (NOT HAPPENING!) and provide a regional guarantee for domestic stability in Lebanon. However, there are no signs so far that such a deal is close...."