OXFAN: Israel lobby is Erdogan's 'Damocles' sword'...

OxFan: Excerpts:

".... Turkey has long feared that Washington would allow Israel to launch a strike against Iran's nuclear installations. Given the destabilising effect of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and more recently of the Iraq war, Turkey has a genuine interest in preventing a new armed conflict in the Middle East.

Turkey's shift away from an earlier policy of keeping out of Middle East conflicts, while generally supporting US policies and maintaining a discreet working relationship with Israel, was prompted in large part by declining practicability. It was considered no longer adequate to safeguard Turkey's growing economic interests in the region:

• Iraq. A new policy began with the Turkish parliament's decision not to authorise the transiting of US troops through Turkey during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
• Israel. Tension with Israel started with the Israeli Gaza offensive in December 2008; and this part of the policy shift also has personal emotional dimensions. Turkey was at the time trying to facilitate negotiations between Syria and Israel, and was outraged that it had not been informed beforehand.
• Iran. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan next attempted to prevent new UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. With Brazil, it negotiated with Tehran a variant of a former UN-proposed deal to exchange low-enriched uranium for high-enriched medical fuel rods. The May 17 Tehran declaration was not welcome in Washington since it did not remove all Iranian stocks of enriched uranium, nor stop the enrichment process. The Israel lobby, in particular, was vocal in condemning what it called Turkey's spoiling tactics.

Flotilla raid. In line with its continuing efforts to cure the rift between two allies, Washington contacted both Israel and Turkey to prevent a clash over the well-publicised decision of the Turkish Islamic relief organisation, IHH, to ship supplies to Gaza in defiance of the Israeli blockade. Prompted by Washington, Ankara made sure that no MPs of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) joined the flotilla, and that all passengers were scanned for weapons before leaving port. Erdogan was infuriated when his precautions did not prevent bloodshed, and a botched Israeli raid on May 31 saw nine Turkish civilians killed :

• Turkey insisted that Israel should apologise, accept an international inquiry and lift the blockade.
• Ankara secured an immediate UN resolution criticising the violence -- although avoiding exclusive blame on Israel at Washington's insistence.
• Erdogan tried to mobilise international support for sanctions against Israel. At the fourth Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, Turkey elicited widespread support for its condemnation of Israel -- but the veto exercised by the Israeli representative prevented mention of this in the final communique.

Response. Erdogan's failure to block sanctions against Iran or secure sanctions against Israel will affect both his domestic and international standing. He had hoped that international punitive action against Israel would make it unnecessary for Turkey to act unilaterally. However, in the absence of this, unilateral policy may be difficult to enact:

1. AKP indecision. There are signs of confusion and indecision in AKP ranks on the best way to obtain a satisfactory response from Israel. Turkey recalled its ambassador, but has not expelled the Israeli ambassador, let alone broken off diplomatic relations. It has cancelled joint military exercises with Israel. However, the threat by Deputy Prime Minister Omer Celik to review military cooperation prompted a statement from the Foreign Ministry that no such proposal had been drawn up. Turkey's trade with Israel amounts to some 2.5 billion dollars or 1% of the country's total foreign trade, mostly made up of the purchase of Israeli-made Heron drones, avionics for military aircraft and tank equipment. The military have indicated that these programmes remain operative.

2. Mixed support. .... Erdogan could lose the support of his more modern and moderate backers if he were to translate his anti-Israel rhetoric into action.

3. Opposition. The opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), under its newly elected leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has abandoned its discreet silence and has criticised Erdogan for the failure of his policy towards Israel, which follows the failure of the earlier attempt to mend relations with Armenia. It has criticised Erdogan's issuing of empty threats in order to divert attention from economic problems at home.

The most likely outcome is the continuation of current exchanges with Israel, but the emergence of discrimination against Israel in government contracts and official business, with Turkey beginning to look elsewhere for future requirements. Joint military exercises will likely cease. There will be continuing pro-Palestinian rhetoric, but limited real action on behalf of the Palestinians -- in part to avoid angering economic partners in Saudi Arabia and Egypt by seeming to usurp their positions as champions of the Palestinian people.

Outlook. Erdogan's regional activism does not envisage a break with the West, or the institution of Turkish regional paramountcy in conjunction with Iran. Its aims are much more modest: to make sure that Turkey's regional interests do not go by default in the diplomatic manoeuvrings of Washington, Israel and Europe.

Success in securing for Turkey an effective voice internationally would have strengthened Erdogan's domestic position, which is weakening after eight years in power. Failure will weaken it. This is why Erdogan has sent Celik at the head of a delegation to explain his policy to Washington, and prepare the ground for contacts with US President Barack Obama in the framework of the G20 summit. However, facing intense criticism from the opposition at home and the Israel lobby abroad, he will find it hard to retrieve his position on the eve of major domestic tests...."