"... Domestic & regional attention may turn to Mubarak as the 'weakest link' in the Gaza blockade's chain"

OxFan: Excerpts:

Motives. These arguments have convinced few, particularly Egyptians angered at the de facto participation in the blockade. The real reasons lie elsewhere: 1. US relations. Egypt has been under mounting pressure from Israel and, in particular, the US Congress to do more to control the flow of weapons across Sinai to Gaza. Between 2006 and 2009, Congress repeatedly condemned Egyptian inaction and tried to reduce US aid to the country, for the first time making some military aid conditional on progress on this issue in 2007. In late 2009, with reported -- but denied -- US military help, Egypt began building a reinforced metal wall at the border and took action against smugglers. As part of a reset in US-Egypt relations, bilateral tensions and Congressional pressure eased. 2. Hamas tension. Egypt has its own concerns with Hamas, which it perceives as having created an 'Islamic emirate' on its borders, contributing to the radicalisation of the region. It sees it as part of a 'resistance front' including Iran, Syria, Qatar and Hizbollah, which has taken an overtly anti-Egyptian stance in recent years. Hamas' historic relationship with Egypt's opposition Muslim Brotherhood is another source of friction. 3. Security. Cairo fears contagion from a chaotic Gaza, and blames a series of bombings in Sinai between 2004 and 2006 on terrorists who may have received bomb-making training from radical groups in Gaza (although probably not Hamas, which has reined in such groups). That weapons may be smuggled across Sinai is a problem not only for its US and Israeli relations, but also a domestic security concern. The discovery of large weapons caches in Sinai during the last two years has raised concerns about the availability of such weapons within Egyptian territory. 4. Negotiating tool. In its role as the negotiator designated by the Middle East Quartet to achieve Palestinian reconciliation, as well as a permanent ceasefire and prisoner exchange between Israel and Hamas, Egypt has made use of its control of Rafah to tighten or loosen restrictions on Hamas officials and on Gazans, as a pressure and negotiating tool (and to reduce the domestic popularity of Hamas). Arab leadership. Cairo's initial reaction to Israel's botched military raid on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla on May 31 was hesitation. It reiterated that opening the border would only be possible once Palestinian reconciliation takes place. However, once again, Turkey had demonstrated leadership and a willingness to confront Israel over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -- long a cause that Egypt had championed as a foreign policy tool: This role has been steadily eclipsed over the past decade, notably as the regime began to take more overtly pro-Israel positions and removed some of the obstacles it had put in place to greater normalisation of relations with Israel. ....a policy of putting 'Egypt first'. Yet, in boosting Turkey's image while exposing Egypt's seeming weakness, the flotilla incident reinforced the domestic perception that the ailing regime of President Hosni Mubarak -- already undermined by a wave of unrest as well as deep uncertainty over presidential succession -- has led the country to its decline..... Easing blockade? The international process begun at the UN, as well as growing recognition, including in Washington, that the Gaza blockade must at least be alleviated if not lifted altogether, may present more problems for Egypt soon: If moves by Israel to alleviate the blockade are deemed insufficient, there are likely to be growing calls across Egypt and the region to open Rafah fully. Although Cairo is currently unlikely to do this due to its own concerns about Hamas and to maintain good relations with Washington and Israel, pressure has noticeably mounted. Should Egypt be forced to lift the blockade, it risks not only empowering Hamas but also giving ammunition to Israel, which could wash its hands of Gaza and claim that Egypt is now responsible for the territory. Egypt has feared such a scenario, which has been advocated by some Israeli strategists. It would also be considered responsible by Israel for weapons smuggled into Gaza as well as any militants who cross into Israel from Sinai. If on the other hand Israel loosens (without lifting) its blockade, a return to the pre-existing situation seems likely (albeit with perhaps more people traffic at the border). Egypt will maintain its part of the blockage, claiming that the 2005 AMA must first be implemented..."