"... the value of sanctions is to slow Tehran down, not change its mind... With more time, the administration can evaluate its other options"

WPR/ here

".... Where does this process go from here?

It depends. If Iran moves quickly to begin addressing the technical details needed to implement the fuel swap deal, it may convince China and Russia that diplomatic efforts are finally beginning to bear fruit. They in turn might agree that the threat of sanctions is an important goad to the process, and so keep discussion of a new resolution alive -- but not move quickly enough to meet the demands of the U.S. political calendar on this issue.

On the other hand, if Iran delays or begins to raise a series of procedural issues, a new resolution could very well move ahead, as Russia has increasingly indicated that it expects some degree of flexibility from Tehran.....

As for China -- or India, for that matter -- they can both live with the requirements of the current draft, because it would not ban outright investment in Iran's energy sector. But Beijing's support might then be conditional on whether pending congressional legislation to impose third-party sanctions on countries investing and doing business in Iran contains the all-important executive waiver authority. That would give President Barack Obama the ability to prevent American sanctions from being imposed against Chinese businesses and financial entities by certifying that China is strictly enforcing existing U.N. sanctions.

But the Obama administration could run up against a growing domestic U.S. consensus that both a U.N. resolution and congressional legislation are needed -- that having one without the other is insufficient. Given also that Congress wants to eliminate executive waiver authority precisely to ensure that the president cannot gut the intent of the sanctions, the Obama administration may find its diplomatic efforts increasingly complicated.

All of this increases the likelihood that we end up with a situation where everyone makes minimal concessions, while no one is fully satisfied: Iran will keep the diplomatic process alive in a sufficient manner to allow China, Russia, Brazil and Turkey to argue that some progress is in fact being made. In turn, these countries may support a new sanctions resolution that is designed to put some degree of pressure on Iran, but which will not be the decisive tightening of the economic noose around Tehran's neck that Washington was hoping for.

It appears that the main emphasis of the draft U.N. resolution would be to target financial transactions if there is reason to suspect they might be aiding Iran's nuclear or missile programs. However, the draft resolution would also call for efforts to intercept the transport of any material that could be used as part of a nuclear weapons program (including delivery of missile components). This would not cause the Iranian government to cry "uncle" -- but it could be used to significantly hamper any rapid progress towards weapons development.

The problem arises once a U.N. resolution passes that fails Congress' standards for action. Then the congressional Iran sanctions bill will move out of reconciliation, with executive waiver authority either gutted completely or very tightly constrained, bringing the curtain down on this act of the Iran drama.

So, my advice for the Obama administration? Avoid the "either/or" dilemma. Encourage Brazil and Turkey to continue their diplomatic efforts, while framing the proposed deal as an important first step and stressing that "goodwill begets goodwill": If Iran agrees to the arrangement and does not attempt to sabotage it through procedural delays and administrative trickery, further diplomatic efforts are possible. Signal to the Russians and the Chinese, who have indicated that the draft resolution contains language both Beijing and Moscow can live with, that it is important to keep up the pressure on Tehran, and that the United States is not going to argue for the strictest possible version of sanctions language. And marshal every last bit of political capital needed to convince key members of Congress to prolong the reconciliation process, so that a unilateral third-party sanctions measure doesn't end up on his desk.

Obama needs more time. He cannot allow his self-imposed deadline for "solving" the Iran crisis to become a straightjacket. Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment has it right when he says, "In essence, the real value of sanctions is to slow Tehran down, not change its mind." With more time, the administration can begin to evaluate its other options.